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THE DEMISE OF THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI RULE:

A

CASE OF FAULTY RECEPTION
EUGENE CERRUTI*

INTRODUCTION

In Illinots v. Gates' the Supreme Court discarded a major fourth amendment doctrine of the Warren Court era. The Gates decision overruled the socalled Agui'lar-Spinelh"rule which governed the use of informers' tips to establish probable cause for a search and seizure. 2 The Agur/ar-Spinelh rule had
become one of the touchstone fourth amendment doctrines of the Warren
Court era. It had also been the basis for more appellate litigation 3 and more
controversy 4 than any other rule of fourth amendment law.
The Burger Court resorted to a drastic juridic device in overruling this
major and recent precedent and completely discarded the Warren Court approach to the confidential informant issue.5 The Burger Court majority had
never before gone so far as to overrule any of the major precedents of the
Warren Court. 6 Previously the Court had been satisfied to revise and restrict the earlier rulings. 7 Thus Gates represents a major breakthrough for
* Associate Professor, New York Law School; B.A. 1966 Harvard University; LL.B. 1970
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
2. This rule derives from the Warren Court decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Together the decisions required that
an informant's tip offered to establish probable cause for a search and seizure warrant satisfy a
two-part test of minimum reliability. Under this test, police must show (1) that the informant
himself had personal knowledge of the information conveyed to the police (the just or "basis of
knowledge" prong); and (2) that there was reason to credit the veracity of the informant who
would otherwise be presumed to be of insufficient reliability to support a finding of probable
cause (the second or "veracity" prong).
3. LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2 ("[N]o other fourth
amendment issue has received such constant and repeated attention from the appellate courts.")
This article has since been largely incorporated into the text of 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.3 (1978).
4. "The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with the informant cases in a consistent or clear fashion and, as a consequence a significant degree of ambiguity and outright conflict is to be found in the lower court decisions." I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 3.3 at 500 (1978). See also LaFave, Search and
Seizure.- "The Course of True Law... Has Not. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 255.
5. The issue is what guidelines, if any, must be followed by police to establish the reliability of an undisclosed confidential informant when the informant's tip is to be used to justify the
invasion of a suspect's fourth amendment rights.
6. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), is arguably a major overruling. However, the
holding was limited to the procedural issue of standing and the court itself described the result
as one limiting, rather than directly overruling, prior law.
7. A decision to overrule a constitutional precedent is extraordinary, even for the modern
Supreme Court. "For despite its widespread reputation as a Court most ready to 'disregard
precedent and overrule its own earlier decisions,' the Supreme Court in fact has directly overruled prior decisions on no more than a hundred occasions in over a century and a half of
judicial review. And only about half of these instances involved cases . . . in which the Court
was dealing with a constitutional question." J. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of
Overruhg, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 213-14 (footnotes omitted).
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8
the emerging conservative majority of the Burger Court.

This article explores the underlying doctrinal problems of the Agui/arSpineli rule. The argument presented here is that the technical failures of
the rule were the product of hasty and faulty design in the rulemaking process, not of any fault in fourth amendment policy or principle. The rule
needed to be reconstructed, not abandoned. In overruling the AguilarSpzneli rule, the court has effectively turned its back on the attempt to regulate one of the most controversial areas of search and seizure practice, without providing a reasonable alternative. It must be conceded at the outset,
however, that the conclusions drawn here with respect to the rule are undeniably harsh and therefore are in marked contrast to the leading scholarship
on the rule.9
The first section of the article analyzes the development of the AguilarSpineli doctrine. It traces the careless creation and reluctant evolution of
the rule during its nearly two decades of existence. The initial policy objective of the Warren Court majority which engendered the rule was to impose
some regulation on the increasingly controversial use by the police of criminal informants as investigative tools. The misuse of such confidential informers had become notorious, but there was no extant fourth amendment
handle with which courts could grasp the problem. The Warren Court majority never managed to develop a coherent set of policies and rules to resolve the overall dilemma of confidential informants in the criminal justice
system, but it did act in piecemeal fashion to fill the most troublesome voids
in this area of search and seizure law. It did so, in the Aguilar-Sptnelli rule, by
borrowing the already established hearsay rule from the law of evidence and
incorporating it into the developing law of probable cause review. It is the
premise of this article that the incorporation, or "reception," of the hearsay
rule was a failure. The hearsay format represented a structural defect in the
rule which surfaced repeatedly in the cases. Thus the continuous refinement
and adjustment of the rule which was attempted in the case law became
notorious for its technical avidity and failure. It became a situation of bad
law making bad cases, rather than the other way around.
The final section analyzes the broader, more fundamental problems of
fourth amendment jurisprudence which are exhibited in Gates. The argument presented is that the faulty reception of the hearsay format in the Agular-Spnelli rule is symptomatic of the accelerated, experimental and
nonsystematic development of constitutional criminal procedure laws during
the formative era of the 1960's. To undertake this argument, the section
relies upon the analytic format of "reception theory" as it has been developed in the comparative law literature. From this perspective, it is possible
to identify in a more general and profound manner the essential and irresolvable defects of the Aguidar-Spznelh rule. It will be demonstrated that the
8. See generally Fiss and Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March
10, 1982, at 14.
9. The two seminal articles on the rule are LaFave, supra note 4, and Moylan, Hearsay and
Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). The former is
more documentative and the latter more analytical, but both conclude that the rule is essentially sound and that its failings are attributable to faulty interpretation or application.
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objectives and conditions of the hearsay format were fundamentally incompatible with those of probable cause determination and review. Furthermore, this broader theoretical framework provides the basis for a series of
affirmative suggestions on how the rule might be reconstructed to fulfill the
original, and still valid, policy objectives of the rule. The ultimate conclusion of the article is therefore highly critical of the court's decision simply to
abandon rather than to reconstruct a troubled rule which is pivotal to the
development and efficacy of search and seizure law.
I.

AGUILAR-SPINELLI: THE HEARSAY RECEPTION

A dilemma existed for the reform-minded Warren Court with respect to
the widespread and rising use by law enforcement personnel of confidential
informants. The modern trend in law enforcement, reflective of the new
emphasis in penal policy on regulatory crimes at that time, was toward ever
greater use of, and reliance upon such informers. Yet, at the same time,
there was a growing recognition that such informers presented a unique and
growing threat to the integrity of the criminal justice system. The Warren
Court's initial response to this dilemma was the Aguilar-Sptnelh rule. Essentially it was a fourth amendment rule of probable cause determination
which incorporated a hearsay test' 0 for those situations where probable
cause was based upon the declarations of a confidential informer. This hearsay test was contrary to firmly estblished Supreme Court precedent which
was never adequately acknowledged or reconciled by the Warren Court.
The incorporation of the hearsay test was fundamentally inappropriate to
the structural setting of probable cause determinations. Therefore Agul'arSpinelh became a formative rule of first impression whose technical failings
have been profound and persistent.
A.

The Informant Dilemma

The use of private informers'" as agents of the police has always been a
difficult problem. Warnings regarding the unrestrained use of informers
have abounded since earliest times. 12 In more contemporary times the informant remains "generally regarded with aversion and nauseous disdain."' 3
Perhaps the ultimate irony of the informant dilemma is that nowhere is the
informant despised more than within the very body that promotes his exist14
ence: the police department.
10. E.g., a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
11. The term "informer" should be clarified. The term may be used to cover a variety of
types of suppliers of information. See generally DonnellyJudczal Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1092 (1951) (classification of "informer" into
four separate types). As used here, the term is meant to convey a lay person who provides law
enforcement with information in order to gain or benefit.
12. The Bible contains its own warning: ". . . meddle not with him that revealeth secrets,
and walketh deceitfully, and openeth wide his lips." Proverbs 20:19.
13. Donnelly, supra note I1,at 1093.
14. The fraternal code of silence within most police departments, and the outrage typically
inspired by the department's use of internal informants, is mute testimony that no amount of
professional rationalization or experience can overcome the deep-rooted mistrust and animosity
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It comes then as no surprise that when the courts began to overturn the
rocks of our criminal procedure landscape, they quickly encountered, and
recoiled at, this ageless nemesis. Justice Douglas sounded an early alarm in
one of his recurring dissents from the Supreme Court's generally conciliatory
approach to the informer in law enforcement: "[t]his is an age where faceless
informers have been reintroduced into our society in alarming ways."1 5 And
a far more poignant and provocative plea for reconsideration was only recently issued by Chief Judge Weinstein of the federal district court in New
York who was prompted by a case tried before him to ruminate on the legal
and ethical ambiguities of our widespread, and increasing, reliance upon
confidential informers:
a large part of our antidrug and antigun enforcement activities are based on purchases by government law enforcement agencies. In a sense the government is, together with its host of criminal
informers, the single largest entity engaged in such criminal activities. . . . Such methods evoke the dark and gloomy realization
that in a sense we, the judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys,
have all been co-opted into the criminal system. 16
Although never quite welcome, the police informant has nonetheless always been given consideration in our laws. The history of such recognition is
typically traced to the medieval practice of "approvement."' 17 This system
provided that once convicted of a crime, you could elect to inform, or "approve," on others. If they were found guilty, you were set free; if not, you
were hanged. As crude as this practice appears, it has not really been altered. It is still essentially a bounty system. For today we continue to provide official encouragement and reward for the informant in a variety of
ways. Congress has appropriated funds for the informant industry.' 8 Various statutes provide financial rewards for tips on specified criminal activities.' 9 Government records pertaining to the use of confidential informants
are exempted from the Freedom of Information Act. 20 Although informants
perform their works for a variety of motives2 ' and rewards, the principal
currency of the information market remains the time-honored deal with law
enforcement. "A major motive-most investigators believe the major motive-of an informant is to obtain leniency on a criminal charge in exchange
for information about accomplices involved in that charge or persons involved in other criminal offenses." ' 22 Most informants today are moved by
reserved for informants. Indeed, it would appear that those who know best the informant business loathe and fear it the most. See, M. HARNEY AND J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1968).
15. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Weinstein, The Informer: Hero or Viloan?-Ethzcal and Legal Problems, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8,
1982, at 1, col. 2.
17. See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 324.

18. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1982).
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3059 (1982).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982). See generally, Dennett, Protecttng the FBI's Informants, 19
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (1982).
21. See generally Harney and Cross, supra note 14 at 65; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL 125 (1966).
22. J. WIL.SON, THE INVESTIGATORS 65 (1978).
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the same consideration as the medieval approvers: a pound of another's flesh
will spare one's own.
Given that the informant is not so much accepted as he is tolerated on
some "necessary evil" theory, it would appear to follow that the informant's
role in modern law enforcement would be one of extremely low profile. "Inasmuch as the motivations of the informant are often questionable, and his
information and operation require extensive verification, it would seem logical that his role should be diminished. Instead, many arrests are made as a
direct result of the informant's word." ' 23 The reason for this is that the peculiar growth and direction of our substantive penal law into the areas of
sumptuary and regulatory crimes has encouraged an increasing dependence
on informers. 24 Law enforcement officials, led by the late J. Edgar Hoover,
have therefore begun a public relations campaign to launder the informant's
tawdry image. They have proposed that the very word "informer" be discontinued 25 and replaced by such euphemisms as "special employee" or
"confidential source."' 26 This law enforcement campaign has been remarkably successful. Thus the proposition that informers are a necessary evil in
modern law enforcement is today generally taken for granted, especially by
the courts. 27 But we should note here two points which have not been adequately explored with respect to this presumed need. The first is that the
empirical basis for this belief is not found in any controlled studies of law
enforcement practices and alternatives, but rather in the simple fact that the
police do use informers extensively. 28 And, secondly, the alleged need for an
expanding informer apparatus itself follows from a choice, namely the decision to utilize the penal justice system as the chosen instrument to enforce an
ever-widening variety of regulatory controls.
The dilemma for search and seizure law posed by the confidential informer was that at the same time that recognition of the abuses of the informant system were mounting, law enforcement rationale for further
institutionalizing the practice was also gathering support. 29 Both use and
abuse were escalating unchecked, without a governing rule of law. The suspect motives and practices of the informer led readily to the same inquiry
concerning the questionable incentives of the police officer. The apparent
marriage of interests between the informer who was looking for a "free pass"
23. Katz, The Paradoxical Role of Informers Within the CrinmnalJustceSystem: A Unique Perspective, 7 U. DAYTON L.R. 51, 54 (1981).
24. See generally Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1093, and Skolnick, supra note 23 at 116.
("Since the vice control squad deals with crimes for which there are no complaining witnesses,
vice control men must, as it were, drum up their own business."). Id. at 116.
25. Harney and Cross, supra note 14 at 65.
26. This is the term of preference popularized by the FBI.
27. "Rather we accept the premise that the informer is a vital part of society's defensive
arsenal." State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964), quoted in McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300, 307 (1967).
28. See generally Wilson, supra note 22 Chap. 3.
29. E.g., J. Edgar Hoover, Law Enforcement Bulletin, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(June, 1955). "Experience demonstrates that the cooperation of individuals who can readily
furnish accurate information is essential if law enforcement is to discharge its obligations ...
There can be no doubt that the use of informants in law enforcement is justified." Id., quoted in
Harney and Cross, supra note 14, at 9.
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for his own criminal activity and the police officer who could issue such
30
passes to advance his own career was not missed.
Just how the members of the Warren Court viewed these developments
is less than clear. 3 1 Their overall handling of the informer dilemma was
evasive and inconsistent. But we do know that at least Justice Douglas based
his own policy arguments on the open recognition of the above real world
factors. In another of his informer dissents, Douglas stated pointedly: "[i]t is
not unknown for the arresting officer to misrepresent his connection with the
informer, his knowledge of the informer's reliability, or the information allegedly obtained from the informer." 32 We also know that the Warren
Court was being pressured by the lower courts to take up the informer issue.
In Williamson v. United States, in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
the Fifth Circuit opened a major challenge to the informant enterprise when
it reversed a conviction based upon information provided by a confidential
33
informant who was working on a contingency fee basis with the police.
The informant was paid on a per capita basis for information on individuals
preselected by the police. 34 The Fifth Circuit came down heavily on the
practice and did not at all attempt to limit its opinion to the particular facts
of the case. The court found that "[t]he opportunities for abuse are too obvious to require elaboration," and that the contingency fee arrangement was
"a form of employment of an informer which this Court cannot approve or
3' 5

sanction.
Yet at the same time other courts were marching in a different direction
with respect to the formulation of a judicial policy approach to the growing
use of informants. In the same year as Wzilzamson, the Warren Court denied
certiorari on another informer case, this one decided by the Fourth Circuit.
In United States v. 1rby36 the police had relied heavily upon an informer's tip
which had been partially corroborated by the police before they arrested and
searched the defendant at an airport. It was then demonstrated that the
particular informant the police had employed and relied upon in this case
was a narcotics addict, had a long history of mental illness, had been discharged from the Army as unfit and had in fact been diagnosed as a pathological liar. The Fourth Circuit found no real cause for concern on these
facts. "It is of little moment," said the court, "that [the informant] was
shown to be a man of unstable character and credibility." 3 7 Yet even here
30. Skolnick, supra note 21, at 138.
31. Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 313 (1966),
did go forcefully on record with his own reservations about the use of confidential informers.
He favored close judicial regulation of such activities, but he would have had the Court do so
pursuant to its supervisory powers (which would not have reached state police activity) rather
than the fourth amendment.

32. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
34. "Q Yes, sir, how were you to be paid, what was the agreement? A: I was to be paid
$200.00 for Big Boy, $200.00 for James McBride, $100.00 for Hogie, he's Big Boy's half-

brother." From the trial record, cited at 311 F.2d at 442.
35. 311 F.2d at 444. Williamson has since been limited very strictly to its facts. See United
States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976).
36. 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
37. 304 F.2d at 283.
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the real issue had clearly come to the surface. The appearance of abuse,
prompted by police opportunities and cynicism, was compelling.
B.

The Response: Aguilar and Spinelli

The Warren Court had no established precedent from which to formulate a policy approach to the informer dilemma. No Supreme Court case
prior to the Warren Court era had confronted the issue directly, and the
Warren Court itself continued to deny certiorari until the mid-1960's on
cases that raised the central issues. Therefore, when the Court did take up
the informer issue, it was a strictly formative undertaking.
The aspect of the overall informer issue which the Court carved out for
39
38
treatment with its holdings in Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelhv. Uniled States
was a narrow one. It dealt only with the matter of police use of confidential
informants to satisfy the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause.
It did not deal with the related issues of the refusal to disclose the identity of
the informer either at the probable cause stage40 or at trial. 4 ' These matters
were treated separately, and inconsistently. 42 This attempt to segregate the
probable cause aspect of the informer dilemma and to formulate a rule for it
independent of the other aspects of the overall issue was indicative of the
court's initial failure to identify a coherent set of policy objectives for its
rulemaking exercise.
In the Aguilar and Spinel/ cases the Court created a standard of judicial
review which was unique to those cases in which probable cause to search
was based upon information supplied by a police informant. In all other
circumstances, if probable cause was based upon information supplied by a
third party, the issuing magistrate or the reviewing court did not conduct a
factual inquiry into the credibility of the third party source. In the noninformant situation, the reviewing court or magistrate reviewed, as a prima
facie matter, only the "sufficiency" of the information supplied to establish
probable cause. But information supplied by an informant was to be treated
differently. Indeed, it was to be treated as hearsay, even though the informant communicated the information directly to the police officer in the first
instance. Therefore the Aguilar-Spznel rule, to be applied only in informant
cases, was a "two-prong" test which incorporated not only the traditional
rule of review for measuring facial sufficiency, but also a new hearsay rule
for determining the credibility of the informant.
That Aguilar was a formative invention of law can be seen through a
review of the case law upon which the court relied in Aguilar. Quite simply,
there was no case doctrine, save for dictum in one case which the Aguilar
court entirely ignored, which treated the probable cause-informant issue as a
hearsay problem. The one case which did adopt a hearsay format to analyze
38. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
39. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
40. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
41. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
42. See infia text accompanying note 157.
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a probable cause issue was Grau v. United States .4 3 In Grau the real issue was
the sufficiency of the allegations adduced in the warrant affidavit to establish
probable cause to believe that the sale of moonshine was being conducted at
particular premises. The court held that the affidavit clearly made out probable cause to believe that both the manufacture and possession of illicit liquor was taking place at the premises, but that the affidavit failed to allege
sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that any sales were taking place there. 44 The particular prohibition statute under which the police
were proceeding specifically required the allegations of sales. The actual
holding was therefore quite narrow. It was tied to the specific statute in the
case and it held the affidavit insufficient according to that statutory standard. The Court, however, included the broad dictum that: "A search warrant may issue only upon evidence which would be competent in the trial of
the offense before a jury."' 45 Whatever the court meant by this statement, it
was subsequently ignored by the Supreme Court and only a few lower court
cases followed it. It was, in any event, the only Supreme Court case to so
state and the Aguilar Court made no reference to it.
Now of course the Grau dictum could never be taken literally. The police have always made arrests, conducted searches, and obtained warrants on
the basis of hearsay information. 46 No one, presumably including the Grau
Court, has ever contended that the police may act only on the basis of personal observation. In the 1948 case of Brinegarv. United States, 4 7 the Supreme
Court made note of the Grau dictum and was quick to dismiss it: "For this
proposition there was no authority in the decisions of this Court . . . The
statement has not been repeated by this Court."' 48 The Brinegar Court was
confronted with a trial court record in which the judge excluded certain
hearsay testimony at trial but had previously admitted that very same evidence at a hearing held to determine probable cause to search. The issue of
the applicability of the rules of evidence to the determination of probable
cause was thus sharply drawn. The Supreme Court found the trial eviden49
tiary standards inappropriate to the determination of probable cause.
43.

287 U.S. 124 (1932).

44. Id. at 125.
45. Id. at 128.
46. In United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge L. Hand stated:
"It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the 'reasonable cause' necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the
accused's guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they
cannot possibly perform their duties."
47. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
48. Id. at 174-75, n.13.
49. [I]f those standards were to be made applicable in determining probable cause for
an arrest or for search and seizure, more especially in cases such as this involving
moving vehicles used in the commission of crime, few indeed would be situations in
which an officer, charged with protecting the public interest by enforcing the law,
could take effective action toward that end.
338 U.S. at 174.
The inappropriateness of applying the rules of evidence as a criterion to determine
probable cause is apparent in the case of an application for a warrant before a magistrate, the context in which the issue of probable cause most frequently arises. The
ordinary rules of evidence are generally not applied in ex parte proceedings, "partly
because there is no opponent to invoke them, partly because the judge's, tetermination
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Had the Warren Court understood the simple profundity of the Brbnegar
analysis, they may never have adopted the Aguilar prong of the test. For
what the Brinegar opinion did was to reject a "residuum rule" 50 approach to
judicial review of searches and seizures. And the court did so on the basis of
procedural and institutional empirical factors. Brinegar made more explicit
what had been the traditional approach to judicial review of probable cause
findings. It recognized the issue to be one of "sufficiency" rather than "admissibility." The question for the reviewing court was whether the police
had sufficient information to meet the legal standard of probable cause, not
whether the information was technically competent to be considered on that
issue at all. Indeed, the courts of the prohibition era had found the more
51
straightforward sufficiency issue troublesome enough.
The Aguilar majority, however, made no reference to Brinegar.512 But it
did cite two other cases, Nathanson v. United States53 and Giordenello v. United
States,54 to support its novel use of a hearsay format to analyze probable
cause-informant issues. Neither of these cases, however, had in fact broken
the mold for treating the issue as one of sufficiency. To be sure, Nathanson, a
case decided one year after Grau and on which the defendant-petitioner
placed great reliance, reversed the probable cause finding without even mentioning Grau. In Nathanson there was no informer. The customs police obtained a search warrant on the basis of a customs agent's affidavit which
alleged merely that the agent "has cause to suspect and does believe" 55 that
untaxed liquors were located at the Nathanson premises. The court reversed
the probable cause finding but clearly not on the basis of an evidentiary
analysis: "The challenged warrant is said to constitute adequate authority
[for the search and seizure]. The legality of the seizure depends upon its
sufficiency."' 56 The trouble the court had with the affidavit in Nathanson was
that it alleged virtually no facts to support a finding; it merely alleged the
officer's finding. If this involved evidentiary analysis at all, it was more in
the nature of an exclusion of opinion evidence than of hearsay evidence. But
in support of its finding of insufficiency, the court made the following
statement:
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a
warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable
is usually discretionary, partly because it is seldom final, but mainly because the system of Evidence rules was devised for the special control of trials by jury."
338 U.S. at 175, n. 12. (quoting 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 19 (3d ed., 1940)).
50. The "residuum rule", now obsolete, dates from the formative era of administrative law
between the two world wars. It was a judge-made rule which stated that no administrative
order could be based entirely upon evidence which would be inadmissible in a court of law, but
rather such an order was required to be founded upon at least a residuum of legally competent
evidence. In effect, the residuum rule incorporated the exclusionary rules of evidence law into
the administrative law of judicial review. The rise and fall of the residuum rule presents a
remarkable parallel to that of the Aguilar-Spine//i rule. See generally K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 256-62 (3d ed. 1972).
51. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
52. But the dissenters certainly did. See 378 U.S. at 119 (Clark, J., dissenting).
53. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
54. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
55. 290 U.S. at 44.
56. Id. at 46.
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cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under
oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not
57
enough.
It was from these words that Aguilar was later to draw the inference that the
court was here imposing restrictions on the type, as opposed to the amount, of
information required to establish probable cause.
Giordenello also was a case decided entirely on sufficiency grounds. Once
again, there was no informer in the case. A federal narcotics agent obtained
a warrant for Giordenello's arrest based upon his accusatory complaint
charging Giordenello with the crime of an unlawful purchase of heroin. 58
The allegations in the complaint were conclusory in nature. They alleged
that the defendant did, at an approximate time and place, purchase heroin.
It was later discovered at the suppression hearing that the complaint was not
based upon personal knowledge, but rested instead on information provided
by other law enforcement officers and unidentified other persons. The defendant raised, 59 and primarily relied upon,6° the Grau hearsay issue. He
alleged that the complaint was deficient because it was based upon hearsay
and not personal knowledge. The court found that it did not have to examine the hearsay issue because the complaint failed on sufficiency grounds:
"we need not decide whether a warrant may be issued solely on hearsay
information, for in any event we find this complaint defective in not providing a sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be
made." 6 1 Once again the court had recognized the distinction between the
separate issues of sufficiency and admissibility and had refused either to give
credence to the hearsay issue or to merge it within the sufficiency test.
The next case of critical significance in the line leading to Aguilar was
Draperv. United States.6 2 In this case the hearsay issue was once again raised
and rejected, but this time there was an informer in the case. This latter fact
makes it all the more revealing that Draper was another of the in-line cases
which the Aguilar court failed even to mention. In Draper the defendant was
63
arrested without a warrant by federal narcotics police as he got off a train.
The police had received a tip from a "special employee" who informed them
that Draper was selling drugs to several addicts and that Draper had left
town and would be returning by train with a supply of drugs. The informer
provided details of Draper's description, his clothing, his fast gait and his
estimated time of arrival. The police staked out the train station and arrested Draper, who matched all the particulars of the tip. He was searched
64
at the scene and two envelopes of heroin were found in his possession.
Only Justice Douglas dissented from the court's holding that the information
adduced was sufficient to establish probable cause. 65 With respect to the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 47.
357 U.S. at 481.
357 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 484, n.2.
Id. at 485.

62. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
63. Id. at 309.
64. Id. at 310.
65. Id. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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hearsay issue raised by the defendant-petitioner, the court was summarily
dismissive: ". . . we find petitioner entirely in error. Brtnegarv, United States
66
•. .has settled the question the other way."
67
The last of the significant pre-Aguilar cases wasJones v. United Slates.
Although known primarily for its contribution to the law of standing, Jones
is actually a pivotal case in the transition from a strict sufficiency model to a
strict hearsay format for reviewing the issue of probable cause based upon an
informer's tip. In Jones the police had considerably more information than
they had in any of the previously discussed cases and it was all laid out in the
police officer's search warrant affidavit. The police had obtained their information from sources who had previously provided reliable information. The
informants told the police they had purchased heroin from Jones on many
occasions at a specified apartment. The informants described the particular
hiding places in the apartment used by Jones to secrete the drugs. 68 The
Court had little difficulty reaching the conclusion that this information was
sufficient to establish probable cause. 69 Only Justice Douglas dissented, but
on the related ground that the informer's identity had not been disclosed to
the magistrate. 70 Once again the hearsay issue was raised inJones and once
again the Court rejected it, but this time it added what appeared at the time
to be an innocuous qualification to the rejection of the hearsay approach.
The question here is whether an affidavit which sets out personal
observations relating to the existence of cause to search is to be
deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the
affiant's observations but those of another. An affidavit is not to be
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantialbasisfor credtig the hearsay is presented.7
With this simple, and perhaps gratuitous qualification, the court suggested for the first time that the sufficiency test may incorporate a hearsay
test of sorts. That is, although sufficiency remained the issue, there may be
occasions when the type or source of the information may influence the
"weight" of that evidence when measuring its sufficiency. This was certainly
a novel dictum in Jones.
The first segment of the Aguiar-Spinelli rule then came into being with
the court's 1964 opinion in Aguilar v. Texas. Notably, this was the first probable cause-informer case to be decided by the Supreme Court which involved a state prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio 72 was only four terms old at the
time and Ker v. California, 73 which held that the state police would be required to follow the same fourth amendment standards as the federal police,
had been decided only the previous year. The opinion in Aguilar opened
with the words: "This case presents questions concerning the constitutional
66. 358 U.S. at 311.
67. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
68. d. at 268.
69. Id. at 271.

70. Id. at 273 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
72. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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requirements for obtaining a state search warrant. ' 74 The court then proceeded to a direct discussion of Ker and the policy reasons for not deferring
to the findings of a state magistrate any more than to those of a federal
magistrate. 75 There is every reason to believe, therefore, that the Warren
Court viewed Aguilar as significant primarily for its role in consolidating the
"single standard" approach to state cases. Indeed, this may be the only way
to account for the court's otherwise cursory and uninformed treatment of the
probable cause-informant issue in Aguilar.
In Aguilar the Houston police had obtained a search warrant for Aquilar's home. The affidavit filed in support of the warrant was patently deficient according to the sufficiency standards then well established in the preMapp federal cases. 76 The affidavit merely alleged in conclusory fashion
that the police "have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe" that the defendant was in possession of narcotics at his
home. 77 It was an easy case on the facts and the Court treated it as such.
The Court did not get involved in a discussion of the hearsay issue and, as
noted above, did not even mention Grau, Brihegar or Draper. It noted Jones
only in passing. Instead the Court relied almost entirely on Nathanson and
Giordenello, the two sufficiency cases which did not involve an informer. 78
Nevertheless, the Court appeared fairly oblivious to the informer aspects of
the case. The Court announced its ruling in the following passage which
launched the confidential informant brigade of cases.
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information
and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant,
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and
some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed,
see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, was "credible" or his
79
information "reliable."
It is from this passage that we get the so-called "two-pronged test" 80 for
reviewing probable cause based upon an informer's tip. The first prong, now
commonly referred to as the "basis of knowledge" prong,"' required that a
warrant affidavit contain "some of the underlying circumstances from which
' 2
the informant concluded that narcotics were where he claimed they were. "
This was simply a restatement of existing law as applied to informers. It
stated that just as a police officer's mere conclusory allegations were insuffi74. 378 U.S. at 109.
75. Id. at 110.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 109.

78. Id. at 112-16.
79. Id. at 114.

80. This phrase entered the Supreme Court lexicon in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
at 413.
81. This appellation first appeared in Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and
Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741, 747 (1974).

82. 378 U.S. at 114.

1984]

DEMISE OFAGUILAR-SPINELLI RULE

cient, as per Nathanson and Giordenello, the allegations of an informant certainly must be factual in nature. This prong of the rule required nothing
more, in kind or degree, than had been traditionally required by the sufficiency test.
But the second prong, since coined the "veracity" prong,8 3 was entirely
new. It required that the warrant affidavit also contain "some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant
. . .was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' "84 There was no authority
for this requirement and the opinion cited none. The opinion merely
dropped a footnote at this point to cite the warrant affidavit injones as a
model for allegations of the preferred sort.8 5 What the Court was requiring
was a function never before contemplated for the issuing court by the sufficiency test: a look behind the facial sufficiency of the evidence, as a matter
of law, to determine the actual probative value or credibility of the evidence,
as a matter of fact. Of course, a strict division between matters of law and
fact is a theoretical premise impossible to maintain in practical affairs. But
the distinction is operative up to a point and it certainly had been a universally operative characteristic of magistrates at the ex parte warrant proceeding not to make findings of fact as to the credibility of the information
provided. Indeed, even today a magistrate is to presume the credibility of a
86
police affiant.
Thus, although the rule was then well settled that probable cause may
be based upon hearsay information, the new rule appeared to require that
some hearsay-that provided by a confidential informant-was to be treated
differently, indeed, was to be treated as mere hearsay. Therefore, the second
prong of theAgudar test required that the magistrate treat information supplied by an informer as unreliable, and hence "inadmissible" on the issue of
probable cause, absent some showing of factual circumstances that would
except it from the exclusionary operation of the hearsay rule. It is not at all
clear that the Aguilar opinion intended or contemplated this result. It is certainly possible that this dictum was added simply to express favor for the
extended allegations in the Jones affidavit. Nevertheless, the more activist
lower courts and the scholars read the rule as a strict requirement for a new
type of review which applied only to confidential informers. The Aguzlar
Court meanwhile had given no indication, other than its reference to the
Jones affidavit, of what would satisfy the new requirement. Nor did it give
any expression to the policy behind the new rule which would at least have
provided the lower courts with an analytical starting point. The opinion was
narrow, cryptic and unhelpful. The case law that followed Aguzdar in the
lower courts almost immediately went aground.
Although the lower courts soon began to clamor for more explicit guidance with the new rule, the Warren Court uncharacteristically refused the
initiative and left the formative work to the lower courts. The Supreme
83.
84.
85.
86.

This appellation also first appeared in Moylan, supra note 75 at 747.
378 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 114-15 n.5.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

Court did not return to the Aguilar issues until five years later,8 7 in Spihelli v.
UnitedStates.88 This in itself was further evidence that the court had set off in
Aguilar something which it had not fully anticipated and which it was unprepared to resolve.
In Spinelli, the Supreme Court was confronted with what had become,
by 1969, an all too typical lower court record. The informant issue had been
considered and resolved in three different ways by three different courts: the
district court, an Eighth Circuit panel and ultimately the Eighth Circuit en
banc. The en banc court ruled six-two upholding the search warrant issued
to the FBI. The discursive opinion of the Eighth Circuit contained considerable grumblings about the vacuous "hypertechnicality" and "ritualistic recitation" that had crept into the rule. 8 9 The Eighth Circuit therefore had
adopted the view that the new "second prong" rule of Aguz/ar did not have to
be applied strictly to require specific information to support the credibility of
the hearsay informant. 9° The Eighth Circuit, in other words, read Aguilar as
not substantially altering the traditional sufficiency approach to probable
cause review. 91
Spinelli, in contrast to Aguilar, was by no means an easy case on its facts.
In Spinelli, the police had received a tip from a "confidential reliable informant" that Spinelli was conducting an illegal bookmaking operation that
made use of two specified telephone numbers. 92 The police investigated the
location of these two numbers and meanwhile tailed Spinelli's movements.
Spinelli was observed by the FBI on five separate occasions to arrive and
remain at the location of the specified phone numbers for approximately one
hour in mid-afternoon. Furthermore, the FBI on its own account knew
Spinelli to be a bookmaker. All of this information was contained in a very
detailed warrant affidavit which covered three pages of an appendix to the
Supreme Court decision. Yet the court was clearly troubled by the obfuscatory approach of the Eighth Circuit:
We believe . . . that the "totality of the circumstances" approach
taken by the Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush.
Where, as here, the informer's tip is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a
87. The intervening cases of Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965), and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) made no significant elaboration of or contribution to the Aguilar rule.
88. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
89. Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 884 (8th Cir. 1967).
90. Id.
91. Aguilar is only a caveat to the general principles governing probable cause and is
not a replacement of those principles. Agutlar was directed to the specific situation in
which a warrant was based solely upon the hearsay conclusion of a third party informant, and the majority found that without elaboration of "underlying circumstances"
this bare conclusion could not provide a magistrate with the substantial basis necessary for a finding of probable cause. However, there is nothing in Aguilar which holds
that a hearsay conclusion has no probative value, and when coupled with other pieces
of information that tend to substantiate the reliability of that conclusion, a valid warrant may not be issued.
Id. at 883.
92. 393 U.S. at 414.
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93
more precise analysis.

Spbnelh therefore set out to confirm what had not been clear among the
lower courts: Aguilar had in fact created a new and distinct rule for evaluating the hearsay provided by informers and the Supreme Court was prepared
to require strict enforcement of that rule. Until Spine/ii, only Justice Douglas
had clearly stated his preference for a rule that discriminated sharply against
informer hearsay. Douglas, in fact, would have excluded it entirely. 94 And
although Justice Harlan in his majority opinion did not go so far, he certainly did go uncharacteristically far in promulgating a narrow and exacting
standard of review. But at the same time that he reaffirmed the new rule,
Justice Harlan also elaborated upon the manner in which the new test might
be satisfied.
The Spinel/ opinion first demonstrated that the warrant affidavit, however detailed, did not explicitly state the basis for the informant's opinion
nor the basis for crediting the informant's hearsay. Justice Harlan made it
clear that there were indeed two prongs to the new test, each independent of
the other. The opinion then suggested two methods by which such a technically deficient affidavit may otherwise satisfy the test. The first method was
to infer from the circumstances of the informer's tip that the basis for the
informer's conclusion was reliable first-hand knowledge of the facts. The
Court referred to the facts of Draper as a "suitable benchmark" for this approach. 95 The unique and specific details of the tip provided in Draper
would permit a reviewing court to "infer that the informant had gained his
information in a reliable way."' 96 In the lexicon of the rule, this has come to
be referred to as the "self-verifying detail" test for satisfying the first prong of
the rule.
The second method to rehabilitate a technically deficient hearsay report
was "independent investigative efforts." ' 9 7 The notion here was that if the
police were able independently to confirm the truth of at least part of the
hearsay tip, it would then be "apparent that the informant had not been
fabricating his report out of whole cloth," 9 and thereby the entire hearsay
report would be accredited. This method was also illustrated by reference to
Draper wherein the independent police observations had confirmed the appearance, gait and travels of the defendant. This method is now commonly
referred to as the "corroboration" test of the Aguilar-Spinelh"rule. 99
Spzelh therefore underscored both the technical requirements of the
,4guilar rule and facilitated its application consistent with the Court's preAguziar cases. It succeeded only in the former of the two objectives. It
clearly demonstrated the fact that Aguzar involved a "two pronged test"
93. Id. at 415.
94. 380 U.S. 102, 121-23 (1965) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
95. 393 U.S. at 416.
96. Id. at 417.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Enormous confusion and inconsistency has arisen in the case law over whether the
corroboration test can rehabilitate a facial defect in the first, or "basis of knowledge," prong as
well as the second, or "veracity" prong. See the discussion in LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
supra note 4, at 561-70.
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and, moreover, that the two prongs were independent of one another. Thus
the hearsay test of the second prong had to be satisfied regardless of how
many personally-observed and particular details were provided by the hearsay informant. The lower courts, however, quickly entered upon a new
round of confusion as they confronted the practical and analytical weaknesses of the opinion. To be sure, Justice White in his concurring opinion in
Spinelli had already identified some of the problems the lower courts were
soon to find irresolvable. With respect to the self-verifying detail notion,
Justice White suggested'O° that instead of second-guessing whether the informant had personal knowledge, the rule could simply require that the police must determine and allege the factual basis for the informant's belief in
the first instance. As to the corroboration test, Justice White noticed that the
Court's opinion, particularly so in its reliance upon the Draper illustration,
suggested that corroboration of the non-inculpatory details of a given tip
could permit an inference of reliability as to the uncorroborated inculpatory
details of the tip. This, suggested Justice White, 10 ' would convert the rule
into one in which a presumption of reliability would follow if the police
could confirm anything that the informer said, no matter how tenuously it
was connected to the facts which directly established probable cause. Yet,
however broadly formative and unsatisfactory the Supreme Court's
rulemaking attempt in Spinelli, the Warren Court did not again return to the
probable cause-informant issue. Thus, at the close of the Warren Court era,
the Court had initiated (or, perhaps, backed into) a strict and controversial
new hearsay format for the confidential informer situation but had made no
real attempt to resolve the major doctrinal splits and confusion that had
developed almost immediately in the lower courts.
The Burger Court made only one real attempt, in United States v. Har-

03
ris, 10 2 to influence the substantive development of the Aguilar-Spineli rule. 1

The attempt was only half successful, however, since the new majority which
voted to affirm a finding of probable cause by the trial court could not itself
agree upon a single reason for doing so.
Harris was a five-four case in which Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the court. It was a plurality opinion in three parts. Three other
Justices joined the first part, a different three joined the third part and only
two joined the second part. The facts of Harris presented one of the
problems which had been plaguing the lower courts. How may the prosecution demonstrate the veracity of an informer who has never before provided
the police with information? One approach, of course, was through the corroboration technique. The extent of corroboration in Harris was weak, however, and only three members of the Court affirmed this approach. The
other method suggested by the plurality opinion was novel to the Supreme
100. 393 U.S. at 426.
101. Id. at 426-27.
102. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
103. The Court did, however, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), hold that an
informant's tip which fails to establish "probable cause" because it does not meet the AguilarSptneli standards may nevertheless be sufficient to establish "reasonable suspicion" to stop and
frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Court and involved, ironically, an extension of the hearsay format. This approach was to credit an informant's hearsay if it fit one of the established
evidentiary exceptions to the hearsay rule. In Harris, the Burger opinion
analyzed the informer's tip as a declaration against penal interest, despite
the fact that this particular exception to the hearsay rule had not yet been
recognized by the Supreme Court. 10 4 Only four members of the Court voted
to affirm the finding of probable cause on this view. In the end, Harris reflected for the Supreme Court the same doctrinal fragmentation and uncertainty that had come to characterize the laborings of the lower courts with
the Aguz/ar-Spinh/ rule. The Burger Court also became shy of the issue. It
did not again agree to review an Aguit'ar-Sptineh"issue until more than a decade later in Ilhhot' v. Gates.
C.

The Deficiencies of Aguilar-Spinelli

In its nearly two decades of existence the Aguilar-Spinelh rule has produced now-legendary inconsistencies in legal outcomes. Both the federal
and state courts have toiled endlessly with the rule but have failed to arrive
at a uniform or workable rendition. The nature and existence of the lower
court's agonies reveal the defective formulation of the rule. As early as Justice White's concurring opinion in Spihelh',10 5 it was clear that the results of
the rule did not readily or reliably accord with common sense. Weak probable cause facts such as those in Draper were affirmed, while seemingly much
stronger facts like those in Spine/h/ were denied. The lower courts experienced the same arbitrary and inconsistent results with the rule. 10 6 When
applied correctly, the rule did not seem to work. It did not produce credible
outcomes. This in itself suggested fundamental design defects in the rule.
The high formalism of the rule is also revealing.'1 7 As it has come to be
generally understood, the rule may be satisfied by very minimal, although
highly formalized, allegations by the police. In other words, there is little
question that a warrant affidavit by a police officer would pass muster under
the rule if it alleged only the following: "The affiant is informed by a confidential source, who has previously supplied this department with information leading to an arrest and conviction, that he has today personally
observed the defendant in possession of narcotics at the above place of residence." The second clause, an allegation of prior reliability, or what is now
commonly referred to as an informer's "track record," satisfies the second,
104. Justice Burger in his opinion acknowledged this but found it to be not a controlling
limitation, 403 U.S. at 584. But see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) which now recognizes a limited
exception for such statements.
105. 393 U.S. at 423.
106. In one recent case, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed its own cases decided
under the rule and concluded humbly hut honestly: "To be noted from the foregoing review of
the case law is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reconciling the results of the decisions.
People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 241, 406 N.E.2d 471, 477 (1980).
107. Hovenkamp has noted the critical influence of legal formalism on the formative development of American laws: "Legal formalism was an intense concern for language, rules and
consistency, often at the expense of legislative or popular feelings about the best public policy.
Although legal formalism strongly influenced every aspect of the law, its biggest influence was
quite naturally felt in those areas that were in relatively early stages of development."
Hovenkamp, Pragmat Reahsm and Proximate Cause in America, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 3. 9-10 (1982).
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hearsay prong of the rule. The third cause, an explicit allegation of personal
observation by the informant, is all that is required to satisfy the first basis of
knowledge prong. It is not immediately clear why an affidavit of this sort is
necessarily superior to the three page affidavit rejected by the court in
Spinelh. Yet this is the strict mandate of the rule. If the purpose of all search
and seizure law is to protect individual privacy by limiting the power to
search to those circumstances where there is a reasonable and reliable basis
for permitting an invasion of privacy, it is not obvious that permitting a
search on the basis of our hypothetical affidavit but denying it on the basis of
the Spine/h affidavit furthers that cause. "Basically, this procedure deems
probable cause to be a question of warrant documentation. It does not seem
to safeguard adequately against situations where the informer either lied to
the police or obtained his information illegally." ' 0 8
It is in this very formalism of the rule that we can most readily identify
its inherent defects, for the rule has created a formalized test to determine
the reliability of hearsay which does not in fact measure reliability. As one
circuit court noted in the days prior to the formulations of Aguilar.
The reliability of such [informers] is obviously suspect. The fact
that their information may have produced convictions in the past
does not justify taking their reports on faith . . . it is to be expected
thatwthe informer will not infrequently reach for shadowy leads, or
10 9
even seek to incriminate the innocent.
Under the present rule, however, "even the giving of information on a
single past occasion has been deemed sufficient when that information
brought about an arrest and a conviction of the individual arrested."' 10 The
strict formalism creates the appearance of strict protection of privacy. Yet
the reality is otherwise.
Another negative aspect of the rigid formalism of the rule is the extent
to which it actually promotes mendacity, and therefore unreliability, on the
part of the police. This occurs for two reasons. In the first instance the technical formalism of the rule discredits the rule with the police officer who
tends to view it as alien and unreasonable. I l' And, secondly, the testimonial
formula required by such a rule makes perjury very simple; the officer need
only repeat the minimal required litany.' 1 2 Such a negative and ironic result, in which a new and highly formalized rule produces poorer outcomes
than had existed previously, is not unknown to our law of criminal procedure. Grano has performed a limited study of the "tailored testimony"
problems of the Aguilar-Spine/li rule and has found them to be considerable. 1 1 3 "In any event, there is no denying the fact that V a particular policeman were willing to perjure himself, it would be very easy to do so in a
108. Katz, supra note 75, at 65.
109. Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
110. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE supra note 4, at 509.
111. See, e.g., Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 NATION 596 (1967).
112. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill.
2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882
(1970), discussed in Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel. Spinelli-Harris Search 14arrants and the
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 418.
113. Grano, supra note 101.
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manner giving the appearance that the probable cause test of Agutdar v. Texas
'
has been satisfied." 14
Another problem with the hearsay format adopted by the rule relates to
the inherent limitations this approach imposed upon the rule. That is, the
hearsay format unduly restricted what was considered pertinent to the formulation of a comprehensive rule to govern the probable cause-informant
situation. Tips from an informer present an objective problem for criminal
justice, but not because the tips are hearsay. The essential problem resides in
the institutionalized personage of the police informant. In other words, information supplied by informants is objectively problematic even when not
hearsay. Most jurisdictions, in fact, recognize this through special rules directed at the problem of informer testimony when rendered at a trial.' 5 By
defining the informer's tip as essentially a hearsay problem, the court closed
its eyes to broader problems which could not be excluded from the overall
question of reliability.
This broader dimension primarily concerns the related issue of the socalled "informer's privilege."''16 This is a separate rule which permits the
prosecution under most circumstances to refuse to disclose the identity of the
confidential informant, either to the defense or to the court. The privilege
applies both in trial 1 7 and probable cause 1 18 settings. The impact of the
privilege on the ,4guilar-Spnelh rule is this: the reliability of theinformer will
almost always have to be determined under circumstances in which neither
the court nor the defense is permitted any information concerning the very
identity or personal make-up of the informer. The clash between the Agul'arSptnelh" rule and the informer's privilege is not unlike a "double-think," or
"Catch-22," proposition. Indeed, in a related context the Warren Court said
as much. In Smith v. Ilhnozs,'' 9 the defendant was convicted of a sale of
narcotics to a confidential informer. At trial, the informer and the defendant were the only ones who provided direct testimony on the question of
whether a sale had in fact taken place. 120 The credibility of the informer,
who gave on direct the name "James Jordan," was paramount to the resolution of guilt. On cross-examination the informer admitted that James Jordan was not his real name. The judge thereupon prevented the defense from
obtaining from the witness his real name and present address. The Supreme
Court held this invocation of the privilege to be a denial of the defendant's
right of confrontation. The Court's analysis of the reliability issue is apt:
[W]hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting
114. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 4, at 577.
115. One common rule requires that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated.
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1981). Another rule, typical of the federal
approach, requires a cautionary instruction to the jury on the credibility of an informer. See,
e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d
Il1 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975). "The rationale behind this requirement
is to insure no verdict based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who may have
good reason to lie is too lightly reached." United States v. Garcia, supra note 35, at 588.
116. See generally LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 4 at 570-86.
117. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
118. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
119. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
120. Id. at 130.
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point in "exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth" through
cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is
and where he lives. The witness' name and address open countless
avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To
forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively
2
to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself. ' 1
Granted that there are necessary and meaningful distinctions to be
made between the probable cause setting and the trial setting of Smith, the
Court's observation that the starting point of any credibility inquiry is the
identity of the declarant remains valid. Indeed, it must appear anomolous,
if not incredulous, to have a system in which there are two operative rules:
one which designates a certain class of declarants as people whose reliability
is uniquely and inherently suspect, and another which specifically shields
that very same class from the "most rudimentary inquiry" into their
credibility.
McCray v. Illinois' 2 2 is the Warren Court case which upheld the informer's privilege in the probable cause setting. The confusion and questionable logic engendered by the hearsay approach to the probable causereliability issue is evident in the Court's analysis. The McCray Court quoted
extensively, and approvingly, from an opinion by the New Jersey Supreme
Court which stated in part:
Where the issue is submitted upon an application for a warrant,
the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in
an ex parte proceeding. As we have said, the magistrate is concerned, not with whether the informant lied, but with whether the affi12 3
ant is truthful in his recitation of what he was told.
It is exceedingly difficult to reconcile this analysis with the Aguilar-Spinelh
rule. For the McCray Court has here written the informer's reliability issue
out of the problem.124 And it has done so with a curious inversion of hearsay
analysis. The basic premise of the hearsay evidentiary rule is that reliability
of factfinding is enhanced by having evidentiary declarations made personally before the factfinder. We exclude hearsay declarations precisely because
the factfinder has no direct access to the declarant and cannot gain such
access through any examination of the witness who merely repeats the declaration as hearsay. The McCray Court appears to have taken this analysis full
circle. It reasoned that because the informer's hearsay is made an exception
to the hearsay prohibition when it meets the formal requirements of the Aguzi
lar-Spinelli rule, the only credibility issue that remained for the magistrate to
consider was that of the police officer affiant. It "followed" therefore that
disclosure of the identity of the informant was generally irrelevant to that
25
credibility issue. 1
121. Id. at 131.
122. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
123. State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 45 (1964), quoted in McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. at 307 (emphasis added).
124. Allen views McCray as one of several key cases of the "waning years" of the Warren
Court which indicate that the Court had lost some of its impetus for reform. Allen, The ludcial
Questfor PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the CriminalCases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 538 n. 103.
125. There is, moreover, the so to speak "Catch-23" rule of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
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D. Hearsay ad Absurdum
The foregoing review of the case law developments which culminated in
the Aguilar-Spinelli rule suggests that the Warren Court was less than fully
cognizant of the true import of its own formulation.1 26 Therefore we have
argued here that the Supreme Court did incorporate a hearsay test into the
rule of probable cause review, even though the Court itself never clearly
articulated the rule in these terms. The point, of course, is that the Court
never clearly articulated the rule in any terms. Yet if the foregoing analysis
of the high Court's cases is not dispositive of the question of whether a
strictly hearsay format as such was introduced into the governing law, a brief
glimpse at several of the subsidiary case law developments under the rule
does confirm the view that in this instance of careless borrowing the captured law did indeed turn out to be the hearsay rule.
1.

Declarations Against Penal Interest

Evidence law has increasingly recognized an exception to the hearsay
exclusionary rule for statements which are, at the time of their making,
against the penal interest of the declarant. 127 Thus, any statement which
knowingly inculpates the declarant is considered sufficiently reliable to be
admissible at trial.' 28 The theory behind the rule is simplistic: mendacity
generally is motivated by and consistent with self-interest, so where the statement in question is against the self-interest of the declarant, it is presumed
not to have been prompted by mendacity.
Virtually all tips provided by confidential informants are personally
compromising to the penal innocence of the informant. Almost every tip by
every such informant involves, as is virtually required by the basis of knowledge prong, a declaration by the informant that he has personally been complicit in some manner in the commission of a crime. 129 Indeed, sources who
have not been personally involved in the criminality upon which they provide information will either: 1) have no reason to become "informants" in
the first instance or 2) fail the basis of knowledge prong. Therefore, as Chief
Justice Burger recognized in his plurality opinion in Harrs,130 an informant's tip can almost always be categorized as a declaration to some degree
against the penal interests of the declarant. This has in fact been the ap154 (1978) which requires the magistrate and reviewing court to presume the credibility of the
police officer affiant and places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to overcome the
presumption.
126. That a strictly formulated two-prong test was not clearly intended by the Aguilar court
in all situations is evidenced in the Court's opinion one year later in Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214 (1965), where the Court did not apply such a test in a criminal tax evasion prosecution.
127. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). Seegenerall'y MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE, § 278 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972).
128. This exception is, however, often subject to a corroboration requirement. See, e.g., FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (requiring corroboration for any declaration against penal interest offered to
exculpate the accused.)
129. Wilson quotes one experienced Drug Enforcement Agency officer who summed up the
common police attitude as follows: "The civic-minded guys are useless--being law-abiding,
they don't know anything about the drug traffic." WILSON, supra note 22, at 66.
130. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971).
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proach followed by a number of lower courts, with the result that admissions
against penal interest by an informant are regularly relied upon as a means
of showing that his information is reliable. 131 This is surely not what the
Aguilar court had in mind as the acid test of an informant's reliability. Yet
the rule had become a reception of the hearsay rule, complete with its
exceptions.
This development, of course, is absurd. At the point of recognizing the
penal interest exception, the rule has come full circle upon itself. For now
the very same reasons that led to a presumption of unreabiihy at the inception of the rule-the criminal duplicity of the confidential informant-are
now treated as the basis for a presumption of relability. Indeed, if the logical
implications of the penal interest exception theory are correct-that is, the
typical declarations by informants concerning their personal knowledge of
the criminality of others are to be presumed to be inherently reliable-then
obviously it was totally unnecessary to formulate the Aguilar-Spineli rule in
the first place. For the hearsay exception theory would hold that the typical
informant's tip is more, not less, reliable than the hearsay provided by, for
instance, the victim of a crime whose declaration does not fit one of the
established exceptions.
The recognition of the penal interest exception demonstrates a complete
loss of sense and purpose by the courts. The reason an informant's hearsay
was singled out for special distrust by the Warren Court is precisely because
of the recognition that informant's have afrmatize, not negative, penal interests in providing the police with information. That is, as discussed earlier,
the typical informant is providing information because he knows that he will
escape, not incur, culpability by doing so. It blinks reality and logic to pretend that the informant who is providing information to further his penal
interest is simultaneously making declarations against those interests. The
interests of the informant in implicating his confederates cannot lead both to
a presumption of unreliability (the Aguilar-Spinelli rule) and of reliability
(the declaration against penal interest exception). Yet this is precisely the
extended logic of the overly formalized hearsay reception within the rule.
2.

Multiple Hearsay Exceptions

The Aguilar-Sptielli rule was an attempt to resolve the informer dilemma. The Warren majority did not absolutely prohibit probable cause
from being based upon an informant's hearsay, as Justice Douglas would
have preferred, 132 but it did attempt to limit the circumstances in which
such information could satisfy the fourth amendment. The compromise was
meant to permit law enforcement personnel to avail themselves of such firsthand information, provided the police exercised proper professional caution
in screening the informant and his information. The expectations of the
two-pronged test were that the police would be able to attest personally to
their professional determination both that the particular informant was reliable and that his information was first-hand. But these expectations cannot
131. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 4, at 523.
132. See supra note 77.
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be met when what the informant provides is not first-hand, but rather second-hand, information. Under these circumstances, it might be assumed,
the basis for deferring to the professional needs and judgment of the police
officer in selecting his sources becomes somewhat attenuated, if not lost entirely. For when the police informant does not commit himself personally to
the information he provides, but instead merely reports what he has heard
from sources not personally known to the police, the police officer of course is
in no position to "vouch" for the remote source. Furthermore, the potential
for dissembling by the informant hustling a deal with the police is obviously
greater where not even the informant himself vouches for the reliability of
his information but merely passes it along as something asserted by yet another criminal source.
One might expect such second-hand accounts of probable cause to fall
short, both in fact and as a matter of policy, of the standard of reasonableness and reliability required to justify an invasion of privacy. Again, however, the application of a strict hearsay analysis obviates the real nature of
the problem. For according to hearsay analysis, the only requirement for a
finding of reliability as to remote sources of information is that the source's
declaration itself fit a hearsay exception. 1 33 "In the hearsay-upon-hearsay
situation, as where an informant of established reliability tells police what
someone else has told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect
to each person in the hearsay chain."' 134 As might be expected, under this
analysis an alleged declaration against penal interest by an unknown criminal source, passed along to the police by another criminal source seeking a
deal, has been held repeatedly to satisfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spineli
rule. 135 Surely here also the considered judgment must be that the hearsay
reception has taken over the rule to the extent of denying the rule its original
sense and purpose.
3.

The Myth of the Magistrate

Contemporary fourth amendment law purports to be grounded in the
policy preference that probable cause should be determined "by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 1 36 The notion here
is that the magistrate will act as a protective screen over the citizen to prohibit unwarranted invasions of privacy. The magistrate is presumed to be a
competent and independent fact-finder 137 who will shield the privacy interests of the citizens against the acquisitive interests of the state. In this sense,
then, the magistrate is presumed to safeguard the privacy interests of the
people in the same manner that the grand jury safeguards their penal interests. Yet the reality is otherwise. For just as the modern grand jury is more
133. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 805.
134. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 4, at 530.
135. See, e.g., the cases cited at id. 543 n.180.
136. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
137. But see Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (held, with respect to arrest
warrants only, that the issuing officer may be a civil service clerk with no law training).
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sword than shield,' 38 so too is the magistrate of the real world little more
than a rubber stamp for law enforcement. The irony is that the hearsay
reception of the Aguilar-Spinelh"rule was designed with this mythical factfinder in mind. The two-pronged test of the rule is meant to require a de
novo review of the probable cause information supplied to the police. But
an informant's tip is not hearsay when presented to the police officer in the
first instance; it only becomes hearsay when the police officer repeats it to the
magistrate. Therefore the premise of the hearsay format of the rule is that
the critical tribunal with respect to the probable cause determination is the
magistrate, not the police officer.
Consider the facts: first, only an extraordinarily small percentage of
searches and seizures at the state level are conducted pursuant to a warrant.
"[T]he few figures that do exist show that the ratio of searches with warrants
to searches without them is tiny. . . . When experts are pressed to estimate
how many police searches are made without warrants, they say about 90
percent, and they could probably make a case for 95 percent." 139 What then
of the remaining five to ten percent of the cases in which a search is preceded
by a warrant application before a "neutral and detached magistrate"? Does
the hearsay format lead to a more exacting review by this judicial officer?
Grano provides the common answer:
Although magistrates givc more attention to search warrants than
to arrest warrants-the former are at least usually read-the review is unlike that assumed in appellate opinions. The magistrate
does not cross-examine, or even examine, the officer concerning the
warrant's factual basis. Invariably, the magistrate simply issues the
warrant if it seems sufficient on its face, with nothing but the of140
ficer's uniform and oath attesting to the credibility of its facts.
One of the very few empirical studies to gather actual statistics on this
process was conducted by faculty and students at Yale Law School.' 41 The
results of the study confirm the common belief. In their study of the police
department in a "medium-sized city in Connecticut," researchers extrapolated that less than 2% of the search warrant applications presented to a
magistrate were denied,14 2 despite the fact that researchers found 16-18% of
the warrant affidavits "doubtful" according to the Aguzilar-Spdelh standards.1 43 Furthermore, the study revealed that in 36% of the cases where a
44
search warrant was executed, nothing was recovered. 1
It is not difficult to see how the hearsay format of the rule has contributed to this lack of meaningful screening by the magistrate. Trial judges are
trained and obligated to rule on questions of admissibility according to a
138. See generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Hstoric Role of the Grandjuiy, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 701 (1972).
139.

F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 204 (1970).

140. Gran, supra note 91, at 415.
141. The study is reported at Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A
Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L. J. 703 (1972).
142. Id. at 710.
143. Id. at 711.
144. Id. at 712.
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prima facie standard. 145 Judges habitually rule on whether or not an item
of hearsay is admissible, not on the basis of a factual finding of reliability,
but rather on the technical legal standard of whether the item, on its face,
conforms to one of the hearsay exceptions. Judges, in other words, are not
meant to evaluate the credibility of evidence, only its legal "competence."
The introduction of evidence at trial is ritualistic and talismanic, and the
judge is priestly, not worldly, in his behavior. To the extent that the probable cause-informant standard has incorporated a hearsay test, and thereby
has become talismanic in its operative features, judges are thereby encouraged to perform the same perfunctory and non-evaluative review at the
ex parte warrant proceeding or at the suppression hearing as they do at an
adversarial trial proceeding.
The conclusion that judges apply the Aguilar-Spinhlh test in a mechanical, if not mindless fashion is difficult to avoid the more one studies the operation of the rule. The Aguilar Court contemplated the magistrate
performing a close scrutiny of both the sufficiency and reliability of the information offered on the issue of probable cause. Yet the real test has universally become one of requiring only the minimal litany. Thus, because the
reliability test of the second prong is satisfied if the informant has previously
demonstrated his reliability, the judge's scrutiny typically will begin and end
with the police officer's mere assertion that the informant has previously
(and perhaps only once) provided information that was determined to be
reliable. The demonstrable inadequacies and failures of such word-watching
are now legendary. United States v. Irby,146 is but one example of an informant found "reliable" by the magistrate who was subsequently demonstrated
to be a virtual credibility basket case, and a notorious one at that.
4.

Hearsay, The Final Bite

A final class of cases in which the hearsay reception can be seen being
taken to the extreme is exemplified by the Michigan Court of Appeals case
of People v. Coleman. 147 In that case an informant by the name of Prince had
provided information upon which the police obtained a search warrant to
enter certain premises in which the defendant was subsequently arrested and
searched. The defendant challenged the warrant on the ground that the
affidavit failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the prior reliability of the
informant. The court analyzed and applied the Aguilar-Spzhelh test and concluded as follows: "This Court . . . finds that the information establishing
Prince's credibility in the present case, though sketchy, was more substantial
than the affidavit information regarding the informant's credibility in Agullar. '' i 48 What is remarkable about this case is not the conclusion, but rather
the very application of the informant hearsay test in the first instance. For
Prince, the reliable informant, was a dog.
The use of the Aguilar-Spinelh"test to measure the reliability of a confi145.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) and (b).

146. 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1962).
147. 100 Mich. App. 587, 300 N.W.2d 329 (1980).
148. Id. at 332.
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dential canine' 49 represents a symptomatic regression in the law of probable
cause review prompted by the hearsay reception. In an earlier era, the developing law of evidence confronted the same issue: should information sup50
plied by animals be treated as an out-of-court hearsay "declaration"?
These earlier cases were primarily concerned with the fact that the "declaration" by the animal could not be cross-examined. 15 1 Eventually the courts
came to realize that the hearsay rule was analytically inapplicable to such
evidence and abandoned the hearsay approach. '5 2 Yet within the confines of
the Aguilar-Spinelli rule, we find the history of hearsay repeating itself. And
we see once again how the hearsay reception was responsible for a belabored
technicalism that could only appear spurious.
II.

RECEPTION THEORY ANALYSIS

The formative problems of our search and seizure laws are not limited
to the Aguilar-Spineli rule. The fourth amendment is everywhere in a state
of crisis and Gates may only signal that the worst is still to come. Traditional
nomocentric legal analysis, however, as illustrated in the foregoing sections,
is limited in its ability to step beyond the individual rule to develop a
programatic basis for a major reconstruction of our search and seizure laws.
The need is therefore pressing to develop a broader theoretical framework
which will enable us more effectively to analyze and pursue the formative
work of the Warren Court. This section will attempt to broaden our analysis
of the Aguilar-Spineli doctrine through an application of the comparative
law methodology of reception theory. We will demonstrate how we can apply this theoretical format to deepen our understanding of the essential defects of the rule and then use it to develop a constructive alternative to the
regressive approach to fourth amendment privacy expressed in Gates.
A.

Nature of Reception Theory

Virtually all sciences include a theory of development, or ontology,
which is comprised of a series of generalizations about the nature of growth
and change pertinent to a given science. Such a developmental theory provides the scientist with an invaluable tool for any critical study. It provides
insight into the true nature of the very subject matter of the science, it generates objective standards to measure and evaluate any observed or planned
growth or development, and, perhaps most significantly, it provides the
programmatic basis for corrective or constructive intervention in the developmental process. The legal scientist is less fortunate than most in this respect, since legal scholars have not yet fully accepted the intellectual
149. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Venema,
563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1976).
150. See generally Annot. 18 A.L.R.3d 1221.
151. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So, 449 (1923).
152. Such evidence is now typically treated as a matter of expert opinion rendered by a
human and based upon the instrumentality of the tracking dog. The question of admissibility
therefore centers about the adequacy of the foundation evidence proferred to establish the relevance and reliability of the data generated by the instrumentality. See cases collected at Annot., supra note 150, at 1230.
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propriety or possibility of such a sociological theory of law. 1 53
Nonetheless, legal studies of the nature of growth of the law are certainly available and do provide us with an analytic format for probing more
scientifically into the phenomena of constitutional criminal procedure law.
By far the most useful of these studies, for our purposes, have been in the
field of comparative law. Comparative law has traditionally been the area
of legal scholarship most open to the theoretical findings and methods of the
other social sciences. The various methodologies developed within comparative law scholarship, although used primarily in the field of international
law, are readily adaptable to the study of individual bodies of law located
154
within a single national system.
Reception theory' 55 is one such comparative law methodology. 156 The
purpose of this theory is to describe and analyze one particular process of
growth in the law: the process whereby a relatively undeveloped body of law
borrows some aspect of law from a more developed body of law. Essentially
a given body of law "short-circuits" the sequential path of growth and
"leaps" to a more advanced state. This is, of course, precisely what was attempted during the Warren Court era with the law of constitutional criminal procedure. 15 7 Reception theory is designed to throw critical light on this
process which is utterly fundamental to legal reform,
Reception theory attempts to identify the essential properties of this
ubiquitous process of legal growth and reform and to explicate it in terms of
its primary objectives. The underdeveloped body of law which seeks to borrow law from a more advanced body is referred to as the "host" system. The
more advanced body of law is termed the "donor" system. When legal bor153. "The new socio-legal approach is regarded as subversive by some law teachers, and
others believe it represents the indulgence of those who do not understand what is truly entailed
in the study of law." Campbell & Wiles, The Study of Law in Society in Britain, 10 L. AND Soc.
REV. 547, 550 (1976).
154. "The fundamental characteristic of comparative law, viewed as a method, lies in the
fact that it is applicable to any form of legal research." H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH 10

(1946).
155. The term "reception theory" will be favored here although other terminology, such as
"borrowing," "incorporation" and "legal transplants," appears in the literature and is used virtually interchangeably. Reception theory appears to have gained the greatest currency and
invites the least confusion with other theories or doctrine.
156. Methodology is at present all that comparative law has to offer those concerned with
the legal engineering of the criminal justice system. "Comparative research of criminal justice
systems is still in its infancy. It is not surprising then, that when questions are asked transcending the concerns of a single system very little is actually known, and answers tend to be
mostly in the nature of impressionistic beliefs and vague hypotheses." Damaska, Evidentiaiy
Barriers to Conviction and Two Moals of Cnminal Procedure. 4 Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
506, 507 (1973).
157. The history of the Warren Court may be taken as a case study of a court that for a
season determined to employ its judicial resources in an effort to alter significantly the
nature of American criminal justice in the interest of a larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under law . . . To those, both on and off the Court, who were
eager for a more profound judicial influence on the quality of American criminal justice, a significant change in the assumptions and tactics of the Supreme Court seemed
clearly required. Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 525-26.
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rowing takes place, the host system is said to "receive" law from the donor
system.
The basic premise of reception theory is that when a rule of law is transferred from one system to another, an organic interaction takes place between the two systems. Therefore, to understand the inherent dynamics of
the rule in its new setting, several focal points of research and analysis must
be undertaken simultaneously. For one thing, the rule itself must be carefully understood in its original form in the donor system. Also, the rule must
be viewed in systemic terms as a component part of that system. The operation and objectives of the rule in the donor system reveal much of the rule's
inherent limitations, both in terms of its theoretical root structure and the
range of factual constructs and determinations to which it is demonstrably
applicable.
The experience of the law in the donor system must be understood because it will not only explain the rule's viability in the donor system but will
also serve to reveal its adaptability for transfer to other systems. The conditions and objectives of the host system must also be understood. What type
of rule is needed? What function is the rule to perform in that system? Are
the operative factors in the host system-the objectives and conditions of the
rule's implementation-similar to those of the donor? "The process of adaptation happens in many different conditions. Depending on the nature of
these conditions, the new law can integrate itself into the new legal system
more or less successfully; or can be an alien body within it; or again it can be
the departure point of a new system."' 5 Perhaps the most basic lesson to be
learned from reception theory is this: to understand the operation and development of a rule of law which has been received from another system, it is
never sufficient to analyze the rule solely in terms of its experience within the
new system. This would be similar to attempting to diagnose the receptivity
problems of a transplanted organ with little or no knowledge of the body
from which it came.
B.

Applcation of Reception Theory

The application of reception theory to a given instance of borrowing
involves a comparative analysis of the host and donor systems to gauge the
"receptivity" of the transplanted law in the new system. The two prinicpal
points of this comparison are the objectives assigned for the rule and the conditions of implementation of the rule in each system. The notion here is that to
the degree that the two systems of law are not compatible on these two
scores, a transfer of law between them will be less likely to succeed. Rather,
given such incompatibility, one would expect to find indications of a spontaneous rejection taking place in the host system. This may manifest itself in a
variety of ways. The host system may simply ignore the new rule, or it may
attempt to accommodate the new law by revising either the rule itself or,
158. G. EORSI, COMPARATIVE CIVIL (PRIVATE)
ROADS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 423 (1979).
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more radically, the objectives and conditions of the host system. Or it may
completely abort the new law, as was done in Gates.
Even our cursory review of the case law developments under the AguilarSpinelh rule has revealed sufficient evidence of a protracted rejection syndrome in which the lower courts struggled unsuccessfully to revise the rule to
the point where they could live with the results it produced. We would like
now to use the methodology of reception theory to sharpen and enlarge our
understanding of why this well-intended rule, so plausible on its face, failed
so badly. To do so, we must compare the respective objectives and conditions of the host (the law of probable cause review) and the donor (the law of
evidence) systems of law.
There are three categories of objectzves of the respective bodies of law
which we may identify and compare. The first category is composed of the
independent objectives which are common to each. The second is the category of mutually inconsistent objectives. And the third class is one of unrelated objectives, that is, objectives for one body of law which have no
counterpart in the other.
The sole objective which is truly common to both the law of evidence
and the law of probable cause review is that of providing a formalized standard of review. Evidence scholars have long advocated the abolition of the
formal categories of admissible hearsay, to be replaced by a rule vesting
largely unformalized discretion in the hands of the trial judge.' 59 But the
law of hearsay has nonetheless endured in its highly formalized state, with
only minor concessions towards informality.160 The Warren Court held the
same objective for the probable-cause informant rule. In rejecting a looser,
"totality of the circumstances", standard of review, the Spine//i Court stated
emphatically: "Where, as here, the informer's tip is a necessary element in a
finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more
precise analysis."' 16 ' This emphasis on formality, which imposes strict centralized control of legal reforms, is symptomatic of law in its formative
era. 162 The emerging law of probable cause review found in the hearsay rule
a ready and credible source for such a standard of review. To underscore the
irony, then, it appears likely that the now notorious technicality of the Aguilar-Spinelli rule was in fact a conscious objective of its authors.
The category of mutually znconszstent objectives, however, is far more
replete:
(1) The hearsay rule is one of the exclusionary rules of the law of evidence designed to protect the presumably unsophisticated lay jury from being misled by various types of evidence whose reliability they cannot
properly assess. By contrast, the probable cause rule has no such objective.
At no point in time, either prior to a search or subsequently upon a motion
159. See, e.g., McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 218, 219 (1956).
160. Federal Rules of Evidence Sections 803 (24) and 804(b) (5) now permit a step beyond
the formalized list of hearsay exceptions, but there has been little development thus far under
these sections. See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER EVIDENCE
803(24)[01],

804(G)(5)[01] (1981).
161.
162.

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969).
See supra note 89.
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to suppress, is the issue of probable cause presented to a jury. On the contrary, the law of probable cause review governs the appropriate use of information already in the possession of the factfinder.
(2) Another objective of the hearsay rule is to promote the presentation of first-hand evidence before the factfinder. "A distinctive and cherished ideal of our trial tradition is that evidence in the main should be
limited to the statements in court of witnesses who have observed the facts
and are produced for cross-examination." 163 The probable cause rule does
not share this objective. The law here is not encouraging informants to appear in person before the magistrate. The objective of the probable cause
rule is to facilitate a warrant process conducted on paper only, or even upon
oral testimony communicated by telephone, 1 64 and to avoid the need for
even a minimal evidentiary proceeding.
(3) The hearsay rule is designed to regulate only the admissibility of
evidence. It is not constructed so as to pass any more precise or particularized judgment on the reliability or probative value of admissible hearsay.
The objective of the probable cause rule, on the other hand, is certainly to
provide a standard to measure the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, the
objectives of the probable cause rule in this respect are a critical step beyond
those of the hearsay rule. To attempt to measure sufficiency according to an
evidentiary standard of admissibility is to attempt to accomplish an objective for which the hearsay rule has never been considered adequate.
(4) Another objective of the hearsay rule is to bifurcate the functions
of judge and jury according to an objective legal standard. The concern here
is to prohibit the judge, through his evidentiary rulings, from invading the
fact-finding province of the jury. The objective, inother words, is to require
the judge to rule on the admissibility of hearsay according to the formalized
rule and to rule it admissible regardless of how unreliable, incredible or absurd in fact the judge views the evidence to be. Of course, judges as magistrates are expected to do precisely the opposite in evaluating the sufficiency
of evidence proferred on the issue of probable cause. In the probable cause
setting, the bicameral objectives of the hearsay rule are inconsistent with the
tasks expected of the singular judicial or police factfinder.
(5) Finally, the inconsistency of the objectives of the host and donor
systems of law may be compared with respect to the standard of reliability
promoted by each. The hearsay rule is essentially a procedural rule designed
to govern the general reliability of an institutionalized litigation ritual. It is
freely acknowledged that the hearsay rule will, on numerous specific occasions, exclude good evidence and admit bad. The justification for the rule is
that it is said to promote and effect generally a more reliable litigation process. The objective of the probable cause rule, however, is to better guarantee the specic reliability of each determination to invade a constitutionally
protected sphere of privacy. The fourth amendment is determined to be
more specifically reliable, and therefore less general and arbitrary, than are
163.

McCormick, supra note 148 at 218.

164. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
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the rules of evidence. 165
The third category of objectives, those that are unrelated between the
two systems of law, also provides a revealing comparison. There are two
regulatory objectives of the probable cause rule which have no analogous
counterpart in the hearsay rule. The first is that the rule governing probable
cause based upon informants' tips involves an attempt to raise the standard
of review for searches based upon an informant's tip and thereby to discourage or minimize the influence of such people in the criminal justice process.
But certainly the hearsay rule, which is directed only at the nature of the
declaration and not at all at that of the declarant, does not share this objective. Consequently, the Aguilar-Spi7eli rule has backfired in terms of this
objective, for by effectively limiting informant's tips only to a hearsay review,
information supplied by an informant is in practice subject to less scrutiny
than the first-hand information of the police officer. For instance, most jurisdictions have developed fact-specific standards for street searches based upon
observations of "narcotics related activity" by the police. If a police officer
conducts a typically warrantless search based upon such alleged observations, he will subsequently be scrutinized through cross-examination at a
hearing held pursuant to a motion to suppress. If the officer can state that
an informant provided him with the probable cause information, at the
hearing the officer cannot be cross-examined as to the specific observations
since he has no personal knowledge of them and the informant cannot be
cross-examined since he is privileged by McCray not even to appear. This is
clearly ironic. 166 There is an obvious import to this situation, and one which
has not been missed by urban police forces across the country. The police
are much better off if they use informants to provide probable cause than if
they were to pursue and investigate the facts independently.
A second unrelated objective of the probable cause rule is to instill a
self-governing professional respect on the part of the police for the privacy of
all citizens. The hearsay rule of course does not, and cannot, promote such
an objective. To the contrary, the hearsay reception does affirmative damage to the pursuit of that regulatory goal. For by encouraging the use of
investigative surrogates in the form of confidential informants, the law is
encouraging the use of less trained, less visible, less responsible, less answerable, and less professional agents who have a keen interest in invading the
privacy of others. 167
The comparison of the condiions of the practical implementation of a
hearsay test in the two different systems of law is reasonably straightforward,
165. The history of the fourth amendment is commonly related to a reaction to the arbitrariness of the infamous "general warrants" of the colonial era. See generally J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-48 (1966).
166. "[C]ourts-including the United States Supreme Court--seem to think it is enough
that an informant says he "saw" a sale of narcotics, even without any explanation as to how it
was known that a sale was occurring or that the object being sold was in fact narcotics."
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 4, at 539.
167. "In this manner, the FBI's own guidelines may provide members of the Bureau with
the means by which to circumvent explicit Supreme Court rulings which serve to suppress illegally obtained evidence, as these unlawful actions of the informant may never be discovered."
Katz, supra note 23 at 58.
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yet equally revealing of the inevitable failure of the hearsay reception in the
Aguilar-Spineli rule:
(1) The hearsay rule has been tailored to fit the circumstances of a
trial. This is a highly predictable and drawn-out ritual of retrospective factfinding in which the opportunity exists to repair or reform an initially inadequate foundation for admitting an item of hearsay. But the probable cause
determination is made prospectively, either by the magistrate or, more commonly, by the police as the facts are still unfolding. The conditions and
opportunity for technical conformity to the rule are certainly more adverse.
(2) The trial proceeding is adversarial. Opposing counsel provide notice, by objecting, of any hearsay defects in the evidence being presented.
The probable cause setting is ex parte. Any notice of any technical defects
will not be provided until it is too late to bring the information into technical compliance.
(3) At trial, law-trained judges and lawyers invoke and apply the rules
of hearsay. In the probable cause setting, particularly in the warrantless situation, the lay police officer is required to assume the role of both lawyer
and judge.
(4) The factfinder at trial is the jury which is presumed to have no
expertise in the subject matter of their fact-finding. The police, of course,
are presumed to have particular professional expertise in weighing the reliability of information relevant to criminal activity.
(5) Finally, the fixed rule of hearsay applies where the objective predictability of the rule's application is required and relied upon by the opposing parties to litigation. Such predictability is thought to promote fairness
and equality between the litigants. In the ex partc probable cause setting,
however, the need for a fixed rule of reliance is far less, if at all, critical to
insure the fundamental fairness of the fact-finding process.
This comparison of the objectives and conditions of the two systems of
rules should demonstrate that the frustration and all-thumbs feelings of the
judges who have had to work with the Aguilar-Spineli rule are well-founded.
The hearsay rule was designed to meet a set of objectives within a context of
conditions which are inconsistent with the mandate and practice of the issuing or reviewing judicial officer. The Aguilar-Spindli rule was never designed
appropriately to meet the indigenous needs of the criminal justice system for
a legal response to the informant dilemma. The dilemma persists, and now
worsens. With a clear view of the objectives and conditions of a probable
cause-informer rule, however, it is possible to identify the structural outlines
of a rule that could be made to work.
III.

TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTED RULE

How then may we move now towards a better rule to resolve the informant dilemma? It is certainly possible to do so, if for no other reason
than that the existing rule of Gates is essentially a non-rule. But before listing
the elements of such an improved rule, it is perhaps best to begin by making
our rejection of the hearsay reception emphatic. The rule governing the de-
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termination of probable cause based upon informants' tips must be tailored
to the realities of search and seizure practice. The principal point here is
that even if magistrates were to perform a meaningful function in reviewing
applications for warrants, the overwhelming majority of searches are conducted without a warrant. Therefore the rule must be effective within the
context of police, not judicial, decision-making. In this respect, it is almost
whimsical that the final word on the hearsay reception of the Aguilar-Spbznelh
rule was written nearly 100 years before the rule itself. In 1873, in analyzing
the appropriateness of a reception of the common law system of evidentiary
rules into the foreign system of Indian Law, Sir Henry Sumner Maine made
the following poignant observation:
The system of technical rules, which this procedure carries with it,
fails then, in the first place, whenever the arbiter of facts-the person who has to draw inferences from or about them-has special
qualifications for deciding on them, supplied to him by experience,
study, or the peculiarities of his own character, which are of more
value to him than could be any general direction from book or
person. For this reason, a policeman guiding himself by the strict
rules of Evidence would be chargeable with incapacity; and a general would be guilty of a military crime.168
Given the foregoing, we may identify at least five elements that would
better meet the objectives and conditions of a probable cause-informer rule:
(1) The first point of an improved rule would be to establish informers, as a matter of policy, as a disfavored investigative tool. If one objective
of the rule is to limit and control police exploitation of informers, a simple
rule of necessity could be incorporated. This would require that the police
rely upon informants to establish probable cause only where no other, or
more preferable, method of investigation is reasonably available. This
would not prohibit the use of informants, but it would require the "necessary
evil" theorists to document their case in each instance. It would, however,
certainly cut down on the increasingly casual use of informants by urban
police departments to perform routine surveillance functions previously performed by the police themselves. In the law enforcement lexicon, informants
are said to be the "eyes and ears" of the police. This is, up to a point,
certainly necessary. Informers, however, should not be used to the point of
permitting the police themselves to become blind and deaf. Police work is
better done by the police, and the rule should so state.
Congress has incorporated such a rule of necessity in the law governing
probable cause determinations for wiretapping. Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968169 requires that before a wiretapping warrant may issue, the applicant must demonstrate that "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably ap168.

H. S. MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST 321-22 (3d ed. 1876).

See also Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysi. A Comparative Institut'onal Alterna-

tive, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981), (argues that legal analysis should identify the most appropriate decision maker to fulfill a given legal policy or objective and then structure the
substantive rules accordingly).
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982).
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pear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 70 Given that
the fear of abuse by informants should at least equal the fear of wiretapping
abuse, there is no reason not to adopt a similar approach.' 7 ' Thus far, however, the courts have been reluctant to adopt such an explicitly regulatory
2
approach to influence police search and seizure choices.17
(2) One of the most common suggestions in the literature1 73 for an
improved rule is to require a minimal level of independent police corroboration of the information contained in an informant's tip. The reason this
suggestion is so obvious and prevalent is that under the Aguziar-Spine/li rule,
once the tip itself conforms to the requirements of both prongs of the rule, no
corroboration by the police is required. This obviously works towards the
wrong end. Perhaps the best way to encourage professionalism and to discourage opportunism on the part of the police is through a rule of necessity,
as indicated above. But it also makes sense to require the police, even in
circumstances where use of an informant is found to be necessary, to perform
as much independent investigative work as is reasonable to corroborate the
informant's tip.
In most jurisdictions, prosecutors are presently required at trial to do as
much. The majority rule in America is that the testimony of a criminal
accomplice is admissible against a defendant at trial, but it must be corroborated by other proof. 1 74 The policy behind the rule is manifest:
The reasons which have led to this distrust of an accomplice's testimony are not far to seek. He may expect to save himself from punishment by procuring the conviction of others. It is true that he is
also charging himself, and in that respect he has burned his ships.
But he can escape the consequences of this acknowledgment, if the
prosecuting authorities choose to release him provided he helps
175
them to secure the conviction of his partner in crime.
The policy objectives of the accomplice rule and the informer rule are identical in this respect: to prevent findings of fact based upon the tips of criminal
informants who have a strong incentive towards mendacity.
It may be argued that the societal objective of avoiding mistaken convictions is stronger than that of avoiding mistaken searches. Undoubtedly
this is so. Yet the rule may take this into account. First of all, even if we are
less concerned about findings of probable cause based upon inaccurate information, we are, one must assume, nonetheless sufficiently concerned to require a greater degree of protection against fact-finding error than is
typically required in an ex parte proceeding. Secondly, the corroboration
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1982).
171. "Simplistically stated, this ... recognizes that a government infringement upon individual privacy may be deemed unreasonable because a less intrusive alternative procedure existed which could have accomplished the same end at less cost to individual privacy." Bacigal,
The Fourth Amendment in Flux. The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 763, 799.
172. Id. at 799-803.
173. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 141.
174.

See generally, 7

J.

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE IN

TRIALS

AT
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LAW

§ 2056

(Chadbourn rev. 1978). But corroboration is not required in the federal courts. See United
States v. Lee, 506 F.2d I11, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
175. WIGMORE, supra note 163, at 322.
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rule for the probable cause-informant does not have to be an absolute requirement, as is the accomplice rule. The rule could simply require corroboration according to a standard of reasonableness. Finally, to the objection
that such a requirement would place an undue burden on law enforcement,
Rebell has answered with the finding that in more than 90% of the cases in
the Yale study the police did perform at least some follow-up investigation
upon receiving an informant's tip. 176 The practical effect of a corroboration
requirement may therefore be to simply require that the police perform bet1 77
ter follow-up investigations.
(3) The rule should also permit evidentiary hearings on the issue of
probable cause where the search has been conducted pursuant to a warrant
issued on the basis of an informant's tip. The point here is simply to recognize that where the reasonableness of the police officer's reliance upon an
informant's tip is at issue, there is no adequate substitute (and certainly not
the hearsay test) for adversarial cross-examination to develop all the relevant
facts. The myth of the'neutral magistrate 178 must be at least partially forsaken. The rule of Franks v. Delaware,179 which essentially restricts a "subfacial" inquiry into the reasonableness of the police officer-affiant, would
have to be modified in the informant situation to permit such an inquiry. I80
Such a modification would not unreasonably compromise the policy objective of encouraging warrants. The police would still be required, under existing law, to obtain warrants wherever there is no recognized exception for
not doing so. Certainly it is not sound policy to encourage warrants to the
extent of making a warrant a shield for abuse.
(4) The rule should require that, where the police choose to use a confidential informant as an investigative agent, the police must be prepared to
document and disclose all of the available information on the informant
himself. This would be something in the nature of a certification requirement. The Aguilar-Sptneli rule requires only that the police be able to allege
that the informant has on one or more prior occasions provided the police
with accurate information to satisfy the veracity prong. It does not require
the police to document those occasions, nor does it require the police to disclose the number of times the informant has provided unreliable information.
Therefore, under the rule and practice of Aguilar-Sptnelh, an informant who
has provided tips to the police on 100 prior occasions, 99 of which turned out
to be demonstrably false, would nonetheless satisfy the second prong of the
rule. Indeed, when one reads the informant cases, it appears that no inform176. Rebell, supra note 141 at 719.
177. The defendant-respondent's brief at 26 n. 10A, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)
offered the following quote from a newspaper interview with Detective Mader, the police officer
who conducted the search in Gates: "Says Mader, 'I am not an attorney. I felt we reacted as
well as we could. I felt we had done everything proper.' But in retrospect, he said, if he had
understood the exclusionary rule as well then as he does now, he would have conducted a surveillance to better corroborate the [anonymous informant's) letter before seeking the warrant."
THE CHICAGO LAWYER, Jan. 1983, at 7, col. 4.
178. See supra text accompanying note 126.

179. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
180. See the argument developed by Grano, supra note 102 at 411.
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ant has ever previously supplied the police with a false tip.'
Because the
rule employed the formal mechanism of a hearsay test, such evidence of
prior unreliability was, incredibly, irrelevant to the issue of reliability. This
fact explains the prevalent cynicism and opportunism that accompanied the
rule.
To require the police to keep files on the informants they would like to
have certified as reliable investigative agents would not be unreasonable.
The federal police, to greater and lesser degrees, already do so.' 8 2 The FBI
keeps extensive and centralized files on its informants. These files catalog
the record of performance of the informant with the agency. The Drug Enforcement Agency maintains comparable records on its informants. Indeed,
it would appear that the self-interest of the professional investigator would
require such records, wholly apart from any requirements of the rule. A
valid objection to such documentation and disclosure would be that it would
compromise the anonymity of the informant. The consideration is addressed
in the following suggestion.
(5) The rule should also require disclosure of the identity of the informant whenever the information supplied by the informant is necessary to
establish probable cause. Once again, the myth of the magistrate and the
policy of encouraging warrants should not exempt the prosecution from a
disclosure requirement where a warrant is issued.' 83 And the McCray 184 rule
should be recognized for what it is: an overstatement of the factual need for
a probable cause-informant privilege and a serious misstatement of the legal
8 5
predicates for such a rule.1
In 1958, prior to any of the Warren Court's attempts to resolve the informant dilemma, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court cogently
expressed the rationale for a rule of disclosure:
If testimony of communications from a confidential informer is
necessary to establish the legality of a search, the defendant must
be given a fair opportunity to rebut that testimony. He must
therefore be permitted to ascertain the identity of the informer,
since the legality of the officer's action depends upon the credibility
of the information, not upon facts that he directly witnessed and
upon which he could be cross-examined. If an officer were allowed
to establish unimpeachably the lawfulness of a search merely by
testifying that he received justifying information from a reliable
person whose identity cannot be revealed, he would become the
sole judge of what is probable cause to make the search. Such a
181. Not only does the data concerning instances of unreliability not surface in the cases,
but there is also little information provided by any outside studies. One notable instance of
statistical backtracking discovered that one "reliable informant" of the 1930s who provided tips
leading to 150 prostitution arrests, provided inaccurate information in 40 of them. J. HOPKINS,
OUR LAWLESS POLICE 105 (1931).

182. See Wilson supra note 22 at 74-76.
183. But see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.3 (1972) which distinguishes between searches made with and without a warrant.
184. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
185. "McCray is based primarily on a wrong reading of two centuries of precedent, precedent which read properly requires disclosure whenever necessary to detect false testimony and
to investigate the issue before the court. Grano, supra note 102, at 440.
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holding would destroy the exclusionary rule. Only by requiring
disclosure and giving the defendant an opportunity to present contrary or impeaching evidence as to the truth of the officer's testimony and the reasonableness of his reliance on the informer can
the court make a fair determination of the issue. . . . If the prosecution refuses to disclose the identity of the informer, the court
should not order disclosure, but on proper motion of the defendant
should strike the testimony as to communications from the
informer. 186
More recently, Judge Friendly has argued that disclosure should also be
required even in the less intrusive stop and frisk situation:
There is no. . . guarantee of a patrolling officer's veracity when he
testifies to a 'tip' from an unnamed informer saying no more than
that the officer will find a gun and narcotics on a man across the
street, as he later does. If the state wishes to rely on a tip of that
nature to validate a stop and frisk, revelation of the name of the
informer or demonstration that his name is unknown and
could
187
not reasonably have been ascertained should be the price.
The compromise position is of course that disclosure be made, in the
first instance, not to the defense but to the trial court in camera.' 88 The
wisdom of such a compromise is unclear, in part because it appears to invoke
some of the same false premises as the mythology surrounding the ability or
likelihood of the magistrate to perform a satisfactory ex parte scrutiny of the
adverse interests of the defendant. Yet even the existence of such an alternative to full disclosure underscores the lack of validity to the present rule
which ignores the disclosure dilemma entirely.
The net effect of incorporating the foregoing proposals into the rule
would be to abandon the hearsay format almost entirely. In its stead would
be created a comprehensive legal response to the informant dilemma which
is both consistent with the policy objectives of the rule and operable within
the typical conditions in which the rule is invoked. It would represent a step
beyond the technical formalism of the formative era of criminal procedure
law and into a secondary stage of experience-based legal engineering. It
would also renew faith in the creation of rules of search and seizure law
which have doctrinal integrity and which may in practice help to safeguard
individual privacy.
CONCLUSION

There is much cause to lament the court's opinion in /oins
v. Gates. At
its heart, the opinion represents a radical reaction to the core concept of
fourth amendment privacy-the need for close judicial regulation of police
investigative activity. The deeper logic of this reaction does not end with the
186.

Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 812, 819, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958).

However,

Prestly has since been legislatively abrogated by section 1042(c) of the California Evidence
Code, the constitutionality of which has been upheld in Martin v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.2d
257, 424 P.2d 935, 57 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1967).
187. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly J., dissenting).
188. See the discussion in Grano, supra note 91, at 440-47.
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overruling of Aguilar-Spinelli. It extends ominously to all search and seizure
laws which may be seen to compromise the local autonomy of the footsoldiers in the criminal justice system, the very police officers and lower court
officials who are most closely caught up in "the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime."' 8 9
There is, on the other hand, no cause to lament the passing of the Aguilar-Spinelli rule itself. The ultimate judgment on this rule must be that while
it served initially to advance the concept of strict judicial regulation, it became, over time, an impediment to the development of search and seizure
law. The present impulse of fourth amendment advocates is too much to
defend against any encroachment on this beleagured body of law. The more
candid and more profitable approach would be to concede the undeniable
defects in many of these early rules, to support only those aspects of the
formative law which can survive their own "strict scrutiny," and then to
demonstrate how a satisfactory reconstruction may be made which furthers
the valid objectives of fourth amendment privacy. For, as we have seen here,
it is the very shortcomings of the early law which provide the necessary intelligence for the law's next step.

189. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

GROMAN-OR NAMORG-REVISITED; THE
PERSISTING PROBLEM OF REMOTE CONTINUITY
OF INTEREST
DANIEL M.

SCHNEIDER*

INTRODUCTION

Continuity of shareholder interest is a familiar and essential element of
corporate reorganizations. Simply stated, this doctrine requires the owner of
an acquired corporation to retain a continuing proprietary interest in a corporation that acquires his corporation. If he holds such an interest, continuity will exist and, assuming fulfillment of other requirements, a tax-free
reorganization will occur. In contrast, an outright sale of a corporation's
assets or stock will not qualify as a tax-free reorganization because there is no
continuity of interest. As first cautioned by the Second Circuit, a "sale of the
assets of one corporation to another for cash without the retention of any
interest by the seller in the purchaser is quite outside" the purview of the
reorganization statutes. Sales and reorganizations are mutually exclusive.
Tax practitioners can easily describe contrasting examples of reorganizations and sales. A shareholder's exchange of stock in a merger under state
law will be considered an "A" reorganization of all of the consideration he
and the other shareholders receive is stock of the corporation that survives
the merger, or, at least if the Internal Revenue Service is to grant a ruling,
2
no more than half the consideration he receives is property other than stock.
On the other hand, a shareholder's receipt of too much consideration other
than stock or, indeed, receipt solely of non-stock consideration will not be
considered an exchange that has taken place as part of a reorganization.
Instead, the shareholder will have sold his stock.
Tax lawyers also can easily recount less clear situations, cases where the
intended corporate acquisition was not readily classified as a reorganization
or as a sale of the acquired corporation's assets or stock. This article addresses one aspect of the grey area. It explores the problem of remote continuity, specifically as it arises in successive mergers.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the "bottom line" of this
* A.B., Washington University, 1970; J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law,
1973; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1976. Associate Professor of Law, Northern
Illinois University. The author would like to thank William Natbony for his comments.
I. Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. dened,
288 U.S. 599 (1933).
2. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A)(1982); Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 (for ruling purposes,
50% interest is necessary). But see John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (38%
interest sufficient for reorganization). The value of the stock is determined by reference to the
trial court opinion, John A. Nelson Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 1031 (1931).
Reorganizations are defined by I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(1982). An A reorganization is described
by § 368(a)(1)(A), a B reorganization is described by § 368(a)(l)(B), and so on through G reorganizations, § 368(a)(I)(G). Set generally infra text accompanying notes 19-28.

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

article. Continuity of interest and concomitant reorganization status are
sought-or avoided-only to obtain specific tax goals. Foremost among the
benefits of engaging in a reorganization is the nonrecognition of gain to the
participants. Neither the corporate transferor, the corporate transferee, nor
the shareholders of the acquired corporation recognize gain or loss upon its
3
or their exchange of stock or assets for stock. The tax attributes of the corporate transferor, such as net operating losses and the method of accounting,
4
On the other hand, the
also are carried over in certain reorganizations.
parties may wish the exchange to be a taxable sale. Then, for example, the
transferee corporation can obtain a stepped-up basis in the transferor's assets
5
and thereby increase the amount of its depreciation deductions. A reorgan6
ization cannot take place if there is no continuity of interest and this article
analyzes that essential element, especially as that element develops into the
problem of remote continuity.
Remote continuity has been used as a catch-all phrase to describe certain transactions that apparently have not been intended to be sales, but
which have failed to qualify as reorganizations for Federal income tax purposes. Shareholders of the acquired corporation technically fail to obtain a
continuing interest in the acquiring corporation and so there is no continuity
of interest. Remote continuity can prevent a reorganization from transpiring or, even if one takes place, can compel gain recognition to shareholders
of the acquired corporation with respect to stock used that is not stock of the
acquiring corporation. 7 Remote continuity occurs in triangular reorganizations, acquisitions involving not only the acquired and acquiring corporations, but the parent or subsidiary of one of these two corporations as well.
For example, in a triangular reorganization the acquiring corporation,
whose stock is given as consideration to the acquired corporation, might
drop the assets of the acquired corporation into one of its subsidiaries rather
than retaining them. At one time, the transaction failed to conform to the
8
condition that the acquiring corporation be a party to a reorganization. As
3. See I.R.C. §§ 361, 1032, 354, and 355 (1982 & West Supp. 1984); see also infra text
accompanying notes 31-38. Ordinarily, a taxpayer will prefer to recognize losses immediately,
in order to reduce income upon which he is taxed. On the other hand, he will wish to avoid
recognizing gain. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 63, 165, and 1202 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 381(a)(2), 382, and 383 (1982 & West Supp. 1984) (carry-over of tax
attributes in A, C, F, G, and certain nondivisive D reorganizations).
5. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 1011, and 1012 (depreciation and Accelerated Cost Recovery
System deductions and basis therein). But cf. I.R.C. § 338 (1982 & West Supp. 1984) (stock
purchase can be treated as asset purchase, allowing step-up in basis).
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(1980)., See also Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1960).
Several recommendations have proposed substantial modification to the present continuity
of interest requirements. See Staff of the Senate Finance Committee, 98 Cong., 2d Sess., Preliminary Report on Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations, reprintedin
DAILY TAX REP. (CCH) J-1 (Sept. 26, 1983); Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relationships, American Bar Association, Tax Section Recommendaton No. 1981-5, reprinted zn 34 TAX LAW.
1386 (1981); Federal Income Tax Project Subchapter C, Proposals of the American Law Institute and Reporter's Study (1980).
7. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 356(a) (1982); infia text accompanying notes 35-36. Compare Bus
& Transport Securities v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 391 (1935) (no reorganization) with Groman v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (reorganization but gain recognized).
8. See Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), infra notes 104-08; in/ia note 144
(Bashford statutorily overruled). The acquiring corporation technically need not be a party to a
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explained below, continuity in triangular reorganizations can be identified
with the need for a party to a reorganization. If stock of a corporation that is
not a party to a reorganization is used in a triangular reorganization, the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service historically have determined that
there is a problem of remote continuity and that continuity does not exist.
Remote continuity is a shorthand term, one that has not been used by
the courts nor by the Service. For example, in two early Supreme Court
cases that first presented the problem of remote continuity, shareholders of
acquired corporations respectively exchanged their stock for stock of an acquiring corporation's parent and for stock of a corporation which then transferred the acquired corporation's assets to a subsidiary. 9 Clearly, the
Supreme Court thought there was no continuity. It compelled the acquired
corporation's shareholders to recognize gain (outside the reorganization statutes) on receipt of the aforementioned stock, but not because of a problem
with remote continuity. Rather, it declared that, in both cases, the aforementioned stock had not been stock of "a party to a reorganization,"' 0 and
therefore the benefits of engaging in a reorganization did not adhere to this
stock. I These exchanges, transactions that were not intended to be sales,
still failed to be the reorganizations that had been planned because stock of a
related corporation, not stock of a "party to a reorganization," had been
used. 12
The problem of remote continuity can arise when statutory mergers follow one another. As explained below, the legislative neutering of the circumstances where the problem can arise makes successive mergers a likely
candidate for remote continuity.' 3 To illustrate the susceptibility of successive mergers, consider a parent corporation that merges into its subsidiary, a
downstream merger, followed by the successor's merger into a third corporation, a lateral merger. (Matters could then be complicated by the acquired
subsidiary corporation's receiving stock of the acquiring corporation's parent, not of the acquiring corporation itself. The transaction might still qualify as a reorganization, but the continuity-the acquired parent's
shareholders' continuing proprietary interest-would be in a more distant
corporation.) 14
If the mergers occurred pursuant to a single plan of reorganization, then
the shareholders of the acquired parent may not be considered to have rereorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(1982). As is described below, however, the benefits of
participating in a reorganization generally depend upon a corporation's characterization as a
party to a reorganization and upon a shareholder's ownership of stock in such a corporation. See
alsoinfia text accompanying 31-38 and 128-31.
9. See Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302
U.S. 454, 455-56. (1938). See ihfra text accompanying notes 91-108.
10. See I.R.C. § 368(b) (1982).
11. See Groman, 302 U.S. at 90-98; Bashford, 302 U.S. at 458.
12. See generally B. BITrKER ANDJ. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
14.11, at 14-22 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BITrKER AND

EUSTICEl (discussion of remote continuity).
13. See in/6a text accompanying notes 133-149.
14. See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), -(a)(2)(D);
Edwards Motor Transport Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 2164 (1964) (discussion of a merger of a holding company into a
subsidiary.).
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ceived stock of the acquiring corporation-the acquired subsidiary. Instead,
they could be treated as having received stock of a third corporation, the
ultimate acquiring corporation, and be compelled to recognize gain, because
they do not possess the requisite continuity. If the mergers occur pursuant to
two rather than a single plan of reorganization, then target shareholders can
avoid recognizing gain in both reorganizations, because of continuity. In the
case of each merger, the shareholders of the target corporation will have
15
received stock of the corporation that actually acquired their corporation.
Business conditions may compel engaging in two successive mergers.
For example, an acquiring corporation probably will wish to dismantle the
management structure of the target companies, especially if it finds that
management to be redundant. Such dismantling can be obtained through
6
the downstream and lateral mergers described in the preceding paragraph. '
But despite compelling circumstances for engaging in successive mergers, no
reorganization can occur if the problem of remote continuity is found to
exist. This article attempts to reconcile the tension between the constraints
of business goals and the requirements of federal income tax laws, so that
both the downstream and the lateral mergers can qualify as reorganizations
under the tax law. This article will initially describe acquisitive reorganizations and define the terms necessary for understanding whether or not a reorganization has occurred and what will happen if there is a reorganization. It
then describes the development of continuity of interest by analyzing statutory and interpretative developments. Finally, it reviews the ramifications of
several modes of analyzing the problem of remote continuity of interest.
I.

A.

THE HISTORY OF CONTINUITY OF SHAREHOLDER INTEREST

Types of Reorganizaions
A reorganization is a corporate transformation entailing the combina-

15. The benefits of engaging in a reorganization inure to the target corporation and its
shareholders only if they exchange their assets or stock pursuant to a "plan of reorganization."
See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 361(a) (1982); infia text accompanying notes 33-36. Section 354(a) requires the target's shareholders to receive stock of a party to the reorganization, ie., the acquiring corporation, under the plan of reorganization. Thus, if the plan for the mergers discussed in
the text were for the acquired parent to merge into the acquired subsidiary, then the acquired
parent's shareholders' receipt of the acquiring corporation's stock would not qualify for nonrecognition under § 354(a). The reason for this is that the acquiring corporation is not a party to
the reorganization, nor was its stock received pursuant to an appropriate plan.
Alternatively, it also could be argued that the plan was to merge the acquired parent into
the acquiring corporation, and that the stock the acquired parent's shareholders received, that
of the acquired subsidiary, was not stock of a party to the reorganization. See Helvering v.
Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
16. Cf American Bronze Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1111, 1124-29 (1975) (simplification of business structure is good business purpose). Legal restrictions also may lead to the
particular structure of a reorganization. For example, the various regulatory approvals necessary to consummate mergers between commercial banks could lead to engaging in downstream
and forward triangular mergers in order to obtain the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, the part of the U.S. Treasury Department that regulates national banks, rather than that
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. See Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercal Bank
Mergers." Product-OrientedRedefniton, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907, 909 n.15 (1983). Recently, the
Comptroller has held a less rigorous view than the Federal Reserve of what mergers will have
anti-competitive effects.
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tion, devolution, or division of preexisting corporations. Continuity of interest is an element only of acquisitive and divisive reorganizations, so only
these types of reorganizations are discussed. ' 7 Corporate rearrangements described in Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") section 368(a)(1)(A), -(B), -(C),
and some situations described in section 368(a)(1)(D) are acquisitive types of
reorganizations in which one corporation acquires the assets or stock of another corporation.' 8 A divisive reorganization must conform with sections
368(a)(1)(D) and 355.9
In an A reorganization, two corporations merge or consolidate under
the corporation laws of the United States, a state, a territory, or the District
of Columbia. 20 Two corporations combine to form a new, third corporation
in a consolidation, whereas one of two combining corporations survives in a
merger, having acquired the property of the other corporation. 2i In either
case, the target corporation transfers its property to the surviving corporation, and the target's shareholders obtain stock of the latter corporation.
The acquiring corporation need not use voting stock, and it may use greater
amounts of non-stock consideration than can be used in other types of
22
reorganizations.
In contrast, B and C reorganizations depend upon compliance with
strict consideration tests. In a B reorganization, shareholders of the acquired
corporation exchange their stock solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. After the reorganization, the acquiring corporation must own at
least eighty percent of the voting stock and at least eighty percent of all other
stock of the target corporation. 23 Thus, the acquiring corporation obtains a
subsidiary. In a C reorganization, the acquired corporation exchanges substantially all of its assets solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation.
Although the acquisition of assets is a shared feature of A and C reorganizations, more stringent requirements are imposed on C reorganizations. Generally, the acquiring corporation must use its voting stock as consideration in
a C reorganization, and this stock must constitute at least eighty percent of
2 4
the consideration paid to the acquired corporation.
17. See zt/a text accompanying notes 50-85 (regarding development of continuity in reorganizations), see also n/ta text accompanying notes 280-89 (regarding continuity in divisive reorganizations and § 355 distributions). Regarding other reorganizations, see ilna note 28; Hickok
9 59
8
v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 80 (1959),nonacq., 1
-2 C.B. nnacq. withdrawn, 1977-2 C.B. 3; Rev.
Rul. 77-479, 1977-2 C.B. 119; Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311 (continuity unnecessary in
recapitalizations); H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2 C.B.
620, 638-39; Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux: The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ProposalsCorporate Aspects, 36 TAX L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1980) (regarding continuity in G reorganizations).
18. See i.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(D), 354 (1982).
19. See generaly BrrrKER AND EUSTICE, Supra note 12, at
14.
20. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (1983).
21.

15 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041

(perm. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
23. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (c) (1982). The acquiring corporation also can use the voting
stock of a corporation that controls it.
24. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), (c) (1982). The acquiring corporation also can use the voting
stock of a corporation that controls it. Compare I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982) and John A. Nelson
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) with I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(C) and (a)(2)(B) (1982), to illustrate the laxer standards imposed on A reorganizations.
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In a D reorganization, one corporation transfers some or all of its assets
to a second corporation. Immediately after the transfer, the first corporation
or one or more of its shareholders controls the second corporation. 25 If the
reorganization is acquisitive, the acquired corporation must transfer substantially all its assets and distribute the acquiring corporation's stock to its
shareholders, so that it must, in effect, liquidate. 26 Such a reorganization
could occur, for example, when a parent corporation wishes to eliminate a
subsidiary but not dispose of any of the subsidiary's assets. 27 If section
368(a)(1)(D) is the basis for splitting a corporation with multiple businesses
into multiple corporations, then it is a divisive reorganization. 28
B.

The Benefits of Engaging in a Reorganization

Being a "party to a reorganization" or a shareholder of a "party to a
reorganization" is a statutory prerequisite to enjoyment of the benefits of a
reorganization. A party to a reorganization includes a corporation resulting
from the reorganization, and both of the corporations in an acquisitive reorganization. 29 And, since 1954, as various triangular corporate acquisitions
have been included in the definition of a reorganization, the meaning of a
party to a reorganization also has been expanded to include all of the corpo30
rations that participate in these acquisitions.
Section 361 provides that a corporation that is a party to a reorganization shall recognize no gain or loss upon its exchange of property, pursuant
to a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation that also is a party to the reorganization. 31 Thus, section 361 accords
nonrecognition treatment to the target corporation, subject only to its re32
ceipt of "boot," i'e., consideration other than stock or securities.
25. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1982).
26. See I.R.C. § 354(b) (1982). A distribution of the controlled corporation's stock in a
divisive D reorganization is made pursuant to § 355, not § 354, so that the transferor's liquidation is unnecessary in the divisive reorganization. See generally BrrrKER AND EUSTICE, supra
note 12, at
14.16.
27. Where a reorganization can be characterized as a C or D reorganization,
§ 368(a)(2)(A) requires the reorganization to be treated as a D reorganization. Under appropriate circumstances, the reorganization also might be considered an A, E, or F reorganization. See
BITTKER AND EusTICE, supra note 12, at
14.16.
28. E, F, and G reorganizations complete the roster of reorganizations. E and F reorganizations, which are recapitalizations and mere changes in a corporation's identity, form, or place
of organization, respectively. Such reorganizations do not involve a substantive combination or
division. In a recapitalization, a corporation's capital structure is altered. An F reorganization
might be effected to gain, for example, the benefit of organizing under another state's law.
Neither of these corporate devolutions, however can be regarded as acquisitive reorganizations.
G reorganizations were added to the Code by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(G) (1982). See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(3) (1982). In a G reorganization, one corporation transfers all or some of its assets to another corporation in a Chapter II bankruptcy proceeding. As in a D reorganization, the transferor corporation must either transfer substantially
all assets and distribute the acquiring corporation's stock or securities to its stock or security
holders, or one or more of the holders of its securities or stock must control the transferee corporation after the reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(G) (1982).
29. See I.R.C. § 368(b) (1982).
30. See I.R.C. § 368(c). See generally inira text accompanying notes 142-45.
31. See 1.R.C. § 361(a) (1982).
32. See I.R.C. § 361(b) (1982).
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The treatment of the corporate transferee, the acquiring corporation,
does not depend upon its status as a party to a reorganization. A corporation that acquires property in exchange for its stock recognizes neither gain
nor loss under section 1032, 3 3 regardless of whether or not a reorganization
has occurred. Its basis in the property that it acquires is determined by reference to the transferor's basis in the property, increased by the amount of
34
gain, if any, the transferor recognizes on the transfer of such property.
Recognition of gain or loss to shareholders of the acquired corporation
is determined under section 354 or section 355. Under section 354, the target
corporation's shareholders do not recognize loss. They recognize gain, but
only to the extent of boot received. 3 5 They must exchange stock or securities
in their corporation solely for stock or securities in another corporation, i.e.,
the aforementioned acquiring corporation. Both corporations must be parties to the reorganization and the exchange must occur pursuant to a plan of
reorganization. 36 A section 355 distribution is made in connection with a
divisive D reorganization. Generally, holders of stock or securities of a corporation, that owns at least eighty percent of another corporation's voting
and other stock, receive the controlled corporation's stock or securities pursuant to the section 355 distribution. Gain is recognized to the extent of boot.
Loss is not recognized. 3 7 Section 358 provides that the basis of stock or securities received by the acquired corporation's stock or securities holders
shall be the same as basis of the stock or securities transferred, increased by
the amount of any gain recognized and decreased by the amount of any loss
recognized and the value of the boot received in the exchange. 38
Being a party to a reorganization or a shareholder of such a party accords certain benefits. As explained below, not being such a party is a mani39
festation of the problem of remote continuity.
C.

Earo Statutoy Development

Section 368(a)(1) did not spring forth fully grown like Athena did from
Jupiter's forehead.4 ° Rather, its pedestrian origin was a 1918 statute, which
was much terser than its contemporary descendant. Continuity of interest
was not and never has been an explicit statutory requirement. 4 ' Instead, the
33. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1982).
34. See I.R.C. § 362(b) (1982).
35. See I.R.C. §§ 354 and 356 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
36. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 356(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1984). Section 356(a)(2) characterizes
gain as capital gain or as ordinary income. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th
Cir. 1973), with Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), and Rev. Rul. 75-83,
1975-1 C.B. 112 (which illustrates the present state of characterizing gain under § 356(a)(2)).
Regarding the "plan of reorganization" under I.R.C. §§ 354(a) & 361(a), see generaloy
Faber, The Use and Mtnuse of the Plan of Reorganizattn Concept, 38 TAX L. REV. 515 (1983).
37. See I.R.C. §§ 355, 356 and 368(c) (1982 & West Supp. 1984). See also in/ia text accompanying notes 273-76.
38. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1982). Other doctrines further limit reorganizations. In addition to continuity of interest, reorganizations must possess a business purpose as well as a con2
tinuity of business enterprise. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), -1(c), - (g) (1980).
39. See in/ira notes 86-131.
40. See BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 11-12 (Modern Library).

41. See generally Turnier, Continuity of Interest-Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring
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doctrine of continuity has been integrated into the development of reorganizations, first by judicial sanction, and then by statutory amendments that, in
effect, have imposed specific continuity standards on certain types of
reorganizations.
Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 191842 treated property as the
equivalent of cash when it was exchanged for other property, for purposes of
determining gain or loss from the exchange. No gain or loss, however, occurred under the statute upon the exchange by a person of stock or securities
for new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value if the
exchange occurred in connection with "the reorganization, merger, or con'4 3
solidation of a corporation."
Only in 1921 did Congress actually define the term "reorganization" as
a merger or consolidation, including the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and of all other stock of an acquired
corporation or of substantially all the assets of the acquired corporation or of
substantially all the assets of the acquired corporation, as a recapitalization,
and as a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization. 44 These
reorganizations find their present counterparts in A, B, C, E, and F reorganizations. 45 The list of reorganizations was expanded by the Revenue Act of
1924, which added modern D reorganizations to the list of events that quali46
fied as tax-free reorganizations.
The year 1924 also marked the introduction of a more comprehensive
reorganization scheme. The term "a party to a reorganization" was first
used in the Revenue Act of 1924. Like its modern day successor, it included
a corporation resulting from a reorganization. It also included both corporations in the case of an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of
Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 912-14 (1976) (explaining the policy underlying early reorganization statutes).
42. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (1918).
43. Id No gain realization provision was expressly enacted in 1918. Rather, § 213(a) simply defined gross income to include gains. Cf S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918),
reprtnted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 117, 120, and H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 130, 132. Not until the Revenue Act of 1924 was a gain realization provision enacted, the precedessor of I.R.C. § 1001 (1982), in order to clarify the statutory
base of the concept. Revenue Act of 1924, infra note 46, § 202(a). See generally H. R. REP. No.
179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprintedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 250.
Section 202(b) was modified by § 202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921, infta note 44, and
was again modified by § 203(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1924, infta note 46, when the predecessor ofI.R.C. § 354(a)(1) was enacted, using language identical to the current statute. See I.R.C.
§ 354(a)(1) (1982).
44. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230.
45. Section 202(c) (2) defined a reorganization as a "merger or consolidation (including the
acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of another corporation)," as well as E and F reorganizations. Although
the statute could be read as defining an A reorganization only as a B or C reorganization, the
Supreme Court held soon after the enactment of § 202 that A, B, and C reorganizations were
separate and distinct reorganizations. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933).
46. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(1)(D), 43 Stat. 257-59. D reorganizations were
viewed as a common form of reorganization under state law, necessitating their beatification to
reorganization status in the federal tax laws. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 252-53. See generally Turnier,supra note 41, at 911-16.
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the voting and other stock of another corporation. 47 Nonrecognition treatment continued to be allowed to the acquired corporation, but only if it was
a party to a reorganization. 48 Nonrecognition treatment also was allowed to
that corporation's shareholders if stock or securities of the acquiring corpora49
tion was distributed to them pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
For the next ten years, the statutory definition of reorganizations was
not otherwise modified. But the terms "reorganization" and "party to a reorganization" were the subjects of judicial analysis.
D.

Eary Cases- Contznuity and Remote Continuzty

The Supreme Court first analyzed continuity of interest in 1933 in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner.50 Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company exchanged its assets with another corporation for $400,000 cash and
$1,000,000 of short-term notes due no more than three and one-half months
after the exchange. 5 1 In addressing whether or not the transaction constituted a reorganization under a 1926 statute (which resembled the 1921 statute noted above), 52 the Court stated that "the seller must acquire an interest
in the affairs of the purchasing company more definite than that incident of
ownership of its short term purchase money notes." ' 53 The Court was unable
to distinguish between an exchange of assets for cash-a taxable sale-and
an exchange of assets for cash and short-term notes. Accordingly, the exchange was taxable. 54 Although the requirements of a statutory reorganization were not clearly defined by the Court, it squelched what it perceived to
be a taxable nonstatutory reorganization.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied upon CortlandSpecialty
Co. v. Commissioner.5 5 Cortland had been decided the year before Pinellas by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In Cortland, one corporation ex47. Revenue Act of 1924,supra note 46, § 203(h)(2). Introduction of the term was intended
to codify the Service's interpretation of the law. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprintedbn 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 251; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
reprintedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 266, 275. See generaly Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924, 24
COLLM. L. REx'. 836, 844-55 (1924). Unlike I.R.C. § 368(b), a party to a reorganization did not
include both parties to an acquisitive reorganization under § 203(h)(2). Since both parties
could qualify only if one acquired a majority of the other corporation's stock (then, a B reorganization), seemingly the acquired corporation in an A or C reorganization was not a party to a
reorganization. However, the statute was not so interpreted. See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935) (this point not raised in A reorganization).
48. Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46, § 203(b)(3).
49. Revenue Act of 1924 § 203(b)(2). H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
reprttedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 251, states that § 203(b)(2) did not modify earlier law. The
earlier statute--§ 202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921-provided nonrecognition treatment for
stock or securities "in a corporation a party to or resulting from such reorganization" received
by the acquired corporation's shareholders.
50. 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
51. See id. at 464.
52. The statute under examination was § 203 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9
(1926). See supra note 44 (1921 statute).
53. 287 U.S. at 470. The Court also distinguished between A, B and C reorganizations.
An A reorganization was a distinct reorganization, not just a term that was void of meaning
other than to distinguish B and C reorganizations. See id. at 469. See supra note 45.
54. See 287 U.S. at 469.
55. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
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changed its operating assets for cash of $53,000 and $160,000 of notes of
another corporation. 56 The notes matured at varying times, none more than
14 months after the exchange. 57 The taxpayer argued that even though the
transaction was not a merger under state law, it was a reorganization (under
the same 1926 statute under which Pinellas would be decided). 58 But the
Second Circuit distinguished between a cash sale and a statutory reorganization. 59 It held that a "sale of the assets of one corporation to another for
cash without the retention of any interest by the seller in the purchaser is
quite outside the objects of merger and consolidation statutes" 60 of the state
where the transaction had occurred and was not a reorganization under federal statute. Instead, "section 203 of the Revenue Act [of 1926] gives the
widest room for all kinds of changes in corporate structure, but does not
abandon the primary requisite that there must be some continuity of interest
on the part of transferor corporation or its stockholders in order to secure
exemption." 61 Such continuity was evident in the state laws under which
the exchange was effected and, therefore, was required by federal law as
well. 6 2 As would be true of Pinellas, reorganizations were defined negatively:
regardless of what constituted a reorganization, the exchange of assets for
cash and short-term notes was not such a creature.
Two years after Pinellas, the Supreme Court again addressed continuity
of interest, this time defining it positively. The Court spoke in four simultaneous decisions.6 3 In the best known of these cases, Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co. ,64 the Court held that a corporation's exchange of all its assets for cash
and voting trust certificates constituted a reorganization because the transferor had acquired a substantial enough proprietary interest in the acquiring
corporation. 6 5 The voting trust certificates, which were deemed to be the
equivalent of stock, represented 56 percent of the consideration and the cash
represented 44 percent. 66 The Court stated:
The transaction here was no sale, but partook of the nature of the
reorganization in that the seller acquired a definite and substantial
interest in the purchaser. . . . [A] large part of the consideration
was cash. This, we think, is permissible so long as the taxpayer
received an interest in the affairs of the transferee which repre67
sented a material part of the value of the transferred assets.
56. See id. at 938.
57. See id
58. See i. at 939.
59. Id.
60. Id Mergers and consolidations encompass the types of transactions described supra
text accompanying note 21, which the court differentiated from a cash sale. Id.
61. Id at 940.
62. Id
63. The Court also decided G & K Manufacturing Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389 (1935),
at this time. The case concerned a reorganization, but no substantial decision was made. The
case was remanded and, therefore, has been excluded from the cases discussed in the text.
64. 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
65. See id at 385, 386.
66. See id at 381.
67. Id. at 386. This was a C reorganization executed under § 112(i)(1)(A) of the Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (1928).
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Simultaneously, the Court held inJohn A. Nelson Co. v. Helver'ng,6 that
continuity of interest existed where 38 percent of the acquiring corporation's
consideration paid to the target corporation was nonvoting preferred stock,
even though cash constituted the rest of the consideration. 6 9 The acquired
corporation's shareholders obtained a "definite interest" in the acquiring
corporation, so that a reorganization was considered to have occurred. 70 In
the third case, Helvering v. Watts, 7 1 the Supreme Court concluded that a reorganization had occurred where a corporation exchanged its assets for stock
and long-term bonds of the acquiring corporation. 72 There, the stock represented 45 percent of the consideration. 73 Although the bonds were held to
be "securities" within the intendment of the law, the Court refrained from
addressing whether or not these securities alone would have created continuity of interest. The fourth opinion, regarding parties to a reorganization,
74
is discussed below.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed continuity of interest in
LeTulle v. Scofield. 75 In Le Tulle, a corporation exchanged all its assets for
cash of $50,000 and bonds of the acquiring corporation in the amount of
$750,000.76 The bonds were payable from one to twelve years after the exchange. 77 The Court decided that the long-term bonds did not establish a
continuity of interest, thereby answering the unspoken question asked in
Walts. 78 Regardless of the term of the bonds, their holder becomes a creditor of the acquiring corporation, not the holder of a proprietary interest in
it. 79 Because of the absence of proprietary consideration, no reorganization
had occurred. 80
Two aspects of continuity of shareholder interest were developed by
these cases that have become entrenched in current law. 8 ' First, the quality
of the consideration must be proprietary. Under Pinellas and Le Tulle,
neither short- nor long-term debt creates continuity. Rather, stock, even nonvoting preferred stock, as in Nelson, must constitute all or a sufficiently large
portion of the consideration. Of course, B and C reorganizations specifically
require that the stock used be voting stock.
68. 296 U.S. 374 (1935).

69. See id. at 376.
70. Id at 377. The transaction effected was a C reorganization, under § 203 of the Revenue Act of 1926 supra note 52.
71. 296 U.S. 387 (1935). This was a B reorganization that was effected under § 203 of the
Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46.
72. See 296 U.S. at 388.
73. See id
74. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
75. 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
76. Set id at 416.
77. See id
78. Set id. at 420-2 1.
79. See id
80. See id. at 421.
81. As noted at the start of this article, continuity of interest can be viewed as the continuing interest of the acquired corporation's shareholder in the acquiring corporation. See, e.g.,
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Commentators, however, have argued variously that continuity should be measured against the acquiring corporation's shareholders, See Turnier, supra
note 41, at 928-41, and that continuity is unnecessary, Faber, Contrnuity of Interest and Bustess
Enterprse Is It Tine To Bury Some Sacred Cows, 36 TAx LAW. 239 (198 1).
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Secondly, the amount of the proprietary interest must be substantial.
The Supreme Court delineated between statutory reorganizations and other
transactions by whether or not the acquired corporation's shareholders' interest was "definite and substantial. '8 2 Fifty-six percent was definite and
substantial, as was 38 percent. 83 It follows that receipt of a greater percentage of stock also qualifies as the requisite proprietary interest that will establish continuity. The proportion measured is of the amount of stock received
against the total consideration received. 84 Regardless of these lesser standards, however, the Internal Revenue Service presently states that it will not
issue rulings unless shareholders of the target corporation obtain and retain
stock of the acquiring corporation at least equal to 50 percent of the value of
all outstanding stock of the acquired corporation on the effective date of the
85
reorganization.
The Supreme Court also decided at an early time that remote continuity of interest was an inadequate form of continuity. It first reviewed the
issue entwined with the problem of remote continuity, whether or not a corporation was a party to a reorganization, in 1935 in Bus & Transport Securities
v. Helvering.86 There, the controlling shareholder of the two acquired corporations formed another corporation whose stock he acquired in exchange for
stock of the first two corporations. 87 He then caused the new corporation to
exchange the stock of the other two corporations for the assets of the acquiring corporation's newly formed subsidiary. 88 These assets consisted of some
89
of its parent's stock.
The Supreme Court concluded that neither of the exchanging parties
were parties to a reorganization since neither "acquired any definite immediate interest in the other." 9 The opinion summarily suggests that effecting a
merger through newly created corporations precludes those corporations
82. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. at 386; John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. at 377.
83. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378; John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 374. Cf Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973) (less than 20% does not satisfy
continuity).
84. This comparison would be skewed if the consideration received were not the same
amount as the consideration given. Perhaps for this reason, Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568,
measures the stock of the acquiring corporation that was received by the acquired corporation's
shareholders against the value of the stock of the acquired corporation that they relinquished, in
stating how much stock they must retain. As noted by BrrTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at
14.11, "a whale can swallow a minnow" because the quantitive comparison necessary to determine continuity is as stated above, not as the percentage of stock that the acquired corporation's
shareholders have received of the acquiring corporation's outstanding stock. Compare Helvering
v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (56% stock; 44% cash) and Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387
(45% stock; 55% long-term bonds) with Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933). Reorganizations occurred in the first two cases, but not the third. The combination of stock with one type or another of non-stock consideration is irrelevant. BITTKER AND
EUSTICE, supra note 12, at 14.11; McGaffey & Hunt, Contiui'ty ofShareholderInterest i Acquisitive
Reorganziattons, 59 Taxes 659, 661-65 (1981). See also McGaffey & Hunt at 665-70 (effect of
valuation upon meeting Rev. Proc. 77-37, see supra note 2).
85. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
86. 296 U.S. 391 (1935).
87. See id. at 392.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id at 393.
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from being parties to a reorganization. The Court appeared to sense that
the real merger occurred between the newly created corporations' ancestors
(the acquiring corporation's parent and the acquired corporations' subsidiaries). And, since newly formed corporations had been interposed that were
not parties to a reorganization, no reorganization resulted.
The problem of remote continuity was reviewed again two years later in
the better known case of Groman v. Commissioner.9 1 There, continuity did not
exist because shareholders of the acquired corporation exchanged their stock
for (i) preferred stock of the newly formed acquiring corporation, (ii) stock of
its parent, and (iii) cash. 92 The acquiring corporation was immediately liquidated by its parent. 9 3 The Court determined that the parent was not "a
party to a reorganization. ' ' 94 Although the Court interpreted the statutory
definition of the term "party to a reorganization" expansively, it strongly
implied that receipt of stock or assets was necessary for a corporation to become a party to a reorganization. 95 This reading of the statute is superficially attractive, because the statute defined a party to a reorganization to
include a corporation resulting from a reorganization and, in effect, both
corporations in a B reorganization. 96 Such corporations would receive something in a reorganization, and the acquiring parent in Groman did not. Upon
closer inspection, this reading of the statute falters. If the conditions that
continuity was intended to satisfy were met-if continuity existed-then the
97
parent should have been considered to be a party to a reorganization.
The subsidiary and the target corporation were parties to a reorganization because shareholders of the target and the subsidiary exchanged stock
and had engaged in a reorganization. 98 The parent corporation, however,
acted as a mere "agent" in effecting the reorganization. 99 The Court rejected the argument of the taxpayer (a shareholder of the target) that the
subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent. 0 0 The parent participated in the
reorganization, but had not received anything directly as a result of its subsidiary's acquisition of the acquired corporation's stock.' 0 ' The Court held
that stock of the parent corporation used in the exchange was not under the
nonrecognition aegis of section 354's predecessor. 102 Therefore, receipt of
the parent's stock was taxable to the acquired corporation's shareholders just
03
as if the acquiring subsidiary had transferred cash, not stock of its parent. 1
Remote continuity was condemned again the next year in Hdverzng v.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

302 U.S. 82 (1937).
See id.at 83-84.
See id.at 84.
Id. at 90.
Id at 87-88.
See id at 85.
See in/fa text accompanying notes 128-31.
See 302 U.S. at 88.
See id at 89.

100. Id.
101. 302 U.S. at 85-90.
102. See in/a text accompanying notes 35-36.
103. An A reorganization between the acquired corporation and the acquiring subsidiary
occurred. It was premised upon the acquired corporation's shareholders' receipt of the subsidiary stock equalling 41% of the total consideration received. See 302 U.S. at 83-84.
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Bashford.10 4 There, the acquiring parent obtained the assets of several corporations and transferred them to its newly-formed subsidiary.' 0 5 The parent's possession of the acquired corporations' assets was determined to be
temporary and, therefore, was disregarded by the Supreme Court. 10 6 In a
brief opinion, the Court held that the parent was not a party to a reorganization, relying upon Groman.' 0 7 Although this transaction was considered to be
a reorganization, as in Groman, receipt of the parent corporation's stock was
taxable to the acquired corporation's shareholders under section 354's predecessor, because the parent was not a party to the reorganization. 108
Remote continuity also has been analyzed in several lower court decisions, most of which were rendered about the time the Supreme Court decided Bus & Transport Securties, Groman and Bashford.'0 9 Some of the cases
are garden variety variations of Groman or Bashford-stock or assets of the
acquired corporation were exchanged for stock of a related corporation that
was not a party to a reorganization." l0 Some of the cases, however, articulated certain themes also found in Groman and Bashford in denying party-toa-reorganization status to a participant in the acquisition.
The agency theory that later would be rejected by the Groman court was
rejected earlier in Beech v. Commissioner. 1"' In Beech, the acquiring corporation proposed a stock-for-stock exchange with the shareholders of the target
corporation."t 2 The former corporation then used two other, independent,
corporations to effect the exchange after deciding that the original plan
3
could be delayed by a required application for government approval.11 Curiously, shareholders of the acquired corporation were not informed of the
new plan. 1 4 The independent corporations acquired 76 percent of the acquired corporation's stock for cash and the rest for stock of the acquiring
corporation.' 15
The court concluded that no reorganization had occurred. 116 The independent corporations could not be considered to be the agents of the acquiring corporation and, therefore, were not parties to a reorganization., '7
Consequently, the acquired corporation's shareholders were outside the
scope of section 354's predecessor." 18
Arguably, the parent and wholly-owned subsidiary participants in Gro104. 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
105. See id at 455.
106. See id. at 458.
107. See id. at 456-57.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. The reorganization was an A reorganization.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-108.
110. Eg., Lawrence v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1941) (complicated factual
setting, in which stock of acquiring parent held to be taxable boot because parent was not a
party to a reorganization).
111. 82 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1936).
112. Seeid at 43.
113. See id.at 44.
114. See id. at 43-44.
115. See id. at 44.
116. See id. at 45.
117. See id. at 44.
118. See id. at 45.

19841

REMOTE CONTINUITY OF INTEREST

man present a stronger agency case than the unrelated parties in Beech. Parent and subsidiary combinations have been vindicated by amendments to
the reorganization statutes.' 19 Aside from the statutes, however, the control
factor of this setting should raise a presumption of agency. On the other
hand, it could be contended that unrelated parties can be hired as agents in
specific circumstances, although apparently not in Beech. If so, the agents
120
can be ignored and the exchange could be treated as a reorganization.
The relevance of the parent and subsidiary connection can be seen in
another case, Hedden v. Commiss'oner.' 2 1 The Hedden taxpayer unsuccessfully
argued another Groman theory, that there was an identity between the acquiring parent and its subsidiaries.12 2 The acquiring corporation exchanged
its bonds and cash for assets of the acquired corporation and then transferred
those assets to two of its subsidiaries.' 23 The taxpayer, a shareholder of the
acquired corporation, argued that the acquiring parent was the real party in
interest.' 2 4 Citing Groman, however, the court concluded that the acquiring
parent could not be identified with its subsidiaries. '25 The subsidiaries had
lives separate from their parent and, in fact, became indebted to their parent
for the consideration used in the acquisition.' 2 6 Therefore, the parent was
27
not a party to the reorganization.
As can be seen, continuity can be roughly equated with being a party to
a reorganization. The above cases indicated that if stock of a corporation
that is not a party to a reorganization is used, continuity will be too remote
to sustain a reorganization for tax purposes. This equivalence probably is
less apparent in the typical continuity cases where the type and amount of
the consideration and not the status of the contributing corporation are at
issue. 128
The doctrine of continuity of interest was developed to bestow certain
tax benefits only in bonafide reorganizations. It should follow that whenever
there is a problem with remote continuity, these benefits should be denied
because a true reorganization has not occurred. Remote continuity, however, rests on a baroque foundation. Groman intimates that a corporation
29
cannot be a party to a reorganization unless it receives stock or assets.'
Mere receipt is little more than a formalistic objection. If the Bashford court
could disregard the formal step of transferring assets to the acquiring par119. See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
120. Although intermediate steps are frequently ignored when taken by related parties, see,
e.g., Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), they certainly can be ignored even when taken
by unrelated parties, see, e.g., American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, II T.C. 397 (1948).
afdper curiain, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). See also infra text
accompanying notes 212-23 (discussion of step transaction doctrine).
121. 105 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.) cer. denied, 308 U.S. 575 (1939).
122. See id. at 313.
123. Interestingly, the quality of the consideration, bonds, was not addressed.
124. See 105 F.2d at 313.
125. See id. at 313-14.
126. See id. at 315.
127. Id. at 315.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
129. See supra note 95.
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ent,' 30 then remote continuity also can entertain disregard of other matters
of form. Substantive theories, such as agency and parent-subsidiary identity,
should be and were raised in some of the older remote continuity cases in
order to ascertain whether or not continuity existed in a remote continuity
32
context.13 1 These points and others are developed below.1
E.

Development of a Statutog Continuity of Interest

Courts, not Congress, imbued the early federal tax statutes with the requirement of continuity of interest. Congress's subsequent amendments to
the reorganization statutes promoted continuity by requiring shareholders of
the acquired corporation to receive a specified proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation. These amendments diminished instances in which
remote continuity could destroy a reorganization.
Congress first required that a statutory continuity requirement be fulfilled with the Revenue Act of 1924, by permitting a transfer of assets to a
corporation that was controlled by the transferor (the acquisitive type of D
reorganization). 13 3 Continuity was fostered because the transferor was required to own at least 80 percent of the corporation to which it transferred
assets.134
Congress again expanded continuity when it enacted the Revenue Act
of 1934. There, Congress required that in the acquisition of stock for stock
or the acquisition of assets for stock-a modern B and a somewhat modern C
reorganization-the acquiring corporation must use solely voting stock to
acquire either (i) at least 80 percent of the voting stock and at least 80 percent of all other stock of the acquired corporation or (ii) substantially all the
assets of the acquired corporation.' 35 (Only in 1954 did C reorganizations
assume their current form.)1 36 This restriction markedly increased the quantity and quality of qualifying consideration that the acquiring corporation
had to provide. Under the 1921 predecessor of the 1934 statute, the acquiring corporation needed only to obtain a majority of a corporation's voting
and other stock in a B reorganization.' 37 Neither B nor C reorganizations
38
heretofore had required use of voting stock.'
130. See supra text accompanying note 106.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 111-23.
132. See infia text accompanying notes 152-302.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 46.
134. See Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46, § 203(h)(1)(D).
2
135. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 11 (g), 48 Stat. 705 (1934).
136. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B) (1982). The definition of a C reorganization was expanded in
1954 to permit the acquiring corporation to use voting stock to acquire no less than 80% of the
assets of the acquired corporation. Liabilities of the acquired corporation that the acquiring
corporation assumes are treated as money paid for the acquired corporation's assets.
137. See supra text accompanying note 44.
138. See generally supra notes 44-45. The 1934 expansion was the result of a congressional
dialectic in which a House Ways and Means subcommittee proposed repeal of the reorganization provisions. Ultimately, the Ways and Means Committee severely restricted reorganizations, and the more moderate stance of the Senate Finance Committee prevailed. See
PRELIMINARY REP. OF A SUBCOMM. ON THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d Cong., 2d

Sess., PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8-9 (Comm. Print 1933); H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted n 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 554, 564; S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 586, 598-99.
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Thus, by 1934, B, C, and D reorganizations were removed from the
judicial tests used to detect continuity. If, for example, an acquired corporation's shareholders had received any consideration in a reorganization consummated in 1935,. other than the acquiring corporation's voting stock, a C
reorganization could not take place. Applying the lesser numerical or qualitative standards of Mz'nnesota Tea or Nelson to these reorganizations became
irrelevant. 139
As the definition of reorganization was tightened in 1934, the term "a
party to a reorganization" was modified to resemble its present-day successor, without the triangular reorganization additions. 140 In 1934, the term
was defined as a corporation resulting from a reorganization and both corporations in an acquisitive reorganization. 141
Instances of statutorily imposed continuity swelled in 1954 and instances in which the problem of remote continuity could arise simultaneously diminished. The Code was amended to overcome the effects of Groman
and Bashford. C reorganizations were modified to allow the acquiring corporation to use the voting stock of its parent, thereby emasculating that holding of Groman which prohibited the parent corporation's stock from being
tendered as part of the consideration. 142
In Bashford, the intermediate step of transferring assets of the target corporation to the acquiring corporation's parent was ignored and, because the
parent was not a party to a reorganization, the target shareholders' receipt of
this stock was taxable. 14 3 Bashford also was gutted. Under the 1954 changes
to the Internal Revenue Code, A and C reorganizations could occur even if
the acquiring corporation transferred all or some of the acquired corporation's assets to its controlled subsidiary. 144
Finally, the definition of a party to a reorganization was expanded to
include the parent and subsidiary corporations in all of the situations described in the above two paragraphs. 145
The problem of remote continuity has diminished as a result of other
subsequent statutory modifications. Voting stock of the acquiring corporation's parent can be used in a B reorganization and all or some of the acquired corporation's stock can be dropped into the acquiring corporation's
139. See supra note 135. The reorganizations in Mitnesota Tea Co., Watts, andJohn A. Nelson
Co. could not have qualified as reorganizations after 1934, because the acquired corporation's
shareholders did not receive solely voting stock of the acquiring corporation. See supra text
accompanying note 135.
140. See supra text accompanying note 30.
2
141. Revenue Act of 1934, supra note 135, § 1 12(g)( ).
142. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) ("the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for . . .
its voting stock (or in exchange solely for . . . the voting stock of a corporation which is in
control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the properties of another corporation . . ."). See infra note 149. See generally Lurie,Namorg-or Groman Reversed 10 TAX L. REV. 119,
134-42 (1954). The author is indebted to Lurie's article for the title to this article.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
144. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C) (1982).
145. See I.R.C. § 368(c) (1982). As Lurie notes, the holdings of many pre-1954 remote continuity cases would not have been affected by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Lurie, supra
note 142, at 134. It follows that their holdings remained relevant.
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subsidary.' 46 A corporation also is permitted to use its parent's stock (but
none of its own) to acquire the assets of the acquired corporation by
merger.' 47 Lastly, mergers were again modified to permit the acquiring corporation to merge its subsidiary into the acquired corporation.' 48
From a historical perspective, remote continuity is not as much of a
problem as it used to be. Reorganizations that failed for some of the participants because they were not parties were recognized as bonafde reorganizations for these participants after enactment of the 1954 Code.1 49 Still,
problems of remote continuity do arise. All of the preceding statutory
amendments do not help a target parent merge downstream into a subsidiary which is immediately merged into the acquiring corporation. Instead,
we must review the authority that has developed around continuity and the
problem of remote continuity.
II.

REMOTE CONTINUITY OF INTEREST IN ACQUISITIVE
REORGANIZATIONS

As can be seen, remote continuity is an irritant to tax planners. It also is
a formalistic problem. 50° Continuity depends upon the type and amount of
consideration received.' 5 ' Remote continuity further hampers reorganizations when it arises because it emphasizes the identity of the recipient, which
must be a party to a reorganization. The balance of this article analyzes
methods of grappling with the problem of remote continuity. The objectives
sought by denying reorganization status when only remote continuity exists
can be satisfied by current authority that emphasizes the substance of the
remote continuity problem rather than meeting formalistic conditions. Denying reorganization status to transactions in which there is remote continuity is unnecessary to insure execution of a bonafide reorganization. The
reasons for which it is unnecessary are set forth below.
146. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(C) as amended by Pub. L. No.188-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964)
(current version at I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B),(a)(2)(C)). The definition of a party to a reorganization also was amended to reflect these changes.
147. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-621, 82 Stat. 1310 (1968). The
acquired corporation was required to exchange substantially all its assets for stock of the acquiring corporation's parent.
148. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2075 (1971). The
definition of a party to a reorganization was amended accordingly. See generally, Ferguson &
Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAx. L. REV. 159 (1973). G reorganizations, unlike
other reorganizations, have sprung forth (so far) fully-grown from Congress. When G reorganizations were added to the Code in 1980, variations allowed in other types of reorganizations
were permitted. All or some of the acquired corporation's assets can be transferred to the acquiring corporation's subsidiary, § 368(a)(2)(C), and stock of the acquiring corporation's parent
can be exchanged by the acquiring corporation for substantially all of the acquired corporation's assets, § 368(a)(2)(D).
149. As Lurie notes, supra note 145, at 134, many of the pre-1954 holdings were
unaffected
by the 1954 amendments. Groman would still fail, because stock of the acquiring parent and
subsidiary were used. In order for I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A) and (a)(2)(D) to apply, stock of only
one of these corporations can be used. Bashford was legitimized only in 1968. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a) (2) (D), supra note 147.
150. Cf supra text accompanying note 129.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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Identity Between Parent and Subsid'ay

A feature common to Groman and Bashford is that the acquiring corpo52
rate groups were parent corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. '
As has been observed,' 53 this hermetic environment enhances the identification of the acquiring parent and subsidiary and diminishes any problem of
remote continuity. The same can be said when the acquired corporation is
the wholly-owned subsidiary of another corporation.
Common sense supports identifying a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary. Subsidiary corporations often are created solely to
expedite triangular reorganizations. 154 Stock of an acquiring corporation
received and retained by shareholders of the acquired corporation received
and retained by shareholders of the acquired corporation will lead to their
continuing interest whether the acquiring corporation retains the stock or
assets of the acquired company or transfers them to its subsidiary. Indeed,
the Code permits the acquiring parent both to place the stock or assets in a
subsidiary or withdraw them tax-free, 155 thereby suggesting an identity between the parent and subsidiary. Penalizing this transaction for failing to
establish a continuing proprietary interest is inconsistent with the fluidity
that otherwise characterizes the event. Conversely, assets or stock acquired
by a subsidiary in exchange for its parent's stock could be transmitted to and
from its parent without taxation.' 56 Should not it follow that parent and
subsidiary are sufficiently identical to overcome the problem of remote
continuity?
The Service's position is that a parent and subsidiary cannot be wholly
identified with one another. The regulations' 57 provide that the "term 'reorganization'. . . imports a continuity of interest on the part of the transferor
or its shareholders in the properties transferred." The regulations continue,
stating that "[r]equisite to a reorganization . . . [is] a continuity of interest
. . .on the part of those persons who, directly or indireat/y, were the owners
58
of the enterprise prior to the reorganization."'
Although the regulation seemingly condones remote continuity (where,
for example, an acquired parent merges into its subsidiary, which then
merges into an acquiring corporation, so that shareholders of the acquired
parent receive stock of the acquiring corporation), early cases do not support
such a broad interpretation. Groman denied the legitimacy of remote continuity where the initial acquiring corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary,
152. See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
153. Lurie, supra note 142, at 123-24.
154. E.g., Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S.
454 (1938).
155. The parent's dropping of property into a subsidiary can be accomplished tax-free as a
contribution to capital or as a transfer of property to a controlled corporation under I.R.C.
§§ 118 or 351, respectively. A subsidiary's distribution to its parent is eliminated from the parent's separately calculated taxable income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a) (dividend paid to another member of an affiliated group is to be eliminated). See also I.R.C. § 243(a) (1982) (85
percent dividend-received deduction outside an affiliated group).
156. See supra note 155.
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a) (1976).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980) (emphasis added).
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was immediately liquidated and assets of the acquired corporation passed to
the acquiring parent. 159 Nor has later authority, with one exception, ap0
proved of remote continuity in acquisitive reorganizations.16
Developments in tax law since Groman may modify the above answer.
Seemingly, the law surrounding affiliated groups might be one source for
creating a parent-subsidiary identity. The consolidated return regulations,
however, treat an affiliated group of corporations-a parent corporation and
one or more 80 percent controlled subsidiaries-as a single entity for some
16
purposes, but not for others. '
Recent attacks on captive insurance companies provide stronger
grounds for imposing an indivisible identity on a parent and its subsidiary.
In Revenue Ruling 77-316,162 the Internal Revenue Service analyzed a corporation's ability to insure itself through a captive insurance company. At
issue was whether or not the insured corporation could deduct premiums
paid for insurance to a wholly owned subsidiary. The ruling observed that
no risk-shifting or risk-distributing, the hallmarks of insurance, had occurred.163 Though the insured and insuring corporations were separate entities, the ruling noted that they "represent one economic family with the
result that those who bear the ultimate economic loss are the same persons
who suffer the loss.' 1 64 No risk spreading occurred because the parent and
subsidiary had identical interests. 16
In a similar litigated case, the Tax
Court and Ninth Circuit decided in the Service's favor, but without ex66
pressly relying on the economic family theory.1
Revenue Ruling 77-316 mentions a leading nominee corporation case in
acknowledging that the parent and insurer subsidiary were independent corporate entities. 16 7 The "nominee" corporation theory, to the extent that one
is recognized, 168 has been used to attach the tax consequences of a corporation to its owner where the corporation is a " 'dummy' or alter ego of its
shareholders, serving no other function and engaging in no significant business activity."'1 69 Application of the nominee theory would permit identifi159. See supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
160. See generally Murray, How to Avoid Loss of Continuty ofInterest Through "Stock Remoteness" in
a Reorg, 59J. TAX'N 8, 9-10 (1983) (on indirect continuity); accompanying notes 270-99 (remote
continuity in divisive reorganization).
161. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1501-11 (1983) (group's income is consolidated) and -77(a)
(parent is agent for subsidiaries) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11, -12 (1983) (consolidated taxable
income depends upon each group member's separate taxable income). See also Bennett Paper
Corp. v. Commissioner, 699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983) (subsidiary's activities cannot be attributed
to affiliated group to which it belongs).
162. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
163. Id at 54.
164. Id
165. See id
166. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), afd 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). See generally Note, Revenue Ruhng 77-316 and Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, An Analysis of the Attack on Captive Offhore Insurance Companies, 2 VA. TAX. REV. 111
(1982).
167. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
168. See generally Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live, 34 TAX L. REV. 213 (1979).
169. BIT-rKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at
2.10.
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cation of a parent and its subsidiary. Application of the theory, however,
often depends upon the nominee's action as its owner's agent and relative
lack of business activity, conditions which will not necessarily be true in all
0
reorganizations. 17
Upon first impression, captive insurance companies seem far afield from
remote continuity. But the common thread between the two areas is their
need, when appropriate, to identify parent and subsidiary corporations.
Identification is appropriate in the area of insurance, because risk-shifting
and risk-distributing are indicia of insurance and using a captive insurer apparently precludes them from happening. Similarly, parent and subsidiary
corporations might be identified for continuity purposes. Subsidiaries enable acquiring corporations to do what they would prefer not to do or cannot do directly. As the subsidiary's independence from its parent grows, as
measured by the parent's ownership of the subsidiary, the utility of the economic family theory diminishes in the captive insurance area. 17 1 Seemingly,
increasing independence of a subsidiary should render this theory less useful
in the remote continuity context as well.
Of the various legal approaches for resolving a parent and subsidiary's
identity, an approach akin to the economic family theory of Revenue Ruling
77-316 appears to be the most sensible. A parent can and often does control
its wholly owned subsidiary. For the sole purpose of determining whether an
acquired corporation's shareholder retains a continuing interest in the acquiring corporation, this control ensures that the interest will not be diluted
whether the acquiring corporation drops property into its subsidiary, uses its
parent's stock, or is subsequently absorbed by its parent.
B.

Step Transaction Doctrine

Another method for analyzing whether or not both of two successive
reorganizations will be recognized as independent events is by determining
whether they should be stepped together. The step transaction doctrine,
which would allow two mergers to be treated as one, combines two events if
they are viewed as interrelated steps of a single transaction. If two events are
72
not interdependent, the separate effect of each step must be recognized.'
The point of departure into an analysis of the step transaction doctrine
and continuity of interest is Revenue Procedure 7 7 - 3 7 .173 Revenue Procedure 77-37 indicates that the Service will not issue advance rulings concerning whether or not a reorganization has occurred unless:
170. See Kurtz and Kopp, Taxabidity of Straw Corporaiornszn Real Estate Transactzons, 22 TAX
2.10. Indeed, it seems more
LAW. 647, 652 (1969); BIrTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at
likely that the acquired parent will be a dummy corporation if its only asset is its subsidiary and
that subsidiary is an operating company.
171. To the extent that the captive insurer did not insure its parent's risks, both Rev. Rul.
77-316 and the Carnation courts allowed the parent a deduction for insurance premiums paid,
because those premiums were paid to outsiders for real insurance.
172. The origin of the step transaction doctrine is unclear, but at least one commentator has
suggested that it can be traced back to a 1932 case. See B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME ESTATES AND GiFTs § 4.3.5 n.74 (1981).
173. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
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there is a continuing interest through stock ownership in the acquiring or transferee corporation (or a corporation in "control"
thereof within the meaning of section 368(c) of the Code) on the
part of the former shareholders of the acquired or transferor corporation which is equal in value, as of the effective date of the reorganization, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly
outstanding stock of the acquired or transferor corporation as of
the same day. . . . Sales, redemptions, and other dispositions of
stock occurring prior or subsequent to the exchange which are part
of the plan or reorganization will be considered in determining
whether there is a 50 percent continuing interest through stock
74
ownership as of the effective date of the reorganization.1
Even if an acquired corporation's shareholders holding 50 percent of the acquiring corporation's stock received in a reorganization sell this stock the
very day of the reorganization, the parties still can obtain a favorable ruling. 175 But they cannot sell one share more if they wish to obtain a ruling,
unless the sale of that share is "unrelated" to the reorganization. 176 Furthermore, the potentially disqualifying disposition of one share can occur in a
variety of ways. It may occur directly, as in a cash sale by a dissenting shareholder who refuses to accept the acquiring corporation's offer of a stock-forstock exchange. Or the disposition may occur indirectly, because some of the
acquired corporation's shareholders redeem their stock shortly before their
77
corporation is acquired.
Revenue Procedure 77-37 lists, but does not amplify, types of dispositions occurring in proximity to a reorganization (sales, redemptions) that
may be considered part of the plan of reorganization. 78 Rather, the tainted
types of dispositions are revealed by rulings and case law. A recent case
highlights application of the step transaction doctrine to continuity in a sale
following a merger.
In McDonald's of Zion v. Comm'ssioner, 17 9 out-of-favor franchisees sold
their McDonald's restaurants to the franchisor, McDonald's. The franchises
were closely held by three individuals and other related persons who held
their franchises through several corporations, all of which McDonald's
wanted to acquire. 180 Although the target corporations' shareholders insisted upon being bought out for cash, they acquiesced to receiving McDonald's stock, after receiving McDonald's apparent promise to enable them to
sell the stock to the public three months later. 18 ' McDonald's gave the
174. Id at 569. See generally McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 84, at 665-70.
175. Cf Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114 (50% of acquired corporation's shareholders received cash; held, A reorganization). See also Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 312 (1950)
(acq., 1951-1 C.B.) (reorganization followed by acquiring corporation's transfer of acquired corporation's stock to its subsidiary; held, reorganization occurred).
176. Cf McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981) (subsequent sale not
combined with § 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization), revd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
177. See generally McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 84, at 670-80; Freling and Martin, Current
Reorganization Techntques, 55 TAXES 852, 863-66 (1977); Blum, CorporateAcquisitions under the Income Tax: Another Approach, 50 TAXES 85, 90-93 (1972).
178. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. at 570-71.
179. 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
180. See 76 T.C. at 975-76.
181. See id. at 982.
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shareholders unregistered stock, which barred them from subsequently transferring the stock until it either was registered or conformed to another securities law rule that required the shareholders to hold the stock for at least two
years.' 8 2 McDonald's also gave the shareholders "piggy back" rights to register and sell their stock when McDonald's next registered its stock for
sale.' 8 3 At the time of the negotiations, McDonald's expected to register
stock in three months. 18 4 Although the shareholders actually did not sell
their McDonald's stock as quickly as they wished, they were able to register
85
and sell it six months after they received it.i
The Tax Court concluded the mergers of the acquired corporations into
McDonald's were A reorganizations, even though the acquired corporations'
shareholders consistently intended to and did sell their McDonald's stock as
soon as they could.1 86 Therefore, McDonald's subsidiaries, the taxpayers,
were unsuccessful in claiming a cost basis in their newly acquired assets and,
instead, took a lower carry-over basis.'a 7 The court considered whether or
not continuity of interest had been maintained by the acquired corporations'
shareholders, concluding that there was no continuity because the merger in
which the stock was received and the stock's subsequent sale could not be
stepped together.' 88 Thus, the acquired corporations' shareholders maintained a continuing interest in the acquiring corporation for a sufficient
amount of time, even though they sold the acquiring corporation's stock as
soon as they could.i 8 9 The court found the step transaction doctrine to be
inapplicable. 190
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.' 9 ' It set forth three variations of the step transaction doctrine, and found that all three could be applied.' 9 2 In the first variation, the "end result test," "purportedly separate
transactions will be amalgamated with a single transaction when it appears
that they were really component parts of a single transaction intended from
93
the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result."'
This test also has been phrased as an intent test-did the parties always
intend to accomplish the end result? 194 The court concluded that all of the
steps were taken to cash out the franchisees and to do so to benefit McDonald's.' 95 Therefore, the end result test was satisfied.
182. See id.
183. See id.at 985.
184. See id.at 979-80.
185. Id at 986-87.
186. See id.at 998-1000 & n.49.
187. See id.at 988, 1001. See I.R.C. §§ 358, 1012, (1982).
188. See id.at 998-99.
189. See id.at 1000 n.58.
190. See id at 998.
191. 688 F.2d 520, 528 (7th Cir. 1982).
192. See id.at 524-25.
193. 688 F.2d at 524, citing the Tax Court's McDonald's opinion, 76 T.C. at 994. But see infra
text accompanying note 212 (step transaction doctrine not neatly divisible into three
variations).
194. See Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 247, 250 (1954).
195. See 688 F.2d at 524.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

In the second test, the "(mutual) interdependence test," "the steps are
so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series." 19 6 The appellate
court rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that interdependence was to be
determined on the basis of whether or not the taxpayer was legally bound to
take all the steps. 19 7 Instead, it asked whether or not the mergers would
have taken place without McDonald's guarantee to the franchisees of the
salability of its stock, and concluded that it would not.' 98 The franchisees
had consistently indicated their desire to sell the McDonald's stock. They
negotiated for the right to force the registration of stock (which allowed the
stock to be sold) after a year.' 99 Therefore, the mergers and subsequent sales
2°
were interdependent.
Under the last test, the "binding commitment test," "if one transaction
is to be characterized as a 'first step' there [is] a binding commitment to take
the later steps." 20 1 The court noted that this is the most limiting statement
of the step transaction doctrine and originally had been formulated in order
to analyze steps separated by several years. 20 2 In contrast, in the case before
it, the court concluded that the transactions were separated by a period of
six months and that application of the binding commitment test was unnecessary.2 0 3 Were it applied, however, it would have been met because the
parties were bound to carry through on the stock registration. 20 4 The franchisees could not transfer the stock if it was not registered and McDonald's
could not be forced to register the stock. 20 5 McDonald's and the franchisees
20 6
were bound to take both steps.
The Tax Court had taken a narrower view of the step transaction doctrine. The taxpayer had argued that application of the end result test was
appropriate, while the government countered that McDonald's non-involvement in the franchisees' sale of McDonald's stock precluded the doctrine's
application. 20 7 In fact, the court reasoned that application of the step transaction doctrine might be appropriate, but only upon careful analysis. 20 8 It
continued, stating that because post-merger continuity is not required for
any specific amount of time, the mutual interdependence test (which does
not require fulfillment of a time period either) is the most fitting variation of
the step transaction doctrine. 20 9 The end result and intent tests, which the
196. 688 F.2d at 524 (citing Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981)).
197. See 688 F.2d at 524.
198. Id
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. 688 F.2d at 525 (citing Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d at 1178 (quoting Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968))).
202. 688 F.2d at 525.
203. Id
204. See id
205. See id
206. See id
207. See 76 T.C. at 994.
208. See id. at 995.
209. See id at 997.
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court distinguished from the interdependence test and also from one another, were alternatively too simplistic and too difficult to administer.2 10
The court determined that the mergers and the franchisees' subsequent sales
were not mutually interdependent, and the mergers did qualify as
21
reorganizations. i
The Seventh Circuit approached McDonald's with an expansive view of
the applicability of the step transaction doctrine, while the Tax Court applied the doctrine more discreetly and reasonably. As explained below, the
few cases that have applied the doctrine to post-merger dispositions all have
used the mutual interdependence test employed by the Tax Court. Recently, this test has been used with greater frequency, so that its application
comports with current trends in tax law.
The step transaction doctrine was designed to deal with problems in
other areas of the tax law. A seminal article regarding the doctrine written
thirty years ago 2 12 concluded that most cases concerning the doctrine arise
under sections 351 or 368(a)(1)(D). Both sections require control of the corporate transferee by the corporate transferor (or by or in conjunction with its
shareholders, under the latter section) "immediately after" the transfer, in
order to effect a transfer to a controlled corporation (section 351) or in a
divisive reorganization (section 368(a)(1)(D)). The genesis of the doctrine in
the sections 351 and 368(a)(1)(D) areas naturally indicates a cautious application of the doctrine to a foreign area, such as post-reorganization
continuity.
Few cases actually have applied the step transaction doctrine to postmerger dispositions. Those cases did not articulate their theoretical basis
but, to the extent that one exists, it appears to be that the steps at issue were
mutually interdependent.
The test of mutual interdependence is best illustrated by American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner.21 3 There, owners of a business transferred the
business's assets to a new corporation in exchange for all of its common
stock. 2 14 The incorporation was part of the owners' plan to sell the new
company's preferred stock to the public as well as to transfer some of the
common stock to the underwriters if they sold the preferred stock.2 15 The
owners' contract to transfer common stock to the underwriters, contingent
upon the underwriters' sale of preferred stock, was not executed until five
days after the owners received the new company's stock, 2 16 and the under210. See id at 998 n.48.
211. Seeid at 998, 1000.
212. Mintz & Plumb, supra note 194, at 250. See also Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in
SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d series 1938) (earlier treatment of the doctrine); Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step TransactionDoctrine, 60 TAXES 970, 971
(1982) (increasing use of interdependence test).
213. 11 T.C. 397 (1948),aJfdper cunam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949),cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920

(1950). See McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 997, rev'd sub nom. McDonald's
Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). (American Bantam Car Co.
articulates mutual interdependence test); Mintz & Plumb, supra note 194, at 251 n.25 (presenting same idea).
214. 11 T.C. at 399.
215. See id
216. See id. at 400.
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writers did not receive the common stock for another five months, after they
sold the preferred stock. 2 17 Because the underwriters received over 20 percent of the corporation's common stock, the owners would not be considered
to have received the stock under section 351's predecessor if all of the steps
2 18
were collapsed into one.
The Tax Court held that the owners controlled the corporation immediately after they exchanged their business's assets for the corporation's
stock. 2 19 Therefore, section 351's predecessor applied:
The standard required by the courts to enable them to say that a
series of steps are interdependent and thus should be viewed as a
single transaction do not exist here. It is true that all the steps may
have been contemplated under the same general plan . . . yet the
contemplated arrangement for the sale of preferred stock to the
public was entirely secondary and supplemental to the principal
goal of the plan-to organize the new corporation and exchange its
stock for the [transferor's] assets. The understanding with the underwriters for disposing of the preferred stock, however important,
was not a sine qua non in the general plan, without which no other
step would have been taken. While the incorporation and exchange of assets would have been purposeless one without the
other, yet both would have been carried out even though the contemplated methods of marketing the preferred stock might fail.
The very fact that in the contracts of June 8, 1936 [made five days
after the assets-for-stock exchange], the associates retained the right
to cancel the marketing order and, consequently the underwriters'
means to own common stock issued to the associates, refutes the
proposition that the legal relations resulting from the steps of organizing the corporation and transferring assets to it would have
been fruitless without the sale of the preferred stock in the manner
220
contemplated.
Whether or not control exists immediately after an exchange intended
to qualify under section 351 has been litigated extensively. 22 1 The hallmark
of the interdependence of steps, as illustrated in the Section 351 areawhether "the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by
one transaction would be meaningless without a completion of the series" 2 22-appears
to be whether the transferor was bound to dispose of
enough stock, when he received it, that would result in his loss of control
223
(notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's contrary opinion in McDonald's.)
With this background, the few cases that have analyzed post-merger
dispositions can be addressed. The earliest of these cases is Anheuser-Busch,
217. Id. at 402.
218. See id at 403-05. The new corporation argued that § 351's predecessor did not apply so
that it could have a higher basis in the assets.
219. Id at 404.
220. American Bantam Car, 11 T.C. at 406-07.
221. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 12, at 3.10.
222. Paul & Zimet, supra note 212, at 254.
223. McDonald's, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 179-85,
191-206.
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Inc. v. Commi'ssioner.224 There, the taxpayer exchanged assets of an ice cream
company it operated through a subsidiary with the Borden Company for
Borden stock. 225 Anheuser-Busch transferred its subsidiary's assets to Borden and to a newly formed Borden subsidiary, to which Borden quickly
226
transferred the assets it had received.
The Board of Tax Appeals determined that Anheuser-Busch and Borden had not engaged in a reorganization. 22 7 Because the plan of reorganization contemplated the transfer of assets to Borden's subsidiary, the subsidiary
and not Borden was a party to a reorganization. 228 Use of Borden's stock by
the subsidiary was fatal. The court premised its conclusion that Borden was
not a party to a reorganization on Anheuser-Busch's knowledge that Borden
intended to transfer the ice cream business assets to its subsidiary. 229 Initially, the evidence supporting this conclusion appears to be slender. Borden's offer to Anheuser-Busch to acquire its ice cream business stated only
that Borden was at liberty to organize a new corporation with which to continue the ice cream business.2 3 0 As the court explained, "the intervention of
a subsidiary will be treated as a, part of the plan, if it is a contemplated
possibility under the plan and actually eventuates. ' 231 The court's conclusion seems justified, however, partly because Anheuser-Busch's transfer of
some of its ice cream company assets directly to Borden's subsidiary implies
that Anheuser-Busch knew the destination of its subsidiary's assets.
In Goldwasser v. Commissioner,232 two corporate transfers occurred backto-back. One corporation acquired another corporation's stock in a stockfor-stock exchange.2 33 The acquiring corporation decided one month later
to liquidate the target corporation and have the target's assets acquired by
234
another of its subsidiaries, and effected this decision two months later.
The Board of Tax Appeals determined that the corporation that initially
acquired the target corporation's stock was not a party to a reorganization,
so that use of its stock was fatal to the existence of a reorganization. 23 5
Again, a letter that was part of the negotiations evidenced the acquiring
corporation's intent to liquidate the acquired corporation and transfer its
236
assets to another of its subsidiaries.
In a third case, Campbell v.Commissioner,237 Bethlehem Steel agreed to a
224. 40 B.T.A. 1100 (1939), af'd sub nom. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 662
(8th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941).
225. See 40 B.T.A. at 1102-03.
226. See id.at 1104.
227. See id.at 1106.
228. d.
229. See i at 1107.
230. See id.at 1103.
231. Id at 1106. Accord, Atwood Grain & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 412 (1973)
(E reorganization); Avco Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 975,acq. 1957-1
C.B. 3, 5, nonacq. 1958-2 C.B. 9 (C reorganization).
232. 47 B.T.A. 445 (1942), affdper curiam, 142 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 765
(1944).
233. See 47 B.T.A. at 447.
234. See id.at 449.
235. See id.at 454.
236. See id.at 453.
237. 15 T.C. 312 (1950), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 1.
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stock-for-stock exchange in order to acquire a small steel manufacturer. The
target corporation's shareholders were interested in having their company
acquired only if the acquisition were a tax-free reorganization.2 38 In September, 1943, the two companies agreed to effect the reorganization. 2 39 The
following month, Bethlehem Steel acquired another company and, at this
time, first thought of disposing of the corporation it had just acquired because possession of both companies created antitrust problems. 240 In a series
of transactions that occurred in late 1943 and early 1944: Bethlehem Steel
acquired the stock of the first corporation; Bethlehem Steel sold the acquired
corporation's stock to one of its subsidiaries; the subsidiary sold the acquired
of Bethlehem Steel; and the accorporation's stock to another subsidiary
24 1
quired corporation was dissolved.
The Tax Court questioned whether or not the Bethlehem Steel stock
received by the acquired corporation's shareholders was stock of a party to a
reorganization. 242 Unlike its decisions in the preceding cases, however, the
243
court determined that Bethlehem Steel was a party to a reorganization.
In the court's view, the acquired corporation's shareholders had bargained
for and obtained stock in the company that they expected would acquire
their company. 2 44 Bethlehem Steel's subsequent disposition of the stock of
the acquired corporation was not part of a plan of reorganization, and so
245
Bethlehem Steel was a party to a reorganization.
One other case bears noting because it addresses the question of continuity in a statutory merger. In Heintz v. Commissioner,246 as in McDonald's,
shareholders of the acquired corporation wished to sell their stock for cash
rather than stock of the acquiring corporation. 2 47 The court denied reorganization status to the merger, due to a lack of continuity. 248 As reasoned by
the Tax Court in McDonald's, however, the acquired corporation's shareholders in Heintz agreed to accept stock only because the acquiring corporation
agreed to arrange a sale soon after the reorganization. 249 In other words, the
Heintz shareholders "committed themselves to sell" their stock. 250 In contrast, in McDonald's, the acquiring corporation acted passsively, merely aiding the acquired corporation's shareholders to sell their stock through piggy25 1
back rights.
The appellate court disagreed with the Tax Court in McDonald's, re238. Id at 314.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 316.
241. See id. at 317-18.
242. Id at 319.
243. See id at 321.
244. Id at 320.
245. Id. at 319-20.
246. 25 T.C. 132 (1955), nonacq. 1958-1 C.B. 7.
247. See id.at 134.
248. See id at 142.
249. See id. at 142-43.
250. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 1001 (1981), rev'dsub nom. McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
251. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 524-25.
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garding its case and Heintz as being indistinguishable. 25 2 The Tax Court's
perception appears to be more accurate. The sellers received an oral promise
in Heintz that their stock in the acquiring corporation would be sold in a
public offering although, in fact, private sales were made. 253 In contrast, the
sellers in McDonald's obtained only a written promise that their stock could
be registered in the next public offering. 254 The purchaser in McDonald's
was not as active a participant in the sale of the stock as it was in Heintz.
The common thread of the post-merger continuity cases is the interdependence of the merger and a subsequent step. The interdependence of successive mergers depends upon development of surrounding facts. On the one
hand, successive mergers within an affiliated group necessarily will be interdependent, because the group's parent will control the events. Indeed, application of the end result test of the step transaction doctrine might be more
appropriate than the interdependence test since the key to applying the doctrine will be the parent's control of all of the events. Documentation surrounding the transactions might suggest the interdependence of the
mergers. 25 5 Even if the mergers appear to be independent of one another,
this independence could be illusory since the parent would not have its subsidiaries engage in the first merger if it did not expect them to engage in the
second one as well.
The independence of successive mergers can be established more easily
if the acquired and acquiring groups of corporations are unrelated. If an
acquired parent merges downstream and the surviving subsidiary then
merges into an unrelated corporation, the steps might be treated as being
independent of one another because shareholders' approval must be obtained twice.2 56 The shareholders of the acquired corporations will be
roughly the same shareholders in both situations-the shareholders of the
target parent will become the shareholders of the target subsidiary, less any
dissenters. 257 Presumably, they will approve the second merger if they can
be convinced to approve the first. But, if the shareholders of the acquiring
corporations also must approve the mergers, they will be different from one
another. The shareholders of the acquiring corporation will be the shareholders of the acquired subsidiary in the first merger and the shareholders of
the unrelated acquiring corporation in the second. Obviously, a stronger
case can be made for independence when shareholder approval of the acquiring corporation is necessary to effect the merger.
252. McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 525-26.
253. See Heintz, 25 T.C. at 137, 139.
254. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522.
255. Cf Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 312 (1950) acq., 1951-1 C.B. I (court relied
partly on documents to find that subsequent disposition of stock was not part of the plan, and
therefore was independent).
256. Generally, a majority of the acquired corporation's shareholders must approve the
merger. See 15 Fletcher, supra note 21, § 7063. In some cases, shareholders of the acquiring
corporation also must approve the merger. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78(D) (approval necessary when, for example, articles or by-laws of the acquiring corporation will change
or the target shareholders will acquire more than one-sixth of the voting power of the acquiring
corporation).
257. See 15 Fletcher, supra note 21, § 7157 (discussion of the rights of dissenting
stockholders).
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Another way in which to discern the independence of a merger from a
second merger is to question whether or not all of the participants engage in
both events. The critical feature in Campbell and McDonald's, at least in the
Tax Court's eyes, was that one of the parties engaging in post-merger events
acted independently of the other. In Campbell, the acquiring corporation
2 58
took actions without consulting the acquired corporation's shareholders.
In McDonald's, the acquired corporations' shareholders acted without the
consent of the acquiring corporation (although the corporation possessed
knowledge of the acquired corporations' shareholders' plans). 259 The other
cases reveal prior agreement about the post-merger steps by all of the
26
participants. 0
Another line of authority deserves mention, if only as an illustration of
the type of evidence that can sustain-or defeat-continuity of interest.
Whether or not a subsequent disposition of stock acquired in a reorganization was part of an earlier plan of reorganization can be inferred from the
time that has lapsed between the stock's acquisition and disposition. The
disposition of stock is more likely to be part of a plan of reorganization if it is
26
disposed of ten days rather than ten years after its acquisition. '
The Service has demarked holding stock for five years after a reorganization as a length of time that will establish continuity. In Revenue Ruling
66-23,262 one corporation entered into an antitrust consent decree in which it
agreed to merge its subsidiary into an unrelated corporation, in exchange for
stock of the acquiring corporation. As part of the decree, the parent also was
required to divest itself of the acquiring corporation's stock within seven
years of acquiring it, although it was free to hold or dispose of the stock as it
wished during this seven year period. Revenue Ruling 66-23 held that the
merger of the subsidiary into the unrelated corporation was an A reorganization. It held that continuity of interest is met if an acquired corporation's
shareholder receives stock of the acquiring corporation
without any preconceived plan or arrangement for disposing of any
of the stock and with unrestricted rights of ownership for a period
of time sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such ownership is
definite and substantial, notwithstanding that at the time of the
reorganization the shareholder is required by a court decree to dispose of the stock before the end of such period. Ordinarily, the
Service will treat 5 years of unrestricted rights of ownership as a
258. Campbell, 15 T.C. at 318.
259. See McDonald's, 76 T.C. at 986, 988-99 n.50. Cf infa note 269 and accompanying text.
260. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1100, a d, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941); Goldwasser v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 445 (1942); afd
per curiam, 142 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1944),cert. denied, 323 U.S. 765 (1944). See generally Faber,supra
note 36, at 526-30 (in plan of reorganization area, no consistent policy on whether or not all
parties must know of plan); Comment, McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois, Inc. v. Commissioner, A False Step for Continuity of Interest, 3 VA. TAX REv. 177 (1983) (to apply step transaction
doctrines, in McDonald's, both parties should agree or know about post-merger steps). But cf
Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 975 (1956),acq. 1957-2 C.B. 3, 5, nonacq. 1958-1 C.B.
9 (no C reorganization; however, target corporation shareholders' ignorance of plan of reorganization not a determinative factor).
261. Butcf Mintz & Plumb,supra note 194, at 249 (time is not necessarily determinative; the
temporal relationship is merely one scrap of evidence assisting the courts in applying their test).
262. 1966-1 C.B. 67.
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sufficient period for the purpose of satisfying the continuity of in263
terest requirements of a reorganization.
It would appear that to a reorganization that requires a disposition of stock,
even though no plan of disposition has been formulated, is innocuous if
264
purged by time.
This theme has been expanded by subsequent rulings. In Revenue Ruling 68 -22,2 65 ten percent of an acquiring corporation's preferred stock received in a merger could be redeemed annually, although the acquiring
corporation had no present intention to redeem the stock. The ruling held
that an A reorganization had occurred, although this ruling also must be
read in conjunction with Revenue Procedure 77-37.266 Since at least 50 percent of the acquired corporation's shareholders would receive and retain
stock of the acquiring corporation for at least five years, continuity exists,
even for ruling purposes under Revenue Procedure 77-37.267
In an analogous ruling, more reminiscent of the rationale of the Tax
Court's decision in McDonald's,268 the Service considered a statutory merger
to be an A reorganization where the acquired corporation's shareholders
could rescind the merger agreement upon the occurrence of certain financial
contingencies, because the contingencies were beyond the control of the
26 9
shareholders.
Thus, if successive mergers are independent of one another, both can
qualify as A reorganizations.
C. Remote Continuity of Interest and Divisive Reorganizations
Another method for analyzing continuity in successive mergers lies in
the area of divisive reorganizations. Certain rulings in this area have
avoided a problem with remote continuity. These rulings have recently been
extended to acquisitive reorganizations as well.
A divisive reorganization occurs when the owners of a corporation that
runs two businesses decide to break the corporation into two corporations,
each of which will Own one of the businesses. This division entails use of
sections 355 and 368(a)(1)(D). 270 In a section 355 transaction, shareholders
or security holders of one corporation receive stock or securities in another
corporation without recognizing gain or loss. 2 7 t Section 355 requires that a
corporation that owns at least 80 percent of another corporation's stock (vot263. Id. at 68.
264. See Faber,supra note 81, at 251.
265. 1968-1 C.B. 142.
266. 1977-2 C.B. 568.
267. Cf Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114 (continuity satisfied in merger even though some
shareholders received cash).
268. McDonald'r, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 179-190..
269. Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 112. The stock also was callable five years after the
merger and was subject to a sinking fund that commenced five years after the merger. Under
the rationale of Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67, these conditions could not adversely affect
continuity.
270. I.R.C. § 355 (1982 & West Supp. 1984); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1982).
271. See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1).
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ing stock as well as all other stock) "immediately before [a] distribution" to
272
distribute stock of the other corporation to one or more of its shareholders.
Nor can the distribution be used "principally as device for the distribution of
the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both."' 273 In a D reorganization, a corporation must transfer all
or a portion of its assets to another corporation if "immediately after the
transfer," the first corporation or one or more of its shareholders, or any
combination thereof owns at least 80 percent of the controlled corporation's
stock (both voting stock and all other stock). 2 74 Because such control must be
acquired in a distribution to which section 355 applies, 2 75 a D reorganization always will entail a distribution of the controlled corporation's stock to
276
the distributing corporation's shareholders.
In other words, if a corporation owns two businesses, it could transfer
the second business to its shareholders by dropping the second business into
a subsidiary under section 368(a)(1)(D) and distributing the second corporation's stock to its shareholders under section 355. On the other hand, if it
already operates the second business through a wholly-owned subsidiary, it
could simply distribute the stock of that subsidiary to its shareholders under
section 355.
Any reorganization, including a divisive D reorganization, is subject to
the continuity of interest test set forth in Treasury Regulation section 1.3681(b). 2 7 7 This regulation provides that: "Requisite to a reorganization under
the Code . . . [is] a continuity of interest therein on the part of those persons
who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the
reorganization." 278 Any section 355 distribution, including one that is part
of a D reorganization, is subject to the continuity of interest test set forth in
Treasury Regulation section 1.355-2(c).279 This regulation "contemplates
. . . a continuity of interest in all or part of such business enterprise on the
part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution or exchange."1280 But for certain cosmetic
changes, the two regulations use identical language.2 8 1 Therefore, if a trans272. See I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(D)(ii), 368(c).
273. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A) and (B). This section also requires that (i) the distributing and
controlled corporations carried on active business for the five years immediately preceding the
distribution (§ 355(a)(1)(C), § 355(b)) and (ii) the distributing corporation distribute at least 80
percent of the controlled corporation's stock (both voting stock and all other stock)
(§ 355(a)(1)(D)).
274. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D).
275. See § 355(a)(l)(D)(ii).
276. In contrast, in a nondivisive D reorganization, the distributing corporation must liquidate after it transfers its assets to the acquiring corporation. See supra note 26.
277. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(a).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1981). Seegenerally Turnier, supra note 41, at 923-24 (questions this regulation); Bloom and Sweet, How IRS Uses Continuity ofInterest to Raise New Problemsr in
Reorganizations, 45 J. TAX'N 130, 134-36 (1976) (discusses remote continuity); Murray, supra note
160, at 9 (same).
279. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1960).
280. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1983). Cf Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).
281. But see Murray, supra note 160, at 10 (Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) requires interest in
entire business enterprise). This appears to be a difference from Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) without a distinction.
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action meets the terms of one of these regulations, it follows that it should
meet the terms of the other.
The genesis of these regulations does not direct one to a contrary result.
282
The regulations were promulgated simultaneously under the 1954 Code.
Before that, the regulations issued under section 355 and section 368's predecessors required continuity, but they were silent regarding indirect
283
continuity.
On the other hand, Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(b) does provide that "[r]equisite to a reorganization under the Code . . . [is] (except as
provided in sectt'on 368(a) (I) (D)) a continuity of interest .... *"284 What type
of continuity is required in a D reorganization? It must be the continuity
required of a divisive reorganization since nothing indicates that an acquisitive reorganization must be accorded special treatment simply because it is a
D reorganization.
Technically, continuity of interest in a section 355 distribution might be
distinguished from another condition, that the distribution not be used prin285
cipally as a device for distributing a corporation's earnings and profits.
28 6
If a person arranges to sell or
Factually, however, they appear to overlap.
exchange his stock prior to its distribution to him, the distribution probably
will be regarded as a device and therefore be excluded from the benefits of
section 355.287 Assuming that the continuity and device conditions can be
equated in a section 355 distribution, then roughly the same purpose is accomplished by the continuity-device condition in such a distribution as by
continuity in an acquisitive reorganization. The continuity-device condition
restricts the sale of stock acquired in a section 355 distribution. Even if continuity can be distinguished from the device condition in a divisive distribution, section 355 continuity seemingly would preclude a post-distribution
sale, 288 just as continuity limits the sale of stock acquired in an acquisitive
289
reorganization.
Theories that overcome the problem of remote continuity in an acquisitive reorganization have not been explicitly condoned. Cases like Groman
illustrate this. On the other hand, remote continuity has been permitted by
the Internal Revenue Service in divisive distributions. If the requirements of
282. T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61.
283. See Treas. Reg. 111,§ 29.112(b)( 1l)-2 (1953) (regarding I.R.C. § 355's predecessor):
2
Treas. Reg. 11i,§ 29.11 (g)-1 (1943) (regarding I.R.C. § 368's predecessor).
284. Treas Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (emphasis added).
285. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). See also Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95 (continuity discussed;
device clause not discussed); Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 C.B. 77 (device clause and continuity
both satisfied).
286. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 12, at 13.06 n.83; Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog:
A New Approach to Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1240-41
(1968).
287. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1); Bittker & Eustice,supra note 12, at
13.06.
288. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-103, 1955-1 C.B. 31 (post-distribution sale; held, no continuity).
I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) also prohibit stock of the distributing corporation from being sold or exchanged pursuant to a prearranged plan. In this sense, the device
clause is broader than and has no analogy to continuity in an acquisitive reorganization.
289. But see Murray, supra note 160, at 10-11 (continuity under section 355 is different from
continuity in acquisitive reorganizations).
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continuity are the same in both sections, then it follows that this interpretation can be applied to acquisitive reorganizations. Recently, the Service did
tentatively extend this rationale to acquisitive reorganizations.
The Service's concession of remote continuity under section 355 is clearest in Revenue Ruling 62-138.2 9 0 There, a bank was required by government regulators to divest itself of real estate held by one of its subsidiaries.
The bank acceded to this demand by having the subsidiary create its own
subsidiary into which the first-tier subsidiary placed the real estate. The
subsidiary distributed the stock of the second-tier subsidiary to the bank
rather than retaining it. The second-tier subsidiary was created under section 351 and its stock distributed under section 355. As part of the same
transaction, however, the second-tier subsidiary's stock was then distributed
by the bank to its shareholders. The second distribution also qualified under
section 355.
The ruling analyzed whether continuity existed in realistic terms. Section 355 requires continuity, but it may be remote continuity. The ruling
states:
In the instant case, there is no change in the aggregate interests
held by the [bank's] shareholders, no new parties in interest were
added as a result of the transaction and none were eliminated. The
shareholders after the transaction held the same enterprises in
modified corporate form as before the transaction and the corporate enterprises were continued as such.
Less persuasive authority also exists. Stock of the distributing corporation was owned by a partnership in Revenue Ruling 76-528.29, The partnership consisted of four individuals who decided to liquidate the partnership
for good business reasons. The distributing corporation transferred assets of
one of its two businesses to a new corporation and then distributed stock of
the new corporation to two of the partners in exchange for their stock in the
distributing corporation. The partnership was immediately dissolved, at
which time two of the partners owned stock of the distributing corporation
and the other two owned the stock of the new corporation. The ruling held
that distribution of the second corporation's stock to two of the shareholders
was a section 355 transaction because the partners stood in the shoes of the
partnership as the only parties who were qualified to receive and continue
the stock interests of the two corporations. As in Revenue Ruling 62-138,
interposition of a juristic entity-a partnership rather than a corporationdid not stifle continuity of interest in a section 355 distribution.
In other rulings, the Service has ruled that an acquisitive reorganization
can follow a section 355 spin-off.292 These rulings, however, do not strongly
support remote continuity. In two of the three rulings, a corporation spun
293
off stock of a subsidiary which then was acquired by another corporation.
290. 1962-2 C.B. 95.
291. 1976-2 C.B. 103.
292. Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1 C.B. 89 (section 355 spin-off followed by B reorganization);
Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125 (section 355 spin-off followed by A reorganization); Rev. Rul.
70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83 (section 355 spin-off followed by B reorganization).
293. Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1 C.B. 89; Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83.
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In the third, the corporation spun off stock of a subsidiary and was itself then
acquired by another corporation. 294 On first impression there appears to be
remote continuity since shareholders of a corporation acquired and then disposed of its subsidiary's stock. This remote continuity, however, is unlike the
remote continuity in successive acquisitive reorganizations, where shareholders of the first corporation to be acquired are separated by another corporation from the corporation in which their proprietary interest survives.
Section 355 forces the distribution of the corporation's subsidiary's stock up
to its shareholders. As that happens, nothing offensive occurs. These Revenue Rulings were factually no different. The shareholders of the spun-off
corporations transferred stock or the assets of their corporation to an acquiring corporation. They retained an interest in the acquiring corporation.
In contrast, something offensive does happen in successive acquisitive
reorganizations (without conceding that the offense, remote continuity,
should bar either reorganization from qualifying under section 368(a)(1) or
should prevent the participants from benefiting). A corporation is interposed between the shareholders of the first acquired corporation and the one
in which they ultimately acquire stock. Similarly, something offensive occurs when there are successive section 355 spin-offs, as in Revenue Ruling 62138295 (again, without conceding the disqualification of either spin-off from
treatment under section 355). Section 355 requires a distribution up to a
corporation's shareholders. It does not require, nor does it even permit, another distribution up to the corporation's shareholders' shareholders.
The Service has analogized some of the remote continuity it acknowledges in divisive distributions to acquisitive reorganizations. In Revenue
Ruling 84-30,296 one corporation (Y) acquired substantially all of the assets
of its sister's (Z's) wholly-owned subsidiary (N) in exchange for Y stock in a
C reorganization. Z liquidated N and distributed N's assets, Y stock, to its
and Y's parent, X.
The ruling held that the indirect continuity mandated by Treasury
Regulation 1.368-1 (b) was satisfied, since the indirect owner of N's business
enterprise before the reorganization, X, continued to possess an interest in
the enterprise after the reorganization. As in Revenue Ruling 62-138,297 on
which this ruling relied, X's aggregate interests did not change. The ruling
also cautioned that the relationships within this group had existed for many
years.
The issuance of Revenue Ruling 84-30 offers a toehold in the attempt to
apply divisive distribution remote continuity concepts to acquisitive reorganizations. It signals the Service's concession to reasoning it has long resisted:
stock can be passed up a chain of owners, albeit an established chain, following an acquisitive reorganization without damaging continuity. 298 Other
divisive distribution concepts also could be applied. For example, the Serv294. Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125.
295. Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95.
296. 1984-9 I.R.B. at 5. See generally Murray, IR.S Revocation of "Stock Remoteness" Posture
May Have Positive Effect on Reorgs, 60 J. TAX'N 352 (1984).
297. Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95.
298. See Murray, supra note 160, at 9-10.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

ice has ruled that an acquisitive reorganization can follow a divisive one if
the shareholders of the spun-off corporation retain stock of the acquiring
corporation. 299 By analogy, one acquisitive reorganization should be able
to follow another if the shareholders of the first acquiring company obtain
and retain stock of the second acquiring company. The Service can be expected to resist this comparison since it limited Revenue Ruling 84-30 to an
already established group of corporations, yet no clear reason exists for refusing to extend the rationale used in divisive distribution rulings. If the reasoning were extended, it would enable the parties involved in two successive
mergers to enjoy the benefits of engaging in a reorganization.
E.

Recharacierization

The last method for analyzing the problem of remote continuity is
recharacterization. If two successive reorganizations present a problem of
remote continuity, that problem might be avoided if both target corporations are acquired directly by the acquiring Service corporation. The Service accepted this theory in Revenue Ruling 68-526.3 00 In this ruling, one
corporation owned sixty percent of another corporation. Pursuant to one
plan of reorganization, both corporations simultaneously transferred all their
assets to and had their liabilities assumed by a third, unrelated, corporation.
Each of the transactions qualified as a C reorganization.
Without much imagination, it can be seen that Revenue Ruling 68-526
presents an alternative mode for successive reorganizations. The target parent and subsidiary corporations will disappear in successive reorganizations,
just as they did in the ruling. Remote continuity is unimportant, or at least
surmountable, in the ruling. If the parent had merged into its subsidiary
and the survivor had merged into the acquiring corporation, the aforementioned problem of remote continuity would have to be confronted. If both
target parent and subsidiary are acquired directly by the acquiring corporation, then one still must ask about continuity. Do shareholders of both acquired corporations obtain and retain stock of the acquiring corporation?
Arguably not, since the acquired subsidiary's shareholder, the parent, has
disposed of whatever it received in its final distribution to its shareholders.
However, Revenue Ruling 68-526 determined that continuity should be
scrutinized and decided that it did exist, because the only persons entitled to
the acquiring corporation's stock received by the acquired parent, had it
30 1
survived, were the parent's shareholders.
It is unlikely that Revenue Ruling 68-526's rationale could be applied
to successive stock-for-stock exchanges, since the most likely route for eliminating an acquired parent is through a downstream merger. The more profitable analogy might lie in holding that successive mergers can be
299. See supra notes 292-94.
300. 1968-2 C.B. 156.
301. See also supra text at notes 290-91. Furthermore, the Service might favor application of
Rev. Rul. 68-526 if the parent is an operating, rather than a holding, company. Compare 82-4
TAX MGMT. MEM. (BNA) 9 (Feb. 22, 1982) with 83-15 TAX. MGMT MEM. (BNA) 6 (July 25,
1983).
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recharacterized as the merger of both corporations into the acquiring
30 2
corporation.
CONCLUSION

Continuity of interest remains a necessary element of any reorganization, although recommendations have been made for the elimination of the
continuity test. 30 3 In some cases, continuity can be satisfied by meeting certain statutory tests. Continuity can be satisfied in other cases, such as statutory mergers, by meeting well-established, if nevertheless sometimes elusive,
indicia of continuity. The problem of remote continuity of interest in successive statutory mergers, even if infrequently encountered, also must be
analyzed.

302. These reorganizations could be A or C reorganizations. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), (C).
303. See supra note 6; Faber, supra note 81 at 261-67.

RETHINKING SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN GREAT BRITAIN
MARK BERGER*

The privilege against self-incrimination is an important feature of both
the English and American legal systems.I Its roots are traceable to events in
English legal history which continue to play a role in defining the scope of
the doctrine in each country. 2 Because the privilege reflects a restriction
upon the power of the state to employ coercive authority in the highly visible
sphere of criminal law enforcement, both countries have found it to be a
source of controversy and intense public scrutiny. 3 Fundamental challenges
to the principles behind the privilege, as well as serious calls for its restruc4
turing appear regularly in both English and Americn legal debates.
What is referred to in the United States as the privilege against selfincrimination is more frequently labeled the right to silence in Great Britain.5 Both designations encompass a set of rules which, in general, permit
*
Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law, A.B. Columbia 1966; J.D. Yale 1969. The author gratefully acknowledges the support provided for this
project by the Curators of the University of Missouri from the Weldon Spring Research Fund.
The Institute for Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London generously made its
research facilities available to the author.
1. The self-incrimination privilege in the United States derives from the fifth amendment's requirement that "No person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In England the doctrine stems from a combination of
statutory and case law sources. Eg., Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § I(a)
(defendant may not be called as a witness except upon his own application); R. v. Boyes, I B. &
S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861) (reasonable ground to apprehend self-incrimination justifies the court upholding a claim of privilege).
2. See infra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
3. As an example in England, such a furor was raised about questioning practices in a
particular murder investigation that a special inquiry was made for the House of Commons.
Report of an Inquiry by the Hon. Sir Henry Fisher into the Circumstances Leading to the Trial
of Three Persons on Charges Arising Out of the Death of Maxwell Confait and the Fire at 27
Doggett Road, London SE6 (HC90 1977) [hereinafter cited as Confait Inquiry].
4. Fundamental self-incrimination reforms have been recommended by both the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report, Cmnd. 8092 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Royal Commission Report]; Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, Eoidence (General),
Cmnd. 4991 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLRC Report]. In the United States there have been
calls for reform from important commentators, L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT? (1959); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor ConstitutionalChange,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968), and even the enactment of a statute designed to reverse the
Supreme Court's Miranda warning requirements. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Title II, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (1969) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982)).
5. The self-incrimination privilege in Great Britain usually refers to the right of witnesses
to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions. Se ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EvIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES
1304 (40th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
ARCHBOLD]; C. HAMPTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-33 (1977); R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 275-82
(5th ed. 1979); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 38 (3d ed. 1963). See generally Greenawalt,
Perspectives on the Right to Silence, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (R. Hood ed.
1974). The terms are used interchangeably hereafter to denote the set of related rules described
in the text rather than only the right of a witness to refuse to answer self-incriminatory inquiries.
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witnesses to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions, allow a criminal
defendant to refuse to take the stand at his own trial, and provide special
protections for the suspect in police custody. The English and American
legal systems provide a core of protection in each of these areas.
Despite the common roots, similar general content, and equivalent importance, there are important differences between British and American
views of the self-incrimination privilege which are particularly instructive.
Because the Americn privilege is constitutionalized in the fifth amendment,
reform tends to focus upon expanding or contracting the scope of the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The British privilege,
in contrast, is a common law principle and therefore, in theory at least, more
readily subject to change. It has evolved in a distinctly British form and, due
to its common law foundations, is subject to re-evaluation even with respect
to its fundamental premises. Indeed, recent suggestions for self-incrimination reform in Great Britain demonstrate that even drastic changes are seri6
ously considered.
This article will discuss the intellectual and legal basis of recent
proprosals concerning self-incrimination in British law. Against the backdrop of the history and controversial development of the British common
law self-incrimination privilege, these new proposals shed a great deal of
light on the basic assumptions behind the priviledge: this is true not only for
the British jurist but applies as well for any study or assessment of the American constitutional privilege.
I.

THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

A substantial history of religious and political turmoil lies behind the
interrelated protections which comprise the self-incrimination privilege. In
seeking to deal with religious and political dissidents, both the Church and
Crown ir post-twelfth century England sought to make use of the inquisitiorial process to conduct their investigations. They employed proceedings
characterized by compelled submission to the oath ex ofio which obligated
individuals to answer truthfully all questions asked of them. Moreover, administration of the oath ex ofici' was not burdened by requirements of a
formal accusation or sufficient evidence against a suspect. Instead, it was a
tool to ensnare the unwary and even force them to identify other potential
victims. Although its early use was confined to English ecclesiastical courts,
the system of compulsory interrogation found its way into civil courts and
achieved prominence in Star Chamber and High Commission proceedings. 7
Opposition to the use of the oath ex oflio combined elements of principle and practicality. Some believed compulsory interrogation was simply
unfair.8 Others, however, objected solely because the technique was successful. This may have been the case for English Catholics who, after King
6. See supra note 4.
7. See genera/ly M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 1-23 (1980); L. LEvN,' ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1 2250-2251 (1961); WILLIAMS, supra
note 5, at 38-45; Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seitsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1892).
8. Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Oftio as Administeredin the Ecclesias-
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Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in Rome, found themselves victimized by compulsory interrogation procedures similar to those they had
eagerly used against Protestants. 9 Similarly, after the defeat of the Spanish
Armada, and with it the threat of a Catholic restoration, Protestant heretics
increasingly became the subjects of Star Chamber and High Commission
inquisitorial investigations. Whether Catholic or Protestant, however, the
suspect in such a proceeding faced the dilemma of potential penalties for
either perjury or refusing to take the oath, or punishment for any criminal
offense revealed by virtue of responding truthfully to the questions asked.
Opponents of the oath ex offici'o found an important ally in the common
law courts which sought to restrain the utilization of the oath by issuing
writs of prohibition.' 0 The reassertion of royal prerogative effectively ended
this tactic, but could not stifle all dissent. Victims of High Commission and
Star Chamber proceedings, such as John Udal 1 I and John Lilburne,12 invoked the common law right of silence in refusing to answer questions or
even take the oath, their legal complaint being that compulsory interrogation procedures were employed without formal accusation or presentment.
Ultimately, Parliament took the broader step of abolishing both the oath
procedure and the High Commission and Star Chamber courts which had so
effectively used it. 13
While these developments may have formally ended compelled questioning under oath by trial courts, the evolutionary process did not terminate there. British law more generally moved toward the disqualification of
the defendant from being a witness at his own trial. Since he was prevented
from testifying it was naturally considered unfair to infer guilt from his silence. Defendants, however, found they were able to hide behind compelled
silence and claim that they were prevented by law from establishing their
innocence. A balance was reached in the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898
which barred the defendant from being forced to testify at his own trial, but
allowed him to elect to take the witness stand in his own behalf.' 4
The right of silence evolved somewhat more slowly outside of the trial
context. Even after compelled interrogations had ceased at trial, they retical Courts in England,

in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES

HOWARD MCILWAIN (1936).

9. During the reign of Henry VIII's daughter, Queen Mary, the oath ex ofticzo was extensively used in an effort to restore the supremacy of Catholicism in England. LEVY, supra note 7,
at 73-82. The roles wre reversed after Queen Elizabeth I ascended to the throne. Id. at 98;
Kemp, The Backgroundof the Fi)th Amendment in Enghh Law:. A Study of its HistoricalImplications, I
WM. & MARY L. REV. 247, 255-68 (1958).

10. BERGERsupra note 7, at 13-14. Sir Edward Coke himself obtained one such injunction,
Collier v. Collier, 4 Leonard 194, 74 Eng. Rep. 816 (1589), and wrote against the oath. Coke, Of
Oaths Before an Ecclesiastical Judge Ex Offio, 12 Coke 26, 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1607).
11. 1 Howell St. Tr. 1271 (1407); LEVY, supra note 7, at 150-51, 164-70.
12. 4 Howell St. Tr. 1269 (1649); 3 Howell St. Tr. 1315 (1637); BERGER, supra note 7, at
14-20.
13. In 1641, Parliament acted to abolish the High Commission and Star Chamber courts
and bar administration of the oath in ecclesiastical proceedings. 16 Car. ch. 10, 11 (1641).
After the Stuart restoration the oath was banned entirely. 13 Car. 2, ch. 12 (1662). Soon thereafter the courts began to extend the privilege of not answering incriminating questions to witnesses. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 290 (1961).
14. 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36 (1898). See generaly BERGER, supra note 5, at 45-48.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

mained a feature of the preliminary examination performed by the Justice of
the Peace.15 This created the anomaly, before passage of the Criminal Evidence Act, that the jury might be presented with the defendant's preliminary hearing confession, but the defendant would not be able to directly
testify as to his own version of the events. The problems were compounded
by the development of the modern police force which created further opportunities for obtaining incriminatory pretrial statements. Justices of the
Peace gradually assumed a more judicial role and the preliminary hearing
was turned into an examination of the evidence against the accused, rather
than an examination of him.' 6 To insure control of the extra-judicial interrogation process, there evolved a requirement that confessions be voluntary
7
and fairly obtained.'
At the beginning of the twentieth century the essential components of
the English right to silence were well established. They were refined in subsequent years, but not fundamentally changed. Calls for basic restructuring
have emerged, however, and been backed by prestigious sources. The succeeding controversy has been as much a political as a legal debate.
II.

A.

CONFESSIONS

Voluntariness

Before the advent of the right to silence, compelling the suspect to incriminate himself was standard procedure. Physical coercion in the form of
torture, and legal coercion represented by the oath ex offwio, were official
instruments of state policy.' 8 With the success of efforts to eliminate the
oath procedure, however, judicial coercion gradually ceased to exist. Trial
questioning was finally ended by the rule disqualifying the accused from
testifying at his own trial. Later, the judicialization of the functions of the
Justice of the Peace led to the abandonment of the interrogation of the accused at the preliminary hearing.
Although these developments did not directly affect the police, the restrictions upon judicial questioning did serve to create a sense of resistance to
police interrogation. Judge Cave observed:
The law does not allow the judge or the jury to put questions in
open court to prisoners; and it would be monstrous if the law permitted a police officer to go, without anyone being present to see
how the matter was conducted, and put a prisoner through an examination, and then produce the effects of that examination
15. Two 16th century statutes required that the justice of the peace examine accused felons
brought before him. 1 & 2 Phil. & M. ch. 13 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M. ch. 10 (1555).
16. BERGER, supra note 5, at 45; Home Office, Evidence to the Royal Commission on
7Criminal Procedure, Memorandum No. 9, The Law of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings,
9 (1978) (all evidence to the Royal Commission Memoranda hereafter cited on file at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London) [hereinafter cited as Home Office
Evidence Memorandum].
17. See infta notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
18. BERGER, Supra note 5, at 12-13, 38-45. Initially, defendants were subjected topeizneforte
et dure to force them to plead to the charge. Failure to plead barred a trial and thus any chance
of forfeiture of property upon conviction. Later it was employed for the additional task of
securing a confession.
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against him . . . It is no business of a policeman to put
questions. 19
Other courts sought to grant police slightly more leeway by permitting questioning once there was clear evidence that a crime had, in fact, been committed. 20 Confusion remained, however, as to whether questioning could
proceed if the accused had been taken into custody, 2 I and as to when permissible questioning became prohibited cross-examination of the defendant. 22 Mr. Justice Hawkins, later Lord Brampton, offered cogent advice in
his Preface to the 1882 edition of Vincent's Police Code when he wrote that
"[p]erhaps the best maxim for a constable to bear in mind with respect to an
accused person is, 'keep your eyes and your ears open, and your mouth
shut.' "23
Despite resistance to the practice of interrogation, English courts generally admitted any resulting confession if it was found to be voluntary. Two
eighteenth century cases, R. v. Rudd 24 and R. v. Warwickshall,25 had established that confessions resulting from threats or promises were entitled to no
weight. This principle evolved into the requirement that courts must exclude involuntary confessions and was, in turn, applied to those police interrogations which the courts ruled were permissible.
The English standard as to what constituted a voluntary confession
evolved in as confusing a manner as its American counterpart. 26 One of the
earliest expressions of the rule, in Warwtckshall, was based upon the objective
of protecting the reliability of the evidence against the accused. 27 The more
recent description, offered by Lord Sumner in R. v. Ibrahim, omits reference
to reliability as an issue, but is nevertheless similar in seeking to explain voluntariness by vaguely defining the contours of an involuntary confession:
19. R. v. Male and Cooper, (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 689, 690.
20. R. v. Crowe and Myerscough, (1917) 81 J.P. 288; R. v. Berriman, (1854) 6 Cox C.C.
388.

21. Compare R. v. Gavin, (1885) 15 Cox C.C. 656 with R. v. Miller, (1895) 18 Cox C.C. 54,
and R. v. Brackenbury, (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 628.
22. Gardner and Hancox, (1915) 11 Crim. App. 265.
23. Quoted in Home Office, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure,
Memorandum No. 5, The Law and Procedures Relating to the Questioning of Persons in the
Investigation of Crime 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Home Office Questioning Memorandum].
See also R. v. Knight and Thayre, (1905) 20 Cox C.C. 711.
24. (1775) 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160.
25. (1793) 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234.
26. Voluntariness is a prerequisite to the admissibility of confessions in the United States,
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), but it is a standard whose meaning is unclear and
whose development has been inconsistent. BERGER, supra note 7, at 104-12; 150-60. English
commentaries on the voluntariness standard can be found in ARCHBOLD, supra note 5, at 1
1377(A)(a)-(f, 1382-85; CROSS, supra note 5, at 541-45; Home Office Evidence Memorandum,
supra note 16, 1 28-37. See aLso D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW
45-52 (1966); Kaci, Confessions.- A Comparison of Excuson Under Miranda in the United States and
Under the Judges' Rules in England, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 87 (1982).
27. Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confession is
deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense
of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,
comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt,
that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.
R. v. Warwickshall, (1783) 1 Leach 263, 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35.
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It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal
law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence
against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a
voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained
hope of advantage exercised
from him either by fear of prejudice or 28
or held out by a person in authority."
In 1963 the requirement was added that confessions obtained by oppression
29
must be excluded.
The early administration of the voluntariness rule was guided by the
condidions of the day. Almost every serious crime was punishable by death
or deportation at that time, and the police did not constitute an organized
group, could not be effectively watched, and were prone to abuse suspects to
gain admissions, 30 the judiciary was compelled to create artificial rules to
protect suspects from such abuse, especially considering the old rule prohibiting suspects from testifying on their own behalf.3 1 The attitude was one of
caution with respect to confessions obtained by the authorities, and in extreme cases courts would view simple admonitions to tell the truth as sufficient to render the confession inadmissible. 32 In contrast, the case law was
very inconsistent in its treatment of confessions to public officials,3 3 and the
voluntariness rule was deemed inapplicable to confessions made to individu34
als who were not in positions of authority.
Contemporary English confession law retains the 'person in authority'
requirement in assessing voluntariness, 35 and has resolved a number of related procedural issues. 36 Nevertheless, the substance of the voluntariness
28. 1914 A.C. 599, 609. Lord Sumner's views were reaffirmed in Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, and Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz and
Power, [1967] 1 A.C. 761. Lord Sumner's definition is also incorporated in section (e) of the
preamble to the Judges' Rules. Home Office Circular No. 89/1978, Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the Police, Preamble § (e) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Rules] reprinted in
Royal Commission Procedure Study, infra
note 44, appendix 12.
29. Callis v. Gunn, [1963] 3 All. E.R. 677; [1964] 1 Q.B. 495. Oppression is also barred by
the Judges' Rules, supra note 28, § (e)(preamble to Rules).
30. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, 182 (Speech of Lord
Hailsham).
31. Id. Wariness of confessions was expressed by Judge Cave much earlier when he observed that "for my part I always suspect these confessions, which are supposed to be the offspring of penitence and remorse, and which nevertheless are repudiated by the prisoner at the
trial." R. v. Thompson, [1893] 2 Q.B. 12, 18.
32. R. v. Kingston, (1830) 172 Eng. Rep. 752 ("You are under suspicion of this, and had
better tell all you know."). See also R. v. Partridge, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 243 ("I should be
obliged to you if you would tell us whit you know about it; if you will not, we of course can do
nothing; I shall be glad if you will.").
33. Ibrahim v. R, 1914 A.C. 599 (Confession admissible after suspect was asked "Why have
you done such a senseless act?"); R. v. Baldry, (1852) 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (confession admissible
after suspect warned of his right not to incriminate himself). Confessions following spiritual
admonitions were also admissible. R. v. Gilham, (1828) 1 Mood. 186, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235.
Inconsistencies are inevitable in light of the fact that the rule has "not been tightly defined in
law." The Fisher Report on the Confait Case.- Four Issues, 41 MOD. L. REV. 455, 460 (1978).
34. R. v. Moore, (1852) 2 Den. 522, 169 Eng. Rep. 1278; R. v. Upchurch, (1836) 1 Mood.
465, 168 Eng. Rep. 1346. Similarly, a confession induced by a hope of pardon, which authorities had not created, would be admitted. Godinho [1911] 7 Crim. App. 12 (C.C.A.). See generally Mirfield, Confessions---the "Person in Authority" Requirement, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 92.
35. R. v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All. ER. 77; Deokinanan v. R., [1968] 2 All. E.R. 346.
36. The prosecution must establish the voluntariness of the confession beyond a reasonable
doubt, R. v. Sartori, Gavin and Phillips, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 397, in contrast to the American
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standard remains ill-defined, and has produced some results which have generated criticism. 37 Threats and promises sufficient to render a confession
involuntary are largely a matter of perspective, dependent upon one's view
of the role of the voluntariness rule. If reliability alone is the objective, confessions obtained by force and substantial threats would be excluded, 38 but
lesser pressures that do not necessarily produce unreliable confessions would
remain. 39 Similarly, inducements which currently lead to the exclusion of
confessions 40 may encourage a suspect to confess without substantial risk of
unreliability. English confession law, like its American counterpart, 4 1 has
moved beyond the reliability principle in a more general effort to control the
interrogation process. The Criminal Law Revision Committee labelled this
42
additional objective the disciplinary principle.
The voluntariness principal incorporates the disciplinary principle in
three major ways. First, it has taken an expansive view of the threats and
preponderance of the evidence standard, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). The challenge
is heard out of the presence of the jury in what the English call a trial within a trial. A decision
to exclude will mean that the jury will not hear evidence of the confession. If the confession is
ruled admissible, the jury may hear evidence relating to voluntariness in order to assess its
probative weight, Prasad v. The Queen, [19811 1 All E.R. 319; McCarthy, [1980] 70 Crim. App.
270, with an instruction that the prosecution has the burden of proof. R. v. Cave, [1963] Crim.
L. R. 371 (C.C.A.); Francis [1959] 43 Crim. App. 174 (C.C.A.). All testimony at the trial within
a trial is inadmissible as substantive evidence against the accused, as is the case in the United
States. Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen, [1979] 1 All E.R. 939; Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968). Both countries bar any use of involuntary confessions for cross-examination
purposes; Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen, [1979] 1 All E.R. 939; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385 (1978), but the British exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions does not extend to
derivative evidence. King v. R., [1969] 1 A.C. 304; The King v. Warwickshall, (1783) 1 Leach
263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234. However, the prosecution must avoid introducing the evidence by
stating it was discovered as a result of what the defendant said, R. v. Berriman, (1854) 6 Cox
C.C. 388, although it has been observed that there is some conflict in the case law. CLRC
Report, supra note 4, at [ 69(i).
37. See Speech of Lord Hailsham, Director of Pub. Prosecution v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All.
E.R. 175, 183; Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
4.73.
38. R. v. Fennell, (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 147; R. v. Parrott, (1831) 172 Eng. Rep. 1275. See also
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz and Power, 1967 A.C. 761 (confession made
following threat of prosecution involuntary). Lord Widgery, C.J., observed that if a confession
"is induced by pressures or other influences [it] may be and often is thoroughly unreliable." R.
v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All E.R. 77, 80.
39. In R. v. Smith, [1959] 2 All. E.R. 193, a Court Martial Appeal Court ruled that the
defendant's confession, made shortly after the sergeant-major had informed the company that
they would remain on parade until he found out who had been involved in a fighting incident,
was inadmissible. Documents produced by a defendant after being informed of the Inland
Revenue's practice of accepting monetary settlement in lieu of criminal prosecution where there
has been voluntary disclosure were ruled inadmissible in R. v. Barker, [1941] 3 All E.R. 33.
40. Northam, [1967] 52 Crim. App. 97 (suggestion of a break on other charges an improper
inducement); Zaveckas, [1969] 54 Crim. App. 202 (improper inducement in police affirmative
response to question of whether bail would be granted following statement). But see Houghton,
[1978168 Crim. App. 197 (no inducements found in context of statement made by defendant for
reward, but after being cautioned). More recently the Court of Appeal said that the practice of
discussing charge concessions with the defendant should be stopped but found no error in the
admission of the confession. R. v. Challinor and Cross, Times of London, October 12, 1982, at
8, col. 4.
41. The "aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). See generally BERGER, supra note 7, at 108-10.
42. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
55. The phrase has also been used by the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
4.123, and
appeared in Lord Diplock's speech in R. v. Sang, [19791 2 All. E.R. 1222, 1230.
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inducements which will render a confessioto inadmissible. 43 Second, the rule
44
independently bars the admission of confessions obtained by oppression.
Finally, the threat and inducements must come from a person in authority. 45
Each of these developments cannot be explained solely on the basis of the
reliability objective. British courts have been regulating police behavior
through the use of the exclusionary rule despite the fact that this is not a
46
favored practice.
Although British courts may feel that in light of the well-established
character of the voluntariness rule, judicial revision would be inappropriate, 4 7 there are not written constitutional restraints barring legislative
change. Both the recent 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
Report 48 and the 1972 Evidence Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee 49 were thus left free to offer recommendations to recast the voluntariness rule, and each sought changes which would have the effect of greatly
reducing opportunities for judicial exclusion of a defendant's statements to
police.
43. R. v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All E.R. 77, 81-82. Judges have commented that the upgrading of the police has made the voluntariness rule "yet one more clog upon the efficient performance by the police of their duties." Northam, [1967] 52 Crim. App. 97, 104 (Winn, L.J.); and
that it was "designed to protect [the suspect] against dangers now avoided by other and more
rational means." Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin. [19751 3 All E.R. 175, 182 (Lord
Hailsham).
44. See supra note 29. In R. v. Priestley, Judge Sachs stated that oppression "in the context
of the principles under consideration imports something which tends to sap, and has sapped,
that free will which must exist before a confession is voluntary." [1966] 50 Crim. App. 183, 51
Crim. App. 1 (note to case). In an address to the Bentham Club in 1968 Lord MacDermott
described oppressive questioning as that "which by its nature, duration, or other attendant
circumstances (including the fact of custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or fears,
or so affects the mind of the subject that his will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he
would have stayed silent." Quoted in Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses in England and Wales: The Law and Procedure,
Cmnd. 8092-1, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Royal Commission Procedure Study]. See also R. v.
Prager, [19721 1 W.L.R. 260; Hudson, [1981] 72 Crim. App. 163. Lord Hailsham observed that
"any civilized system of criminal jurisprudence must accord to the judiciary some means of
excluding confessions or admissions obtained by improper methods." Wong Kam-Ming v. R.,
[1979] 2 W.L.R. 81, 90 (dissenting opinion).
45. The most recent reaffirmation appears in R. v. Rennie, Times of London, November 7,
1981, at 4, col. 1. Presumably, since inducements from other sources can have the same impact
as those from persons in authority, the requirement, therefore, suggests an objective of controlling the conduct of official interrogators. An inducement made in thepresence of a 'person in
authority', however, will suffice. Cleary, [1963] 48 Crim. App. 116.
46. This position was forcefully put by Lord Diplock in R. v. Sang, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1222,
1230:
It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or
prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by
them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law, if it was obtained
legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the
appropriate disciplinary authority to deal with.
47. The speeches of Lord Morris ("I do not think that a reconsideration or modification of
the rule lies within the province of judicial decision") and Lord Hailsham ("the rule has survived into the twentieth century, not only unmodified but developed, and only Parliament can
modify it now from the form in which it was given classical expression by Lord Sumner") in Ping
Lin reflect judicial unwillingness to tamper with the voluntariness standard. Director of Pub.
Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, 179, 182.
48. The Commission was created by the Prime Minister. Royal Commission Report, supra
note 4, at
1.1.
49. CLRC Report, supra note 4.
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The Royal Commission's position relied heavily upon empirical research it had itself commissioned. Of particular importance was a psychologist's six-month observational study of interrogations conducted by the
Brighton Police Criminal Investigation Department. 50 The study's conclusion was simply that the legal concept of voluntariness could not be utilized
meaningfully by a trained observer attempting to use psychological principles to categorize confessions obtained by police following interrogation. 5 1
Given the Royal Commission's conclusion that the legal definition of voluntariness was imprecise and offered little guidance to police, 52 the added evidence of the variance of psychological and legal voluntariness 53 was
sufficient to warrant a new approach to confession admissibility.
The core of the Royal Commission's proposal was abandonment of the
voluntariness rule and the development, in its place, of a code of practice to
regulate the manner in which police interrogations could be conducted. The
object of the code would be to produce "conditions of interview that minimize the risk of unreliable statements."' 54 It would focus on the circumstances and environments in which suspects could be questioned but, apart
from prohibiting threats of violence, torture, and inhuman or degrading
treatment, no attempt would be made to regulate interrogation tactics. 55
The drafting of the code was seen primarily as a Home Office responsibility, 56 although this would inevitably entail input from the police. 5 7 Violation of code provisions involving violence, threats of violence, torture, or
inhuman or degrading treatment would lead to the automatic exclusion of
any confessions so obtained. 58 This was the only exception to the Royal
Commission's reluctance to use the law of evidence as a tool to deter police
misconduct, whether in the form of an automatic or reverse-onus exclusionary rule. 59 In cases involving other breaches of the code of practices, it rec50. Irving, Police Interrogation: A Case Study of Current Practce, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 2, (1980) [hereinafter cited as Case Study]; Interview with
Walter Merricks, Commission Member (October 19, 1981); Interview with Dr. Michael McConville, University of Birmingham (November 16, 1981). Observational data was also assembled in a Home Office research study. Softley, Polce Interrogation: An ObservationalStudy in Four
Police Stattons, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4 (1980).
51. Case Study, supra note 50, at 136, 152; Interview with Barrie Irving (October 15, 1981).
52. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
4.70-4.72.
53. Id. at
4.73.
54. Id. at
4.110.
55. Id. at
4.111-4.114. The Royal Commission suggested that appropriate subjects for
the code would include limits on night questioning; provision for refreshments; a ban on interviewing persons substantially under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or who have been held
incommunicado beyond a specified period; and conditions of lighting, ventilation, and seating
for the interrogation. It believed that any attempt to regulate interrogation tactics would fail in
both the effort to define the impermissible tactics and in dealing with tactics that are implicit in
the suspect's situation even if not made explicit, such as a belief that a confession will lead to
bail.
56. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.116.
57. Interviews with William Bohan, Criminal Policy Division, Home Office (October 16,
1981); Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch, Metropolitan Police (October 20, 1981).
58. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.132. Automatic exclusion was viewed
as necessary in light of the seriousness of the breach of such rules and society's abhorrence of
violent and degrading conduct.
59. The Royal Commission questioned the effectiveness of an automatic exclusionary rule,
citing Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665 (1970), but

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

ommended a remedy tied to the reliability goal underlying the code. Where
there has been such a breach
[t]he judge should point out to the jury or the magistrates be advised of the dangers involved in acting upon a statement whose
reliability can be affected by breach of the code. They should be
informed that under pressure a person may make an incriminating
statement that is not true, that the code has been introduced to
control police behavior and minimize the risk of an untrue statement being made and that if they are satisfied that a breach of the
code has occurred it can be dangerous to act upon any statement
made; accordingly, they should look for independent support for it,
before relying upon it. 6°
More direct enforcement of the code would derive from police internal su61
pervision and the complaint procedure.
Reliability had also been the linchpin of the 1972 Criminal Law Revision Committee recommendations. In its Evidence Report, the Committee
called for the retention of the exclusionary rule with respect to statements
obtained as a result of oppressive treatment of the accused, but sought to
alter the rule of automatic exclusion for statements obtained as a result of
threats or inducements. In its place the Committee recommended that only
those statements obtained as a result of threats or inducements likely to pro62
duce an unreliable confession should be excluded.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals were based upon
the utilitarian view that the object of the criminal process is to achieve the
"right result," but its entire report was abandoned largely as a result of the
furor generated by its call for the restructuring of the right to silence. 63 Well
aware of the fate of the Committee's efforts, 64 the Royal Commission chose
instead to rely upon the concept of the need for a proper balance between
65
the liberties of the individual and the interests of the whole community.
was itself criticized for confusing the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in the quite different contexts of interrogations and searches. Inman, The Admissibility ofConfessions, 1981 CRIM.
L. REV. 469, 475. It also raised questions as to the appropriateness of spending more court time
on matters not related to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Royal Commission Report,
supra note 4, at 4.128. A reverse-onus exclusionary rule, which would place the burden on the
prosecution to justify the non-exclusion of illegally obtained confessions, was seen to reflect the
same problems as well as lacking the certainty needed to adequately guide police. Id. at
4.129-4.131.
60. Id. at 1 4.133.
61. Id. at 1 4.118.
62. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 65. In line with its reliability focus, the Committee
would allow the fruit of inadmissible confessions to be introduced. Id. at T 68. The fact that the
truth of an inadmissible confession is confirmed by evidence subsequently discovered, however,
would not justify its admission, although the jury could be informed that derivative evidence
was discovered as a result of a statement made by the accused. Id. at 69.
63. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 1 27; Gerstein, The Se/f-Incrimiation Debate tn Great Britain, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 81 (1979); JUSTICE, Report of Conference on the Report of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, April 11, 1981, at 10 (Comments of Professor Michael
Zander); Interview with Charles Morrison, Q.C., Dean of the Inns of Court School of Law
(September 24, 1981).
64. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 1.24-1.31.
65. Id. at $1 1.11-1.12; Inner Temple, Conference on Questioning and the Rights of the
Suspect, September 26, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Inner Temple Conference] (Remarks of Walter Merricks, Member of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure).
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Each, however, felt that the contemporary voluntariness rule was an inappropriate standard and developed a formula which would have the unmistakeable effect of increasing the number of confessions reaching the jury.
The Royal Commission would allow all confessions to reach the jury, excluding only those obtained under the most extreme conditions, and with only a
judicial warning in the event of a breach of the code of practice. The Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposal was to exclude only confessions obtained as as result of oppressive questioning or tactics likely to result in an
unreliable statement. The goals of insuring the accuracy of the trial's outcome and balancing individual and societal interests were seen to call for
looser evidentiary controls on the interrogation process.
Suggestions that reliable confessions be admitted against the accused as
long as the methods used to obtain them are not extreme, are very much in
keeping with the British preference for avoiding the use of evidentiary rules
to discipline police. 66 The exception for extreme tactics, where both the
Royal Commission and Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended
automatic exclusion, is largely consistent with the reliability objective since
any resulting confessions would have a high risk of unreliabilty. Despite the
67
fact that both proposals received support from some quarters, most of the
69
68
Much of the opposireaction has been either cautious or openly hostile.
tion was based on the view that the proposals were vague in failing to specify
either the circumstances likely to produce unreliable confessions under the
Criminal Law Revision Committee model or the content of the code of interrogation practices proposed by the Royal Commission. Others concluded
that even without such details the elimination of the voluntariness test would
66. See supra note 45. Interview with Sir David Napley, former President, Law Society
(December 3, 1981).
67. Not surprisingly, police groups supported relaxed confession admissibility rules in evidence presented to the Royal Commission. Association of Chief Police Officers of England,
7.76
Wales, and Northern Ireland, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
(1978); Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales, Written Evidence to the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.20 (1978). Others also reacted favorably to the
Royal Commission's suggestions. Interview with Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal Court
(November 18, 1981). Supporters of the Criminal Law Revision Committee's recommendations
included Professor Rupert Cross and Sir David Napley. Cross, The Evidence Report: Sense or Nonsense, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 329, 354; Interview with Sir David Napley (December 3, 1981).
68. In the case of the Royal Commission recommendations, the lack of the details of the
proposed code of practices led some to reserve judgment on the acceptability of eliminating the
voluntariness rule. JUSTICE, Comments on the Home Office Consultative Memorandum, at 8
(1981) (The Home Office Consultative Memorandum sought comments on issues raised by the
Royal Commission Report); Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch, Metropolitan
Police (September 20, 1981).
69. Law Society, Memorandum ofthe Council ofthe Law Society on the Royal Commission s Report
2, 29 (1981); Law Society and Bar Council, Memorandum by the Law Sociey and Bar Council on
Certain of the Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5 (1981); 5 RIGHTS
(Journal of the National Council for Civil Liberties) 4 (1981); Interviews with Neil Denison,
Q.C., Secretary, Criminal Bar Association (September 22, 1981), Richard DuCann, Q.C., former Chairman of the Bar of England and Wales (November 11, 1981), Peter Archer, M.P.
(November 17, 1981). The Labour Party position appeared to be that a reverse-onus exclusionary rule should apply to improperly obtained statements. House of Commons Debate, November 19, 1981, at 538 (Comments of Roy Hattersley, M.P.). It has been suggested that lawyers
may simply prefer the vagueness of the voluntariness standard. Interview with Barrie Irving
(October 15, 1981).
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simply reduce already existing protections for the accused. 7 °
One reason for the differing positions on proposals to replace the voluntariness rule is the fundamental question of how much rules of evidence
should be used for deterrent purposes. The same issue permeates debates on
the American exclusionary rule. 71 Closely related are the differing perceptions as to the frequency of police malpractice, the utility of alternative remedies for police misconduct, and the likely success of utilizing the
exclusionary rule for this purpose. 72 There is also no consensus as to which
interrogation tactics, short of the extreme, are either improper or likely to
produce unreliable statements. Police may be able to overcome resistance
and secure a confession through persuasion and pressure, but is this necessarily bad or likely to produce unreliable evidence? The opponents of the voluntariness rule proposals appear to have a different view of how the British
criminal justice system operates in practice and differ in their vision of how it
should function. Whether the proposals to alter the voluntariness rule will
be adopted by Parliment, and in what form cannot be predicted. It does
appear, however, that such an effort will be undertaken by the current
73
government.
B.

The Caution and Silence

One of the central premises of the common law of confessions is that a
suspect has no obligation to give a statement to the police. Lord Parker's
description of this principle in Rice v. Connol/y74 reflects the generally accepted view that:
though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty
to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed
the whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual75to
refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority.
The voluntariness rule is consistent with this because the lack of an obliga70. Inner Temple Conference, supra note 65 (Remarks of Harriet Harmon, Legal Officer,
National Council for Civil Liberties).
71. See The Exclusionmy Rule Bills: Hearings on S 101 and S 751 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1981).
72. Judges may tend to view themselves as presently doing an adequate job of protecting
the rights of the accused. Interviews with Lord Justice Eveleigh, Member of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (November 19, 1982), Lord Justice Lawton (October 13, 1981);
Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal Court (November 18, 1981). Some barristers also feel
that court supervision of the voluntariness standard has been improving. Interviews with Neil
Denison, Q.C., Secretary, Criminal Bar Association (September 22, 1981); Richard DuCann,
Q.C., former Chairman of the Bar of England and Wales (November 11, 1981). A sign that
there were major problems in the interrogation process, however, was the recognition by the
police themselves that their testimony as to oral confessions, the so-called police verbals, was not
being believed. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitors Branch, Metropolitan Police (October 20, 1981). One commentator observed that the Royal Commission lacked "a sense of streetwisdom, and a practical application of how copybook safeguards get blotted in police cells and
in courtrooms." The Guardian, November 20, 1981, p. 15, col. 1.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 253-87.
74. [1966] 2 Q.B. 414.
75. Id. at 419. Suspects in the United States have the same right. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion to answer police questions does not mean that an individual should be
prevented from voluntarily deciding to provide information.
Because it is the English prosecutor's duty to establish the voluntariness
of the accused's confession beyond a reasonable doubt, 76 he is confronted
with the problem of assembling the necessary evidence to meet the burden of
proof requirement. The practice of cautioning suspects of their right to remain silent prior to interrogation grew as a procedure enabling the prosecution to meet this evidentiary burden. 77 Due to uncertainty as to whether a
caution was required, however, the Chief Constable of Birmingham wrote to
the Lord Chief Justice in 1906 asking for clarification. In response, he was
informed that a caution should precede questioning if the officer had determined that the suspect should be charged. Later the judges of the Kings'
Bench were asked to draw up guides for police interrogation, and the result
was the first set of Judges' Rules in 1912.78 Changes were made at various
points, and the current Judges' Rules, with accompanying Home Office Adminstrative Directions, were issued in 1978. 79
The Judges' Rules incorporate the voluntariness principle,8 0 but provide regulation of the interrogation process well beyond the principles minimal dictates. The Rules are not viewed as having the status of law, 8 ' and a
violation of one of the rules or accompanying administrative directions does
82
not lead to the automatic exclusion of any statement thereafter obtained.
As one court observed, "their non-observance may, and at times does, lead to
the exclusion of an alleged confession; but ultimately all turns on the judge's
decision as to whether, breach or no breach, it has been shown to have been
made voluntarily."' 83 How frequently the discretion to exclude confessions is
8 4
exercised is subject to some disagreement.
The cautioning of suspects plays a central role in the structure of the
Judges' Rules, but the obligation to administer the caution does not arise
immediately. Pursuant to Rule II:
As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned
before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating
76.

R. v. Cave, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 371; R. v. Sartori, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 397.

77.

P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND

32 (1960).

78. The 1912 Judges' Rules are reproduced in R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, 539 n.3.
The historical evolution of the Judges' Rules appears in Royal Commission Procedure Study,
supra note 43, app. 13, at 162-65.
79. Judges' Rules, supra note 28.
80. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, Preamble § (e).
81. Archbold, supra note 5, at
1388 E.; Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra
note 23, at [ 22.
82. Conway v. Hotten, [19761 2 All E.R. 213; R. v. Collier, [1965] 3 All E.R. 136; Comment, R. v. Roberts, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 464 (C.A.); Voisin, [1918] 13 Crim. App. 89.
83. Prager, [1971] 56 A. App. R. 151, 160.
84. Courts have not been inclined to exercise their discretion to exclude evidence as a
means of disciplining the police. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
4.124. One
Commission member believed that the discretion to exclude was so infrequently exercised that it
could be safely removed. Interview with Walter Merricks (October 19, 1981). Others, however,
believe that the courts provide adequate protection. Interview with Lord Justice Lawton (October 13, 1981).
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to that offence.
The evidentiary standard triggering the duty to caution in form and practice
parallels the standard required for an arrest. 8 6 Under Rule I, questioning
before this point may proceed without a caution, but, when "reasonable
grounds to suspect" arise, the individual must be informed: "You are not
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be
put into writing and given in evidence." If the investigation proceeds to the
point where an individual is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offense, Rule III(a) requires that he be cautioned in the same
form as Rule II, prefaced by the question "Do you wish to say anything?"
However, Rule III(b) generally precludes any further interrogation:
It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence
should be put to the accused person after he has been charged or
informed that he may be prosecuted. Such questions may be put
where they are necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimizing harm or loss to some other person or the public or for clearing
8 7
up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement.
Furthermore, a caution must precede any such questioning.8 8
To an American observer, the differences between the Miranda warning
requirements and the obligation to caution imposed by the Judges' Rules are
readily apparent. In particular, the English warning is far less detailed and
exclusion of evidence obtained without a caution is discretionary. More significant is the fact that Miranda's rather demanding waiver requirements are
not part of the British system, and thus police in Great Britain feel free to
attempt to persuade suspects to answer questions and do not necessarily take
no for an answer.8 9 There are similarities as well. There is an investigatory
period in both systems in which questioning may proceed without a warning
or caution, and the obligation to inform the suspect of his rights arises coincident with the assertion of custodial authority. Similarly, the standards increase when the process becomes more adversarial and the prosecution phase
9 °
commences.
The most controversial of the recent recommendations for changing the
British right to silence sought a fundamental restructuring of the restraints
upon police interrogation and the very right of suspects not to respond to
police questions. The Criminal Law Revision Committee proposed that,
while silence in the face of police questioning should not consistitute an of85. Judges' Rules, supra note 28,'at p. 154.
86. Criminal Evidence Act, 1967 s.2. The current standard reflects a change from the pre1964 rules which focused upon the point where a police officer "has made up his mind to charge
a person with a crime." P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 28 (1960).
87. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, at 154.
88. Given the lack of support for post-charging interrogation, one might expect police to
delay the charging decision. Although this has been held a violation of the Judges' Rules, resulting statements are not excluded. The only incentive for police to comply is the fear that the
defendant may claim the violation rendered the statement involuntary, and the risk the jury
will believe the claim. R. v. MacIntosh, Times of London, October 8, 1982, at 9, col. 5.
89. Interview with Barrie Irving (October 15, 1981).
90.

P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 27 (1960); Zander, The Right of

Slence tn the Police Station and the Caution in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW (Glazebrook, ed.
1978).
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fense, it should be subject to a wider array of adverse consequences. More.over, substantial changes in the police caution were proposed to insure that
suspects would be made aware of the consequences of exercising their right
to silence. This plan became the central focus of the debate over the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Evidence Report and led to its downfall. 9 1
The Committee's proposals came against the background of a number
of confusing decisions delineating the limits of judicial comment on the accused's pretrial silence. A number of rulings had barred the suggestion of
adverse inferences of guilt in cases involving post-caution silence. 92 Other
cases, however, distinguished an inference of guilt from notifying the jury
that a defense was advanced for the first time at trial and inviting them to
consider that fact in assessing its weight. 93 A Privy Council ruling had rejected the distinction between pre and post-caution silence 94 and the Criminal Law Revision Committee assumed that the prohibition against drawing
an adverse inference from silence existed independently of the caution. 95 A
more recent court ruling suggests that the current law bars even a comment
that a defense was first raised at trial. In R. v. Gilbert, the court observed that
the current law is that the judge "must not comment adversely on the accused's failure to make a statement. '9 6 Additionally, in a 1976 decision,
doubt was cast on the Privy Council's view that pre and post-caution silence
should be treated the same, 97 and the Criminal Law Revision Committee
believed that the law would permit consideration of precaution silence in
98
assessing the accused's evidence.
The specific form that the Committee's recommendation took was the
proposal that:
If the accused has failed, when being interrogated by anyone
charged with the duty of investigating offenses or charging offenders, to mention a fact which he afterwards relies on at the committal proceedings or the trial, the court or jury may draw such
inferences as appear proper in determining the question before
them. The fact would have to be one which the accused could
reasonably have been exprected to mention at the time. 99
91. Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra note 23, at J 41, 129; Zander, supra
note 90, at 344.
92. Davis, [1959] 43 Crim. App. 215; Leckay, [1943] 2 All. E.R. 665; Naylor, [1933] 1 K.B.
685.
93. Ryan, [1964] 50 Crim. App. 144; Littleboy, [1934 2 K.B. 408. Great Britain now
requires advance notice of an alibi defense.
94. Hall v. R., [1971] 1 All E.R. 322.
95. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
29.
96. [1977] 66 Crim. App. 237, 245.
97. R. v. Chandler, [1976] 3 All E.R. 105.
98. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
80. Exactly when permissible comments on the
weight of the evidence become prohibited suggestions of an adverse inference of guilt is difficult
to discern from the case law. Compare R. v. Gerard, [1948] 1 All E.R. 205 and Tune, [1944] 29
Crim. App. 162 (permissible comments) wth Sullivan, [1966] 51 Crim. App. 102 [and] Hoare,
[1966] 50 Crim. App. 166 (prohibited comments). Where the accused and accuser are on an
equal footing, i.e., the accuser is not a member of the police, silence in the face of an accusation
may constitute evidence of guilt. Parkes v. R., [1976] 3 All E.R. 380; R. v. Christie, 1914 A.C.
545.
99. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
32.
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The totality of the circumstances would determine whether an adverse inference would be warranted in light of the nature of the defense and the suspect's explanation for failure to mention it. The adverse inference could be
drawn even in a committal proceeding which has as its purpose determining
whether to commit the accused for trial.' ° Similarly, at trial, the adverse
inference could be used not only in the determination of the accused's guilt,
but also in assessing whether a submissible case had been made.10 1
The Committee recognized that its proposals were inconsistent with the
warnings required by the Judges' Rules. Rules 1 and 2, in particular, create
a sense in the mind of the suspect that he is not obligated to answer police
questions. The possibility of adverse inferences being drawn from his failure
to mention any relevant fact is a consideration that logically should be
weighed by the individual in deciding whether or not to exercise his right to
silence. A defendant could claim that the caution led him to believe there
would be no comment on his silence and thus no adverse inference should be
drawn. To remedy this, the Committee recommended a new caution:
You have been charged with [informed that you may be prosecuted for]-. If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in
your defense in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you
hold back until you go to court, your evidence may be less likely to
be believed and this may have a bad effect on your case in general.
If you wish to mention any fact now, and you would like it written
down, this will be done.502
Significantly, the caution would be administered only after an accused was
charged or officially informed that he would be prosecuted. No such advice
would have to be given at earlier stages of the investigation.' 0 3 A minority of
the Committee, however, urged that the application of the entire proposal be
delayed until a regular process of tape recording of confessions had been
instituted by the police.' 4
The reactions to the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposal were
overwhelmingly negative.' 0 5 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, despite some sympathies for the Criminal Law Revision Committee's
proposals, chose to recommend no change in the existing law on the right to
silence in police questioning. 0 6 The Royal Commission took this position
despite support for the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals from
police and prosecutor groups,' 0 7 and criticisms expressed by the Law Society
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at
39. If corroboration is required, the Committee also proposed to allow the
adverse inference to be used to meet this evidentiary obligation. Id. at 40.
102. Id. at 44.
103. Id. As previously indicated, after charging the Judges' Rules permit asking the accused
if he has anything further to say, but discourage further detailed interrogation. See supra note 86
and accompanying text. The Committee chose not to directly address the caution required in
the limited circumstances of post-charging interrogation under Rule (b). CLRC Report, supra
note 4, at $ 43 n.I.
104. Id. at
52.
105. Zander, The CLRC Evidence Report-A Survey of Reactions, 1974 LAw Soc. GAZETTE 954.
106. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 4.53.
107. Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Evidence
to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 9 7.38-7.45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Chief
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and Criminal Bar Association calling for less extreme modifications of the
right to silence in police questioning. 0 8
The Commission recognized that cases calling for adverse inferences
under the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals would be few in
number. These cases would involve only those in which the accused did not
plead guilty, did not make a damaging admission nor confession to the police, and attempted for the first time to offer a defense at trial. The Commission was concerned that in spite of this, cautions would have to be given to
every suspect.' 0 9 This policy, in turn, might affect the way the police would
conduct all their interviews," 0 and could only serve to add to the pressure
on the suspect to answer police questions. The result would be a risk that
even innocent individuals would make damaging admissions in the face of a
warning that silence would be to their detriment. There was also concern
that the effect of a system of adverse inferences would constitute a subtle
shifting of the burden of proof, a particularly inappropriate result where the
questioning might be based on unsubstantiated and vague allegations or on
mere suspicion."' Finally, concern was expressed that the system of adverse
inferences from silence might lead to frequent factual disputes as to whether
the individual remained silent. The resulting administrative burden could
well be unmanageable."12
The Royal Commission did not exhaustively consider the viability of
alternatives suggested to it. The Criminal Bar Association, for example, recommended that at the committal stage of the proceedings the defendant
should be invited to make any disclosure of facts relating to his defense and
that his failure to do so could be considered in assessing credibility, but not
as evidence of guilt or as corroboration of the prosecution evidence where
such is required. Comments to this effect could be made to the jury by both
the judge and the prosecuting counsel." 3 The defendant's duty to produce
relevant facts would arise only after the prosecution had revealed at the
committal proceedings the facts supporting the charge." 4 Thus, the Criminal Bar Association's proposals were responsive to both concerns voiced by
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. The Criminal Bar AssociaPolice Officers Evidence]; Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Part I of the Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1 4.13 (1978); Prosecuting Solicitors'
Society of England and Wales, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 27-

29 (1978).
108. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 11 52-67 (1978); Law Society, Police Powers and Rights of Suspects 11 5862 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Law Society Evidence].
09. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at T 4.49.
110. Id. at 4.50. The Commission added that it would affect pre as well as post-caution
interrogations.

11.

Id. at

4.51-4.52.

112. Id. at 4.52.
113. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure pt. 2, 1 52-68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bar Evidence]. This was a reaffirmation of the position taken by the Bar in 1973. Strong sentiment for a revised procedure
after the completion of initial police investigation was also noted by the Senate of the Inns of
Court and the Bar in its Submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure at 5

(1979).
114.

Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at pt. 2, T 59.
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tion avoided risking a subtle shift in the burden of proof by rejecting the use
of adverse inferences from failure to provide the relevant facts of a defense as
evidence of guilt, and limiting its use to credibility questions. In short, the
prosecution could not make its case by relying on the silence of the accused.
Under the Criminal Bar Association proposals the stage at which the information would have to be provided arose after the conclusion of the initial
police interrogation practices. The police could not use the immediate shock
of arrest coupled with the caution proposed by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee to obtain an early incriminating admission from the accused.
The Law Society offered somewhat more specific suggestions on the
right to silence during pretrial investigation. They viewed the existing right
to silence as contrary to common sense and unfairly favoring those who are
criminally experienced and likely to be guilty. 15 It proposed that:
[I]f a defendant exercises his right not to answer questions or if he
fails to give an explanation consistent with his innocence which one
might reasonably expect him to have volunteered the trial judge
and the prosecution (by cross-examination or in its final address)
should be entitled to comment thereon to the6 extent that such matters go to the credibility of the defendant."1
As was the case for the Criminal Bar Associations proposals, the Law Society
recommendations did not go so far as to authorize adverse use of the defendants silence during interrogation for purposes of proving his guilt or as corroboration. The Law Society proposal also rejected implementation unless
there existed effective sanctions against abuse by the police.' I In this way
the Law Society felt that it had satisfactorily resolved the two major obstacles to adverse use of silence; specifically the concern that it would shift the
burden of proof and encourage police abuse during the interrogation process. The Law Society also drafted a revised caution to reflect its recommended changes"' and observed that it would be in police interest to
adminster the caution at an early stage since its position was that adverse
comment upon silence prior to the administration of the caution, would not
be permitted. "19 The Law Society called for further cautioning either immediately before or immediately after charging.120 Believing that the Royal
115. Law Society Evidence, supra note 108, at
54-55.
116. Id. at
58(b).
117. Id. at
58-59.
118. Id. at
64.
I suspect that you may be involved in an offence of [burglary]. I am going to ask you
some questions. If you are later prosecuted, your answers to my questions will be
given in evidence and your answers should be truthful and accurate.
You are not compelled to answer the questions but I must warn you that, if you
fail to do so, a court may be less likely to accept as true any evidence you give at the
trial.
You should also tell me of anything which you think is in your favour because, if
you do not, the court may be unwilling to accept as true any evidence you give at the
trial concerning matters you have not told me about now.
Do you wish to consult a solicitor? If so, I will try to arrange for you to see one
before I question you.
Id.
119. Id. at 65.
120. After informing the suspect that he has been or will be charged with an offense, the
officer should state:
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Commission on Criminal Procedure had failed to provide for sufficient safeguards, particularly with respect to the accuracy of the interrogation, the
Law Society recommended against modifications of the right to silence in its
2
review of the Royal Commission's Report.' '
With so much support for modifications of the right to silence during
police investigation 122 it is perhaps surprising that the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure entirely avoided venturing into this area. Even though
the proposals of the Criminal Law Revision Committee had been soundly
rejected, compromises were nevertheless available. As both the Bar Council
and Law Society recommended, adverse inferences could have been limited
to credibility questions, thus avoiding the objection that silence should not
be used to shift the burden of proof to the defendant which the Criminal
Law Revision Committee arguably did in recommending the use of silence
as proof of guilt and corroboration. Moreover, the triggering point for such
inferences could be deferred past the initial police investigatory phase, thus
ensuring that only those against whom there was reasonable suspicion would
be subjected to it. The wording of the caution could be modified from the
format suggested by the Criminal Law Revision Committee to minimize its
arguably threatening character. Additionally, a strong argument can be
made that it is morally approriate to draw inferences from silence in appropriately controlled situations.' 23 Absent a recommendation from an entity
with the prestige of the Royal Commission, however, it is unlikely that
changes in this aspect of right to silence in England will be forthcoming.
The previous recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee,
I told you at an earlier stage that it was important that you should tell me of anything
you believed to be in your favour. If there is anything you have not told me already,
you should tell me now. If you wish, you can make a written statement and, although
I can write it for you, it would be better if you yourself write it out.
68.
Id. at
121. Law Society, Memorandum by the Council of the Law Society on the Royal Commis5.13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Law Society Memorandum]. Following the
sion's Report
issuance of the Royal Commission Report, the Bar Council also changed its position and supported the recommendation that there be no change in the right to silence. Law Society and
Bar Council, Memorandum by the Law Society and Bar Council on Certain of the Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure at 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Law
Society and Bar Council Memorandum].
122. Of course, this was not a unanimous position. One group urged retention of the existing right to silence, fearing added pressure on suspects to answer questions whose meaning
was equivocal. A further concern was raised as to whether suspects would appreciate the full
significance of the questions. The point was also made that the suspect's silence might be due to
reasons unrelated to the subject under investigation. London Criminal Courts Solicitors' Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Solicitors' Assoc.].
123. Professor Greenawalt has persuasively developed this argument and concluded that
"although adverse inferences are proper when a person refuses to respond to questions based on
substantial evidence of his wrongdoing, those who bear responsibility for determining guilt
should not be allowed to draw such inferences from silence that has occurred before substantial
evidence of wrongdoing exists." Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and ConstitutlnalRight, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 43 (1981). Yet, questions remain as to the evidentiary connection between
silence and either guilt or the suspect's credibility. See Solicitors' Assoc.,supra note 122. If it is a
weak one, silence may simply not be probative. Even if the connection exists, the nature of the
custodial environment arguably should not lead to adverse inferences from silence. Greenawalt,
supra note 123, at 65. Further consideration of the implications of adverse inferences of guilt as
opposed to credibility are also called for.
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even though rejected in England, nevertheless have influenced the law in
124
members of the British Commonwealth.
C.

Interrogation Before a Magistrate and Other Accuracy Controls

In addition to proposals for reform of existing self-incrimination principles, the English have also considered the merits of more fundamental
change in the system of justice. This has included evaluation of continental
criminal procedure systems and the inquisitorial procedures they utilize as
an alternative model for governing the acquisition of information from an
accused. In France, for example, ajuge d'instruction conducts an official inquiry to determine the suspect's guilt. Questioning of the accused is an essential component of this procedure. Instead of relying upon the
accusatorial contest between the prosecution and the defense, the inquisitorial process offers a model of active judicial control over the investigation
process. Although there is some question as to the effectiveness of judicial
controls over investigative activities, the inquisitorial model nevertheless prefers a different format for, and emphasis on, the interrogation of the
25
accused.'
Because of the radical change that adoption of inquisitorial procedures
would entail, British self-incrimination reform proposals have instead been
premised upon retention of the existing adversarial process.' 26 Nevertheless,
124. The Privy Council considered an appeal from Singapore which had enacted some of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommendations. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor,
[1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singpore). See Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence. The
Singapore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 89.
125. The advantages of contemporary inquisitorial procedures are explored in L. WEINREB,
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 117-46 (1977). In Professor Weinreb's view, police responsibilities should
primarily be those relating to peacekeeping and general emergency services, and that these are
inconsistent with other demands placed upon them to act "judiciously, with discretion, and
mindful of conflicting interest" in performing their investigative duties. Id. at 120. His solution
is the creation of an office of an investigating magistracy. However, the effectiveness of such a
system in supervising the investigation process is itself subject to dispute. Compare, Goldstein
and Marcus, The Myth ofJudicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) and Goldstein and Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978) with Langbein and Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: 'Myth'
and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). The distinctions between inquisitorial and accusatorial
procedures are explored in Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973).
126. The Criminal Law Revision Committee took as an underlying assumption that the
English adversary system would not be replaced by inquisitorial process where "there is a full
judicial investigation of the whole case, including that for the defense, before the trial and at the
trial the judge questions the accused from the report of the investigation." CLRC Report, supra
note 4, at $ 13. In the Committee's judgment such a change could not be made piecemeal and
in the absence of a complete consideration of the entire system. Id. Similarly, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recognized that any change to an inquisitorial system would be
"impossible, on political and practical grounds." Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at T
1.8. Even the JUSTICE recommendations for the interrogation of suspects before a magistrate
specifically disclaimed that the judicial official would act as an examining magistrate. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects 1 14 (1967). In evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, JUSTICE reaffirmed its position that a magisterial inquisition
along the lines of the Frenchjuge d'instruction was "not intended." JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure 31 (1979). Nevertheless, others have conccluded that an effort should be made
to at least incorporate aspects of the inquisitorial system. Interview with Judge John Buzzard,
Central Criminal Court (November 18, 1981).
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JUSTICE, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists,
has consistently recommended that the magisterial inquiry of the inquisitorial process be at least adapted to British criminal procedure. Under the
JUSTICE proposal, the police would still be in charge of the investigation of
the offense and the interrogation of the suspect, but a magistrate would be
available to validate any statement obtained from the accused or the fact
that the accused refused to make any statement. Although the proposal
would mean greater judicial involvement in the investigation process, the
recommendation did not contemplate the development of a magistrate's in27
quiry along the lines of the continental model.1
Under the JUSTICE proposals police would have retained the right to
question a suspect for an adequate length of time.' 28 Any statements made
to the police that were not subsequently confirmed before a magistrate, however, would not be admissible. t 29 The suspect would be informed of the
nature of police suspicions against him and that police questions would be
confined to the matter under suspicion. The individual would then be given
an opportunity to make a statement before questioning began and again
after it had concluded. He also would receive a caution which reflected the
fact that failure to answer legitimate questions could result in adverse inferences or comment.1 30 The function of the judicial officer in the proceeding
would thus be "to ensure that the questioning by the police is done fairly,
that the suspect is given every opportunity of giving his explanations or ver127. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects
14 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure
31 (1979).
128. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 1 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 25(1) (1979).
129. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects §§ 2,3 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 25(3) (1979). The proposals of JUSTICE would also retain the admissibility of
statements made by individuals before becoming a suspect or being taken into custody, as well
as statements volunteered by a suspect on his first encounter with the police, such as the classic
exclamation, "it's a fair cop." JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 18 (1967); JUSTICE,
Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure §§ 27, 28 (1979). In light of it's concern for excessive reliance on
volunteered statements, as well as the risk of distortion and misinterpretation, JUSTICE urged
greater availability of tape recorders to limit such problems. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 28 (1979).
130. The magistrate would be required to tell the suspect
You have just heard from the police officer (or representative) why you have been
brought here, and in a few moments he is going to ask you some questions. Is there
anything you would like to say before he does so? There is no need to say anything at
the present stage unless you wish to do so because when the questioning is over you
will have another opportunity of saying anything you choose. Anything you do say
will of course be recorded and may be used as evidence later on if you are tried for the
offense which has (or, for any of the offenses which have) been mentioned.
After the suspect has either made or declined to make a statement the magistrate informs him:
You are going to be asked questions and it is your duty to answer them unless I say
that you need not do so. If you are brought to trial itmay tell heavily against you if
you have refused to answer questions at this stage. On the other hand, the answers
which you give today may clear you of suspicion so that you will not be brought to
trial at all; and even if you are, it may then count in your favour if you do answer here
and now. I must also assure you that in answering these questions you have nothing to
fear from any threat which may have been made against you, and nothing to gain
from any promise which may have been made to you. Do you understand?
Finally, at the conclusion of the interrogation the magistrate informs the suspect:
Is there anything else that you would like to have on the record? You may say anything more that you wish in explanation of the matters you have been asked about.
JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 11 (1967).
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sion of the events, and that the proceedings are duly recorded and
13 1
certified."
In JUSTICE's view, the existence of a procedure for compulsory interrogation before a magistrate would make it less important to provide immediate access to a solicitor. 132 Nevertheless, their proposal provided for a
right of access to a solicitor for the general purpose of advice and consultation. In the context of the interrogation before a magistrate, however, the
solicitor's role would be sharply curtailed. He could object to the interrogation in general as unjustified or raise objections to particular questions on
grounds of unfairness, irrelevance, or breach of privilege. He would also
have the right to pose his own questions to the suspect. Because the proposal
entailed the withdrawal of the right to refuse to answer questions based on
self-incrimination, and instead provided for sanctions of adverse inference
and comment should the suspect refuse to answer, JUSTICE concluded that
"it will become contrary to public policy and to professional etiquette for a
33
solicitor to encourage his client not to answer proper questions."'
JUSTICE viewed its system of compulsory examination before a magistrate as providing protection against unfair police interrogation while at the
same time ensuring the admissibility of any statements made by the accused
before the magistrate, and permitting appropriate adverse inferences and
comment in the event that the accused refused to respond. Nevertheless,
support for the JUSTICE proposals has not been forthcoming. The Criminal Law Revision Committee viewed the proposal to make any statement
given to the police prior to interrogation before a magistrate inadmissible as
contrary to its general philosophy favoring the admissibility of all relevant
evidence.' 34 Another concern was that the magisterial interrogation would
be too formal, leading suspects to refuse to answer and thus defeating the
purpose of the procedure. 135 This was a position reiterated by the Home
Office in its evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.1 36 A
member of the Royal Commission added the concern that the suspect's
awareness of the inadmissibility of prior statements made to the police, and
of the necessity of reaffirmation of his admission before the magistrate, could
alert him to weaknesses in the state's evidence. As a result, police might well
apply additional pressure to secure reaffirmation of the suspect's state131. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure § 31 (1979).
132. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure § 46 (1979). Nevertheless, JUSTICE viewed
the right of access as "helpful and desirable" to permit the giving of advice concerning the
appearance before the referee, as well as providing an opportunity to answer questions concerning such procedures as bail and pre-trial identifications. Id.
133. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects, § 15 (1967).
134. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at § 47. In explaining its general philosophy of relevance,
the Criminal Law Revision Committee observed that "[slince the object of a criminal trial
should be to find out if the accused is guilty, it follows that ideally all evidence should be
admissible which is relevant in the sense that ittends to render probable the existence or nonexistence of any fact on which the question of guilt or innocence depends." Id. at § 14.
135. The Committee thought that suspects might even be deterred from answering police
questions before commencement of the magistrate's questioning. See CLRC Report, supra note
4, at §§ 146-47.
136. Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra note 23, 1 146-47.
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ment. 13 7 Resource limitations, were regularly cited by all opponents as a
major limitation.' 38 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure's fundamental objection was one of principle. In its view any system of interrogation before a magistrate reflected a break with the very nature of the
accusatorial system and risked shifting the burden of proof against the
accused. 139
The JUSTICE proposals for interrogation before a magistrate only
partly reflected an effort to alter the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination by providing for adverse inferences and comment in the event
the accused refused to respond. The same result could be achieved by simply permitting the same consequensces to follow from silence in the face of
police questioning. Beyond that objective, however, JUSTICE viewed its
proposals as a means of assuring fairness and accuracy in the interrogation
process. Although the JUSTICE scheme for achieving this end did not receive widespread support, its concern for fairness and accuracy has been reflected in a variety of different recommendations. Indeed, there has been
widespread agreement in the need for a system that would provide an accurate record of the entire interrogation process, including any admissions
made by the suspect.
The emphasis upon the need for a system to ensure the accuracy of the
methods and output of the police interrogation process is a direct result of
British police reliance upon testimony as to oral admissions made by the
suspect. The issue has arisen so frequently and has become so controversial
that commentators have developed a special name for it-the so-called
verbals. The rules of evidence permit police to testify concerning a suspect's
verbal admission.140 When such testimony is presented, however, there are
two distinct risks. First, the ease of offering evidence of an oral statement
may provide an inducement to fabricate the admission, or falsely claim that
the admission was never made. Second, since the admission may be made in
the course of a conversation or as the result of a question and answer session,
the circumstances may not permit the police to make a contemporaneous
record of exactly what was said. Instead, the police may, several hours later,
attempt to write down their recollections of the admissions and in so doing
erroneously record the suspect's statements.
The risk of fabrication of verbals, as well as allegations that they have
been concocted, has been recognized for some time. The very nature of the
evidence is such that fabricating either the admission or an allegation that
the admission was never made is a simple undertaking. Lord Justice Lawton
commented that "something should be done and as quickly as possible, to
137. JUSTICE Conference on the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure,
April 11, 1981 at 4 (remarks of Walter Merricks).
138. See supra notes 128-30. Se also Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.59; Law
Society Evidence, supra note 102, at
16; Police Superintendant's Association of England and
Wales, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Police Superintendant's Evidence].
139. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.59.
140. The Judges' Rules state that voluntariness covers the admissibility of "any oral answer
given by that person to a question put by a police officer and of any statement made by that
person." Judges' Rules, supra note 28, Preamble § e.
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make evidence about oral statements difficult either to challenge or to con' 14 1
Reliance upon such evidence has been subjected to increasing scruCOCt."
tiny by juries, to the point where some have felt that guilty defendants have
been able to secure acquittals solely on the basis of their challenges to police
veracity. At the same time, police cannot deny that instances of fabricated
14 2
verbals do exist.
English juries are also skeptical when police testify concerning verbal
admissions based upon notes they have made hours after the event, a skepticism that is heightened when they deny collaborating with each other. One
judge observed that "police officers nearly always deny that they have collaborated in the making of notes, and we cannot help wondering why they
are the only class of society who do not collaborate in such a manner ...
Collaboration would appear to be a better explanation of almost identical
notes than the possession of a superhuman memory." ' 143 There is a risk that
the more dogmatic an officer becomes about the accuracy of his recollection,
the greater the chance that the jury will disbelieve him entirely. 144 The unfairness of the system is only heightened by the fact that police generally do
not show their notes to the suspect, even though they may refer to them to
145
refresh their recollection at trial.
Most frequently urged as a solution to the problem of providing an accurate record of interrogation sessions has been the proposal for requiring
that such sessions be tape recorded. The Criminal Law Revision Committee
recommended that the feasibility of such a requirement be studied, with a
minority of the Committee calling for the suspension of its proposals to permit adverse inferences to be drawn from a suspect's silence until such a system had been implemented. ' 46 The years since the Committee's
recommendation have produced no consensus on the wisdom and feasibility
of tape recording police interrogations. Police groups have been against the
proposal, arguing that it would be far too costly, would lessen the evidentiary value of other unrecorded statements, would generate a new kind of
dispute as to the conditions preceding the point at which the tape recorder
was turned on, and have a further concern that the very presence of the tape
14 7
Quesrecorder would inhibit suspects from answering police inquiries.
141. Turner, [1975] 61 Crim. App. 67, 77.
142. See Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, § 4.2; Senate of the Inns of Court and the
Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 6 (1979); Williams, The Authenticationof Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 14.
143. R. v. Bass, [19531 37 Crim. App. 51, 59. Lord Devlin saw this as a reaction to the
dilemma that if police evidence as to oral statements of the accused differed, counsel for the
defense could seize upon the inconsistencies, but that he would also take advantage of collaboration to suggest to the jury that the statement was the product of the officers' agreed version. P.
DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND, 41

(1960).

The state of the law has

changed, however, and it has been held that there was no error in admitting police oral testimony where the officers had admitted collaborating in reconstructing the suspect's statements.
R. v. Quinlan and Turner, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 349.
144. Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 6 (1979).
145. Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 11.
51-52.
146. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
147. Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Evidence
to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 7.113(10) (1978); Commissioner of Police of

1984]

RETHINKING SELF-INCRIMINA TION

tions have also been raised as to whether police simply fear criticism of their
interrogation techniques. 148 In contrast, others have supported the concept
of mandatory tape recording of police interrogations, arguing in favor of
both their feasibility and effectiveness. 14 9 Still other participants appear unable to come to a conclusion.150 No definitive steps towards the permanent
institution of such a plan have been taken. 1 5 ' The issue remains important
52
since written statements are given in only a minority of cases.1
The Royal Commission itself concluded that the tape recording of inter153
views at the police station is feasible and would not be excessively costly.
It did not, however, view the tape recording of entire interviews as either
practicable or desirable. 154 Instead, the Royal Commission recommended
that police conclude interviews by tape recording an oral summary of the
main points of the interrogation as well as preparing a written summary,
including any statements made outside of the police station. The suspect
should have his own opportunity to offer comments on both the interview
and summary. 155 In the Commission's view:
[this] will enable the gist of an interview or the taking of the written statement to be got into the record without the need for transcription. The officers written summary and the written statement
itself will, in effect, be the transcription of the major part of what is
56
on the tape.'
the Metropolis, Part One of the Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure §§ 5.7(l)-(4) (1978); Police Superintendant's Association of England and Wales, Written
Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.29 (1978).
148. Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Poice, 1979 CRiM. L. REx', 6, 22.
149. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, § 16 (1978); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, § 35-38 (1979); Law
Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commission's Report, § 5.14, at 24-26 (1981).
150. Prosecuting Solicitors' Society of England and Wales, Written Evidence to the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure 22 (1979) (supporting mechanical recording if cost effect
and reliable) [hereinafter cited as Prosecuting Solicitors' Evidence]. In considering the potential
benefits and costs of a system for monitoring police interrogations the Magistrate's Association
found itself "unable to propose any specific solution to this problem, which we are convinced
would work satisfactorily in practice within the framework of the accusatorial system." Magistrate's Association Memorandum to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure It (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Magistrate's Evidence].
151. Glanville Williams reported that successive Home Secretaries have accepted police arguments against extensive tape recording, resulting in a "bi-partisan policy of defensive inactivity." Williams, The Authentliation of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6. Nevertheless,
experiments to determine the feasibility of a system of recording police interrogations continues,
with no insuperable technical problems arising, but with the participants desiring clarification
of the evidentiary implications of the taping system. The Times of London, March 17, 1982, p.
4, col. 4.
152. In research conducted for the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Baldwin and
McConville found that only one in three suspects in a sample of cases prosecuted in Crown
Court in London had made a written statement, the figure being one in two for a comparable
sample in Birmingham. Baldwin and McConville, Confessions in Crown Court Trials, Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 5, at 13-14 (1980). An observational
study of police interrogation practices by Paul Softley of the Home Office Research Unit disclosed that only 28% of the sample made written statements during their period of detention by
the police. Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations,
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4, at 81 (1980).
153. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4,
4.25.
154. Id. at 4.26.
155. Id. at
4.27.
156. Id. at
4.29.
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The tape would be available for the defense lawyer in order to validate the
officer's written summary or written statement if there is a dispute as to accuracy, and could conceivably be used at trial for the same purpose. The
Royal Commission rejected suggestions that evidence as to summaries or
written statements which have not been taped should be automatically
excluded. 157
In light of the available evidence, there is certainly a need for greater
accuracy in the process of recording a suspect's statements. One sample of
contested trials in Magistrates' Courts demonstrated that statements were
introduced in approximately one-third of the cases, with about one-half of
them being challenged. Nearly all the challenges to verbal statements were
based on their accuracy, while only a fraction of the written statements were
158
similarly challenged.
The Royal Commission also recognized the need to improve the accuracy of testimony about oral statements. Police practice has been to write
out the suspect's statement after the questioning ends, but not necessarily on
the basis of contemporaneously taken notes. The practical problems are that
interviews are sometimes conducted by one officer, thereby preventing undisturbed note taking, and some suspects are inhibited if notes are taken
while they are talking. Among the Royal Commission recommendations to
improve note taking were use of printed questionnaires wherever practicable.' 5 9 Where this is not possible, the Royal Commission recommended that
the record presented to the court "should be presented . . . as what it is: a
minute of the salient relevant points made at the interview."' 16 If there has
not been a contemporaneous record of the statement or the suspect does not
elect to make a written statement under caution
it should become the practice for the interviewing officer at the end
of the interview and in the suspect's presence to note down in writing the main relevant points made during the interview. These
should be in summary form and should contain not only admissions or damaging statements but also denials. The summary
might also include any remarks made to the police officer outside
the police station or before the caution. The summary should be
corrections
read over to the suspect, who should be invited to offer
16 1
and additions to it if he wishes and also to sign it.
4.28, 4.30.
157. Id. at
158. Vennard, Contested Trials in Magistrate's Courts: the Case for the Prosecution, Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 6, at ch. 4 (1980). The problem is
hardly new. Lord Devlin referred to it in his published version of the Sherrill Lecture he delivered in 1956 at the Yale Law School.

P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND

48 (1960). He observed, however, that "the general reputation of the police is good enough for
their version of oral statements to carry great weight, so long as the jury is given no reasons to
suspect any unfairness or lack of impartiality in the particular circumstances." Id. However, it
is no longer clear that juries can be depended upon to accept police versions of oral statements,
and there are definite signs of growing distrust between police and various segments of British
society, as evidenced by the disorders during 1981 and the conclusions of the Government inquiry into the disturbances undertaken by Lord Scarman. See generally Times of London, November 26, 1981, p. 1, col. 2; p. 4, col. 1; p. 5 col. 4.
159. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.12.
160. Id. at 4.13.
161. Id. In a related development, the Metropolitan Police have adopted a policy of where
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Others present might also be invited to sign. Even though the Royal Commission recognized that a suspect who did not wish to sign a written statement might not sign the summary, it nevertheless believed its
recommendations were an improvement over existing practice. The recommendations would eliminate the problem that the suspect neither signed the
officer's record made after the interview nor knew until much later what was
in it, while later being faced with a claim that it represented a verbatim
account of what the suspect said.
The police themselves are well aware of the fact that the existing system
of testifying as to oral statements made by suspects has had an adverse effect
on prosecutions. There is concern that juries are reluctant to credit police
officer testimony as to verbals. 162 Although the Metropolitan Police responded with a system of using, where feasible, two officers during questioning, with one writing down the questions and answers, and with the suspect
being asked to initial it at the completion, it was felt that even this could
inhibit securing necessary admissions. 163 This practice is similar to recommendations of the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE164 calling for a
procedure in which the suspect is provided with immediate indications of the
record being made of his responses and is given an opportunity to verify
them.
There was less agreement as to the merit of the Royal Commission's
recommendation that police tape record summaries of the interview with the
suspect. One commentator noted:
There is a distinct danger that if used at trial the prejudicial effect
of such tape-recordings might greatly exceed their evidential value.
The fact that a confession or the accused's assent to a summary is
recorded on tape does not necessarily constitute supporting evidence of reliability, although an undiscriminating jury might all
too readily regard it as having that effect. Moreover, factual disputes concerning events preceding 65
confession would not be re1
solved by recordings of this nature.
The Law Society expressed grave reservations as to the acceptability of a
summary of the suspect's statement as a substitute for a full tape recordfeasible using two officers to conduct an interrogation, one writing down the questions and
answers, and then at the conclusion offering the suspect an opportunity to initial the result.
Morton, The Royal Commssion on Criminal Procedure: A Solicitor's View, 131 NEw L.J., 276, 277
(1981). It is not clear, however, how frequently it is feasible to commit two officers to the
interrogation process. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch Metropolitan Police
(October 20, 1982).
162. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch Metropolitan Police (October 20,
1982); interview with Richard DuCann, Q.C. (November 11, 1981).
163. Morton, supra note 161, at 277-78, Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch,
Metropolitan Police (October 20, 1981).
164. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, part 2, § 14 (1978) (suspect should be invited to sign entries of his oral
statements and be given a copy, both being handled by an officer not involved in the investigation); JUSTICE, Comment on the Home Office Consultative Memorandum 6 (1981) (contemporaneous notation of suspect statements to be countersigned by suspect in presence of station
officers, with copies immediately supplied to suspect or his solicitor). See also Prosecuting Solicitors' Evidence, supra note 143, at 24 (1979) (admissibility conditioned on prompt written notation of statement with opportunity given to the suspect to sign it).
165. Inman, The Admzssibih'ty of Confessions, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 469, 480.
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ing.166 It suggested that three specific difficulties would arise from the system of tape recording summaries.
First, it gives the interviewing officer an opportunity of selecting
from the interview the points, which he, whether consciously or
sub-consciously, wishes to emphasize, and therefore becomes an
even less accurate record of the interview than the notes made by
the interviewing officer. Secondly, it provides no safeguard to the
suspect or police against the use of or allegation of antecedent oppression. Thirdly, there is the danger that a jury may give greater
1 67
credence to such a summary than it does to other evidence.
At most, the Law Society was willing to accept a tape recording of a summary of the interview, "with suitable safeguards," as a temporary measure
pending the introduction of the regular tape recording. It was felt, however,
that this should encompass allowing the suspect to comment on each of the
main points of the summary as they were made.68 Overall, the amount of
the attention given to the accuracy problem demonstrates that it remains a
persistent and serious concern within the English criminal justice system.
D. Access to a Solicitor
The right to have access to and consult with an attorney has become an
especially important device in controlling the police interrogation process in
the United States. Not only do the Miranda warnings include notification of
the right to counsel, 1 69 but also failure to respect the assertion of that right
will render any subsequent confession automatically inadmissible.1 70 Arguably, once an attorney undertakes to represent an accused, counsel is in a
position to protect him from an unwise decision to provide the authorities
with incriminating evidence.1 7 1 The scope of the right to counsel in the regulation of police interrogations clearly suggests an effort to develop a broad
protective shield against abuse. Counsel is present as an advisor to and protector of the accused, not merely as a witness to the event.
In Great Britain, both the Judges' Rules and the accompanying Administrative Directions make provisions for the right of access to a solicitor. Pursuant to the Preamble to the Rules,
every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if
he is in custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable hinderance is caused to the processes of investigation or the adminis166. Law Society, Observations on the Consultative Memorandum from the Home Office
6-7 (1981).
167. Law Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commission's Report 25 (1981).

168. Id. at 26.
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-75 (1966).
170. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
171. E.g., the New York courts require that police refrain from questioning a suspect who is
represented by counsel unless they obtain an affirmative waiver in the attorney's presence. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d'894 (1976). This is comparable to
the position of the National Council for Civil Liberties prohibiting a waiver of the right of
access to a solicitor by a suspect before he has had the benefit of representation. See 1nfra note
183.

1984]

RETHINKING SELF-INCRIMINA TION

72
tration of justice by his doing so.1
This is supplemented by Administrative Direction 7(a)(i) which permits him
to speak on the telephone with his solicitor "provided that no hinderance is
reasonably likely to be caused to the processes of investigation or the admin73
istration of justice."'

Despite these affirmative rights, the required caution to the suspect
makes no mention of the fact that he may consult with his solicitor. Even
though Administrative Direction 7(b) calls for the suspect being orally informed of the rights and facilities available to him, supplemented by conspicuously placed notices,' 74 this has proven ineffective. The Court of
Appeal held in R. V. King 175 that there is no error in the failure of the police
to inform the suspect of his right to a solicitor. In the court's view the paragraph of the Adminstrative Direction containing the right of access includes
no warning requirement, while the paragraph calling for notification of
rights made no mention that the notice had to be given at any particular
time, thus allowing the suspect to be informed of his right of access to counsel following the conclusion of questioning. Suspects who have, however,
been arrested and are being held in custody do have the statutory protection
of the Criminal Law Act of 1977 which provides custodial arrestees with the
right
to have intimation of his arrest and of the place where he is being
held sent to one person reasonably named by him, without delay
or, where some delay is necessary in the interest of the investigation
of offenders, with no
or prevention of crime or the apprehension
76
more delay than is so necessary.1
Yet, even though intimation of the arrest and custody may be given to a
solicitor, 1 77 this falls far short of a right to consultation.
There is a strong prevailing feeling that what appears to be a "right" to
have access to a solicitor is, in fact, ignored in practice. The available research in England indicates that very few defendants ask for the assistance of
a solicitor, and such requests as are made are frequently denied. 178 Moreover, the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure voiced virtually unanimous agreement that police repeatedly deny
suspect requests for access to a solicitor, as well as independent efforts by
79
solicitors to consult with individuals they have been retained to represent. 1
172. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, preamble § (c).
173. Id., Administrative Direction 7(a)(i).
174. Id., Administrative Direction 7(b).
175. R. v. King, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 40.
176. Criminal Law Act 1977, c. 45, s. 62.
177. See Home Office Circular No. 74/1978 to Chief Officers of Police Concerning Section
62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, 28 April 1978 at § 5, reprintedin Royal Commission Procedure
Study, supra note 44, at app. 14.
178. Sofiley reported that only 11% of his sample of 168 adult suspects requested to confer
with a solicitor, and of those nearly V3were denied. Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study
No. 4, at 68 (1980). Comparable conclusions were reached in Baldwin and McConvill, Police
Interrogation and the Right to See a Solicitor 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 145 and Zander, Access to a Solicitor
in the Police Station 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 342.
179. Eg., Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
17; London
Criminal Procedure, part 2, § 18 (1978); Law Society Evidence, supra note 108, at
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This situation prompted one Court of Appeal decision to remind police that
"it is not a good reason for refusing to allow a suspect, under arrest or detention, to see his solicitor, that he has not yet made any oral or written admission." ' 80 Additionally, in a more dramatic step, a confession obtained by
police after denying access to a solicitor was excluded by a Crown Court
judge out of concern that officers would otherwise ignore the right of access
to a solicitor.18 1 This lead has not been followed, and elsewhere confessions
18 2
obtained under similar circumstances have been admitted.
Despite the apparent consensus that the right of access to a solicitor is
frequently denied on pretextual grounds, the Metropolitan Police evidence
to the Royal Commission was nevertheless content to make no changes in
existing practice. t8 3 Yet, the view that the right of access to counsel cannot
be unqualified was shared by other groups presenting evidence to the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure. Often their comments simply reflected
the position that police should retain the authority to deny access to a solicitor because of the potential risks to people and property if critical information was leaked. 184 Those supporting qualifications on the right of access to
a solicitor, however, were unable to articulate a precise definition of appropriate situations where access could be denied. The Criminal Bar Association failed to even address this issue, concentrating instead on procedural
requirements that if access is to be denied, the suspect must be so informed
in the presence of an officer independent of the investigation, and with due
record made.' 8 5 The proposal of the Prosecuting Solicitors' Society, that
private consultation with a solicitor be permitted "unless there are reason'8 6
able grounds for believing that the process of justice would be impeded,"'
hardly constitutes a detailed criterium. Although it is appropriate to call for
greater judicial vigilance in the supervision of police interrogations, as was
recommended by the Criminal Bar Association,' 8 7 enforcement will of necessity be inconsistent absent reasonably specific criteria.
Along with suggestions that the existing system be retained have come
recommendations for greater protection of the right of access to a solicitor.
At one extreme, the right of access could be made a mandated procedure,
with all statements obtained in violation of the right being excluded.' 8 8
Criminal Courts Solicitor's Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure § g, at 6 (1979); Police Superintendant's Association of England and Wales, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, § 7.17 (1978).
180. R. v. Lemsatef [1977] All E.R. 835, 840.
181. R. v. Allen, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 163.
182. R. v. Elliot, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 551; R. v. Dodd, Justice of the Peace, October 31,
1981, vol. 145, at 649.
183. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure, part 1 at $ 4.26 (1978).
184. Police Superintendant's Evidence, supra note 137, at § 7.5. This position was implicit
in the Magistrate's Association view that the existing Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions are satisfactory. Magistrate's Evidence, supra note 150, at 12.
185. Criminal Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at § 18.
186. Prosecuting Solicitor's Evidence, supra note 150,
7(6), at 32-33.
187. Criminal Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at
19.
188. Legal Action Group, Legality in the Criminal Process: Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
3.23(2), (3) (1979). The Prosecuting Solicitors' Society recommended that admissions made other than in the presence of a solicitor would be admissible only
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Even greater protection could be provided if the right of access was made
non-waivable as recommended by the National Council for Civil Liberties.' 8 9 Other calls for improved protection of the right of access to counsel,
however, were premised upon recommendations for drastic reform of the
right of silence. Those who called for the use of adverse inferences against
suspects who remain silent in police interrogation, and changes in the caution to inform the suspect of that fact, were willing to allow the suspect to
consult with his solicitor free of intrusion. Most took the position, however,
that the solicitor could not advise his client to remain silent and that any
such advice would not constitute a reasonable explanation for the suspect's
silence so as to mitigate the effect of the adverse inference.19 0 Under these
conditions, there would hardly be any reason to discourage access to a solicitor since such consultation would be likely to increase the chances of the
suspect responding to the interrogation.
Ultimately, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure rejected suggestions that it fundamentally restructure the right to silence. Thus, any call
for improved protections for the right of access to a solicitor could not be
coupled with restrictions upon the scope of advice the solicitor could offer.
Similarly, the Commission rejected use of a solicitor as a witness to the
events of the interrogation, just as it rejected the call for questioning before a
magistrate.' 9 1 The Royal Commission did view the right of access to a solicitor as protecting important interests of the accused, and thus constituting a
right in need of protection. As a result, it recomended that the accused be
informed of his right to a solicitor but also be permitted to waive that
right. 192 In contrast, the solicitor would have no independent right to consult with his client, because the Royal Commission viewed the right of access
as a right vested in the accused. 193 If the right is invoked, the solicitor should
be allowed to be present during the police interview, but his function would
only be to offer the suspect advice if it is requested.' 94 Although the Royal
Commission recognized the importance of access to a solicitor and the strong
arguments in favor of making it mandatory, it was persuaded that it should
permit discretion to withhold access "where exercise of it would cause unreasonable delay or hinderance to the processes of investigation or the administration ofjustice."'1 95 This exception was not meant to include withholding
access because the solicitor might advise his client not to speak, nor where
if it was impossible to secure the attendance of the solicitor, the statement was volunteered
before the defendant was advised of his rights or before the solicitor could attend, or the defendant refused a solicitor. Prosecuting Solicitors' Evidence, supra note 150, § 7(4). at 30-31.
189. Inner Temple Conference, supra note 62 (remarks of Harriet Harmon, Counsel, National Council for Civil Liberties).
190. E.g., Chief Police Officers Evidence, supra note 107, at
7.46; Prosecuting Solicitors'
Evidence, supra note 150, at 7(6), at 32; Interview with Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal
Court, London, (November 18, 1981).
191. Royal Commission Report,supra note 4, at
4.60, 4.99. In the Commission's view the
use of magistrates or solicitors to validate an interview would create serious resource problems
and would involve both in performing functions inconsistent with their traditional role.
192. Id. at 4.87. The waiver would not have to be in the presence of a solicitor.
193. Id. at 4.88.
194. Id. at
4.87-4.88.
195. Id. at 4.89.
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196

To insure proper control the Royal Commission recommended that refusal of access to a solicitor should be limited to grave offenses. 19 7 Additionally, there should be:
reasonable grounds to believe that the time taken to arrange for
legal advice to be available will involve a risk of harm to persons or
serious damage to property; or that giving access to a legal advisor
may lead to one or more of the following:
a) evidence of the offense or offenses under investigation will be
interfered with;
b) witnesses to those offenses will be harmed or threatened;
c) other persons suspected of committing those offenses will be
alerted; or
d) the recovery of the proceeds of. those offenses will be
impeded. 198
The decision to deny access would have to be made by a ranking officer,
appropriately recorded, and subject to later review. 199 Yet despite the detail
of the recommendations, the Royal Commission was unwilling to recommend exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of its proposals. Its view
was that despite the lack of legal advice, resulting statements might well be
2 00
sufficiently reliable to justify their admission.
The Law Society and Bar Council initially expressed agreement with
the Royal Commission recommendations, noting that the resource problem
of providing solicitors could be met and cautioning that the exceptions to the
right of access would have to be narrowly drawn.20 1 In a more extended
analysis, the Law Society questioned the exclusion of grave offenses from the
automatic right of access, labelling it illogical.2 0 2 In response to the Home
Office Consultative Memorandum seeking clarification of views on the impact of the Royal Commision recommendation, 20 3 the Law Society indi204
cated that it "reluctantly supported" the Royal Commission's proposals.
It recognized no other acceptable solution to balancing the need for legal
advice, which is not qualified in cases of grave offenses, with the risk to prop196. Id. at 4.90.
197. Id. at 4.91. The term grave offenses is defined in 3.7 of the Commission's Report to
include serious offenses against the person, property, dishonesty, and other drug and administration of justice crimes.
198. Id. at 4.91.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 4.92.
201. Law Society and Bar Counsel Memorandum, supra note 121,
11, at p. 4. The memorandum did, however, admit that resources were inadequate to provide solicitors if there was a
mandatory requirement of their presence at all interviews.
202. Law Society Memorandum, supra note 121, § 5.15, at p. 27. Additionally, the Law
Society observed that in order to fulfill the Commission's proposal to provide mandatory access
to counsel in lesser offenses, it would be necessary to eliminate the restrictions on access to
counsel for such offenses contained in section 7(a) of the Administrative Directions accompanying the Judges' Rules and in section 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 providing for the suspect
to give intimation of his arrest to another person.
203. Home Office, A Consultative Memorandum on the Report of the Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure
12 (1981).
204. Law Society, Observations on the Consultative Memorandum from the Home Office,
12 at 7 (1981).
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erty, persons, and the processes ofjustice that prompt access might generate.
The Royal Commission proposals were seen as a clear improvement over the
practice of allowing junior officers to regularly deny counsel in all classes of
cases simply because of fear that access would reduce the likelihood that
suspects would respond. Additionally, the Law Society saw it as appropriate
to warn the jury of reliability considerations in the event that the prosecution seeks to use a statement obtained in violation of the suspect's right of
access to counsel. 20 5 In response to the Home Office inquiry as to whether
there were any steps that could be taken to guard against the risk of disclosure so that the right of access could be made absolute, the Law Society
concluded that no practicable means exist to prevent solicitors from causing
mischief. They added, however, "it is acknowledged that the police view of
impropriety may differ from the profession's view and consideration may
have to be given, by the profession, to giving further appropriate guidance to
20 6
its members."
The English take a different view of the right to counsel in criminal
matters, particularly during investigative procedures. This is amply demonstrated by the general acceptance by many influential groups of conditions
justifying denial of access to counsel. Even efforts at tightening the criteria
that would justify denial of counsel to the accused still left ample discretion
for police to use their own judgment. There was frequent objection to the
propriety of denying access because of fear that counsel would advise silence,
but there was also significant support for reforming the right to silence so as
to render such advice improper. This would leave counsel with a very limited role in interrogations and obviate the risk that his presence would impede the interrogations.
III.

THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN THE COURTROOM

Under the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, a defendant in an English
criminal trial has the right not to give evidence or appear as a witness. 20 7 In
a sense, the right not to give evidence is broader than the scope of the general right to silence. In any other context, the right to silence would authorize the individual to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions. 20 8 Yet,
British law, as is true in the United States, 20 9 permits the accused to refuse to
give evidence at all. In the United States this has been partly explained by
concern that forcing the accused to give evidence would expose his character
to the jury which in turn might be more damaging than anything the accused might say. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed this view when it observed that "[e]xcessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and
attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses
charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree
205.

Id. at 8.

206. Id. at 9.
207. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § l(a).
208. R. v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 1861-1873 All E.R. 172 (1861); R. v. Coote, [18731 L.R. 4
P.C. 599; Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434.
209.

BERGER, supra note 7,at 73-80.
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as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him."' 210 These facets of
the accused's personality would also be exposed in English trials if he was
forced to give evidence, but the total impact would be lessened as a result of
more restrictive rules governing the cross-examination of the defendant as to
2 11
prior crimes.
As part of the series of compromises leading to the Criminal Evidence
Act of 1898, the accused was made a competent witness in his own behalf,
thus reversing the rule by which he had up until then been disqualified from
testifying in his own trial, but he could not be compelled to give evidence
over his objection. 2 12 Additionally, the prosecution was explicitly prohibited
from commenting upon the accused's failure to give evidence. 2 13 Moreover,
where the accused chose to give evidence, cross-examination as to his character and prior convictions was expressly limited to situations enumerated in
the statute. 21 4 It was later held that by necessary implication, where an accused chooses to give evidence he may no longer claim the privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to questions whose answers might result in
2 15
the defendant incriminating himself.
The absence of any specific prohibition against judicial comment on the
accused's failure to give evidence, particularly in light of the specific prohibition barring prosecutorial comment, has been held sufficient authority to
permit the trial judge to refer to the accused's silence during trial when summing up for the jury.2 16 However, this has not prevented confusion from
arising as to the permissible scope of such judicial comment. Where the trial
judge lets himself get carried away in his comments to the jury on the accused's silence, appellate courts have been willing to reverse. Thus, in a 1950
decision, the Privy Council held improper a judge's comment that the defendant "has not seen fit to go there in the witness box. . . . You have not
been able to ask him one question; the one person who is alive today to tell
210. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
211. See infra note 232.
212. As a result of the Evidence Act of 1851 parties in civil cases had become competent
witnesses. Evidence Act 1851, § 2, 14 & 15 Victoria, ch. 99. In piecemeal fashion, as Parliament
created new offenses, it added provisos allowing the accused in any charge under the new act to
be a competent witness, but at the same time it avoided any general reform allowing all defendants to testify. BERGER, supra note 5, at 46. Itwas estimated that by 1898 some 20% to 25% of
all accused persons were competent to testify by virtue of such enactments. Home Office Evidence Memorandum, supra note 16,
57. Nevertheless, concern remained that making witnesses competent to testify would unfairly compel them to give evidence to their own
disadvantage which in turn might potentially lead to the conviction of innocent individuals. As
a compromise measure, the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 provided that although the accused
was competent to be a witness in his own behalf, he could not be compelled to give evidence.
One observer has expressed doubt whether there was much support for making the defendant a
compellable witness, and thus it is unclear whether the act was a compromise measure or simply
reflected the prevailing beliefs of the time. Compare Home Office Evidence Memorandum, supra
note 16, at
58 wizh Cross, supra note 5, at 411.
213. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36, § 1(b). The act contains no ban on
comment by the judge, and subsequent case law has held such to be permissible within limits.
R. v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 77.
214. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36, § I(f).
215. "A defendant who gives evidence is, unlike any other witness, bound to answer questions even though the answers may incriminate himself." Minihane, [1921] 16 Crim. App. 38.
216. R. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77. Judicial comment on the silence of the accused was
deemed to be a matter of trial court discretion.
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us what happened. ' 2 17 In a more recent 1973 decision by the Court of Appeal the trial judge was held to have committed error in saying to the jury
but you may think members of the jury, that in a case of this kind
it was really almost essential, if there was a real explanation as to
his part, . . .is it not essential that he should go into the witness
box himself and tell you that himself and be subject to cross-exami2
nation about it. Well, he did not do so and there it is. 18
Yet, a judge's observation to the jury that it "might have found it more
satisfactory and of a greater assistance to you if she had gone into the witness
box" 2 19 was held not to be in error. Sir Rupert Cross' conclusion from the
existing case law is that
[a~ll that can be said on the authority is that the question whether
the judge should make any comment, and how far he should go in
commenting, depend on the particular facts, and that it is essential
for the judge to make two things plain to the jury, first, that the
accused has the right not to testify, second, that they must not as22 0
sume that he is guilty because he does not do so.
More generally, the area appears to be one in which British commentators
are reluctant to commit themselves to a statement of what the law purportedly is. The uncertainty may lead judges either to make no comment whatsoever, or to remark solely upon the right of the accused not to give evidence
without suggesting any adverse inferences from such silence, however
22 1
limited.
In tracing the history of the Criminal Evidence Act, the Criminal Law
Revision Committee noted that the suggestion had been made during the
consideration of the bill for a prohibition against comment by both the prosecutor and judge. This was initially resisted by the then Solicitor-General,
but he eventually agreed to a compromise in which only comment by the
prosecution would be barred. He thought the judge should retain the discretion to comment in appropriate cases such as where the defense attacked the
character of the prosecutor.2 22 In the Committee's view, the trial judge
under current law has more power to suggest adverse inferences than is normally exercised as long as he does not comment that the jury should draw an
217. Waugh v. The King, 1950 A.C. 203, 210-211.
218. R. v. Sparrow, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 488, 492. Improper comments were also found to have
been made in R. v. Mutch, [1973] 1 All E.R. 178, 179 ("the jury are entitled to draw inferences
unfavorable to the prisoner where he is not called to establish an innocent explanation of facts
proved by the prosecution which, without such an explanation, tell for his guilt").
219. Story, [19681 52 Crim. App. 334.
220. Cross, supra note 5, at 414. Another commentator has suggested that the judge's comment may not suggest that silence constitutes corroboration or proof of guilt. C. HAMPTON,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 197 (1977). Additionally, there is a suggestion in R. v. Bathurst, [1968]
2 Q.B. 99, that there may be a wider scope for judicial comment on the accused's failure to give
evidence with respect to affirmative defenses.
221. Thus, itwas reported in a recent newspaper account on the trial of three prison officers
accused of murder that the judge made the following comment on the failure of the defendants
to give evidence. "It is their right not to give evidence; it is their entitlement and right to make
an unsworn statement from the dock. It would be quite wrong to draw any adverse inference
towards any of the accused from their failure to give evidence on oath." Times of London,
March 18, 1982, p. 3, col. 6.
222. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
108.
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inference ofguiI from the accused's failure to give evidence. 223 The Committee's conclusion, however, was that "the present law and practice are
' 224
much too favourable to the defence."
As an alternative, the Committee recommended that once a prima facie
case against the accused was established, "it should be regarded as incumbent on him to give evidence in all ordinary cases."' 225 Failure to do so, in
the Committee's view, would call for adverse comment by both the judge
and prosecutor. 226 In support of its position the Committee argued that if
adverse comment is warranted, there is no basis for barring the prosecution
from making it given the fact that limiting adverse comment to the judge
might make the latter seem like an extra prosecutor. Additionally, since the
defense addresses the jury after the prosecution, it will have the ability to
22 7
reply to any comment the prosecutor might make.
The Committee was also willing to authorize broader comments than
current law permits the judge to make. It recommended that any adverse
inference dictated by common sense should be permitted, a standard similar
to the one the Committee proposed for an accused's failure to mention during pre-trial interrogation any fact on which he intended to rely at trial. 22 8
The Committee added its recommendation that such inferences should be
229
considered as corroboration where required by law.
The Committee recognized that its recommendations would greatly increase the pressure on the accused to testify, but its proposals did not end
there. It added a recommendation that following the presentation of an adequate prima facie case
the court should tell the accused that he will be called on at the
appropriate time to give evidence in his own defence and should
tell him what the effect will be if he refuses to do so; and we propose that, when this time comes,
the court should formally call on
230
the accused to give evidence.
The purpose of calling on the accused to give evidence, in the Committee's
view, was to demonstrate to the jury or magistrate "that the accused had the
right, an obligation, to give evidence but declined to do so. ' '231
Under American criminal procedure a proposal comparable to that of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee would have a devastating impact. It
would force the accused to either suffer the consequences of substantial adverse inferences being called to the jury's attention or subjecting the defendant's entire criminal record to the jury's consideration as a result of crossexamination to impeach the defendant's credibility. 23 2 English law is far
more protective of the accused who gives evidence. Under the Criminal Evi223. Id. at 1109.
224. Id. at 1110.

225. Id.
226. Id.

227. Id.
228. Id.See supra note 101.
229. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at

230. Id. at
231. Id.
232.

111.

112.

See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 609. The judge, however, may disallow the impeachment by
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dence Act, when the accused is called as a witness he may not be questioned
about any prior convictions unless they are either relevant to show that he
committed the current offense; the witness has given evidence against a codefendant; the accused has given evidence or asked questions of the prosecution to establish his own good character; or, finally, his defense has been such
as to "involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses
23 3
for the prosecution."
The Criminal Evidence Act does permit the prosecutor to prove the
defendant's prior offenses where they are relevant to establishing his guilt for
the offense with which he is charged. Indeed, if such evidence is admissible,
it could be produced on the prosecutor's presentation of his case-in-chief
without having to rely on cross-examination. 23 4 The more substantial protections are those which control the use of cross-examination as to prior convictions for purposes of impeaching the credibility of the accused. Under
American law such cross-examination is uniformly authorized, thus forcing a
difficult choice upon the defendant. If he has a significant criminal record
he can only testify at the risk of revealing the record to the jury, and with the
hope that it will not be misused by the jury to infer guilt nor unduly affect
his credibility. The British defendant, in contrast, may testify and avoid
revealing his prior criminal record by not placing his character in issue, not
making any imputation on the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses,
and refraining from giving evidence against a co-defendant.
There is some uncertainty as to the scope of the cross-examination
shield created by the Criminal Evidence Act. Lord Devlin took the position
that the defendant puts his character in issue, and subjects himself to crossexamination by prior convictions, when he produces testimony as to a good
reputation. 23 5 Professor Cross argued that the existing case law, as well as
statutory construction, demonstrate that character is put in issue when the
defendant produces testimony as to his disposition, as distinct from the repu23 6
tation others have of him.
More substantial difficulties appear to have arisen from the exception
which permits cross-examination of the defendant where he has cast imputations on the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses. Cases in which the
defendant claims that the police have fabricated a confession 23 7 or has described police testimony as "wishful thinking" 238 have been held sufficient to
justify cross-examination as to the defendant's prior convictions. There is,
however, a risk that a literal construction of the statute would permit crossexamination of the accused even where he did no more than merely deny his
proof of a prior conviction if its probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial impact. See
also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 84-90 (2d ed. 1972).
233. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36 § 1(0(ii). However, impeachment
by prior convictions is discretionary. See R. PATrENDEN, THE JUDGE, DISCRETION AND THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 79 (1982).

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Cross, supra note 5, at 423-24.
Jones v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 1 All E.R. 569.
Cross, supra note 5, at 426-27.
Levy, (1966] 50 Crim. App. 238.
Tanner, [1977] 66 Crim. App. 56.
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guilt. 239 The mere assertion of innocence might be viewed as a suggestion
that the prosecutor's witnesses were lying. The solution to this dilemma has
been the interpretation of the Criminal Evidence Act to permit cross-examination where the defendant cast imputations on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution to show their unreliability as witnesses
independently of the evidence given by them, or when the casting of the
240
imputations is necessary to enable the accused to establish his defense.
Such cross-examination is barred when the defendant simply denied making
24
a confession without alleging that the police fabricated it. ' Simply denying the charge, even if emphatically, will not cause the defendant to lose his
shield. 242 Even where testimony as to prior offenses may be given, this may
not include going beyond the fact of conviction to show a pattern of
24 3
offenses.
In situations where the defendant seeks to cast imputations on the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses, he can avoid revealing his past con244
The procedure
victions by making an unsworn statement from the dock.
of allowing the defendant to make an unsworn statement from the dock, free
of the risk of cross-examination, grew out of the history leading to the passage of the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act. Prior to that time the accused was
not permitted to give evidence and was not entitled to full representation by
counsel. The unsworn statement was a means to allow him to prcscnt his
case. The practice survived the Criminal Evidence Act as a way of allowing
the defendant to avoid cross-examination. The evidentiary status of such
statements remains unclear. One court of appeal decision suggested that
[w]hat is said in such a statement is not to be altogether brushed
aside but its potential affect is persuasive rather than evidential. It
cannot prove facts not otherwise proved by the evidence before the
facts and inferences
jury, but it may make the jury see the proven
245
to be drawn from them in a different light.
Even though a jury may not be directed to disregard the statement, "it can
be properly pointed out to them that it can not have the same value as sworn
246
evidence which has been tested by cross-examination.
There has been a great deal of opposition to the procedure of allowing
the accused to make an unsworn statement from the dock, including calls for
24 7
and the Royal
its abolition by the Criminal Law Revision Committee
239. See Cohen, Challenging Police Evidence of Interviews and the Second Limb of§ I(f)(ii)-Another View, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 523; Cross, supra note 5, at 429-30.
240. Selvey v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions [1970] A.C. 304.
241. Nelson, [19791 68 Grim. App. 12.
242. R. v. Rouse, [19041 1 K.B. 184. This principle has been extended to cases in which the
defendant alleges that the victim of a claimed rape in fact consented to intercourse. Rather
than viewing such a defense as an imputation on the prosecution witness, it is taken instead as a
simple denial of guilt. See Cross, supra note 5, at 432.
243. R. v. France and France, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 48.
244. See R. v. Butterwasser, [19481 I K.B. 4; Cohen, The Unswom Statement From the Dock,
1981 CRIM. L. REV. 224.
245. R. v. Coughlan, [1976] 64 Grim. App. 11, 17.
246. Campbell, [1978] 69 Crim. App. 221 (C.A.).
104.
247. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at
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Commission on Criminal Procedure. 248 Support for removing the shield
protecting the accused against cross-examination on his prior convictions,
however, has not materialized. Only a minority of the members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee thought that the accused should receive less
cross-examination protection than under current law by being treated no
differently than an ordinary witness. Under the committee majority's recommendation, cross-examination on prior misconduct of the accused would
be limited to situations where the main purpose of the defense in attacking
prosecution witnesses was to raise an issue as to the witness, credibility.
Cross-examination of the accused on his past misconduct would not be permitted unless it was relevant to his own credibility as a witness. 249 If an
attack against the prosecution would be necessary in order to put forward a
defense, the accused would not automatically be subject to such extensive
cross-examination. Even this cross-examination can be avoided if the impu250
tations are raised by the defendant without himself giving evidence.
Reactions to the proposal to permit adverse inferences to be drawn from
trial silence have been mixed. The Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar
objected to any change in the accused's right to silence at trial because of
concern that it would undercut the prosecution's duty to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 25 1 Whether or not adverse inferences are permitted,
perhaps there is something wrong in calling the accused to the witness box in
order to highlight his failure to give testimony. 252 The position of JUSTICE
also avoided making any proposals to alter the right of silence at trial. In
their view "only the trial judge should be entitled to comment adversely in
reasonable terms, provided he also invites the jury to take into account any
special circumstances which might have led the accused to maintain
silence.'"253
While changes in the right to silence at trial as well as during pre-trial
questioning can be treated similarly, there are sufficient distinctions between
the two to warrant differing treatment. Pre-trial questioning occurs while
the suspect is in police custody and before the state has made out a prima
facie case. Eliminating the right to silence at so early a stage could well
encourage fishing expeditions against individuals who are only vaguely suspected of involvement in a criminal offense. Absent reforms to improve the
accuracy and reliability of the record of pre-trial questioning, there is a risk
that too much weight may be placed upon police testimony as to what the
suspect did or did not say. Problems relating to the accuracy and reliability
of the record have no bearing upon the right to silence at trial. By adding
248. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 4.67. Both the Criminal Law Revision
Committee and the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recognized that some provision
would have to be made for an unrepresented accused to address the court on any matter which
his representative could have done had he had one. Id.; CLRC Report, supra note 4, at T 105.
249. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 1 126, 127.
250. R. v. Butterwasser, [19481 K.B. 4.
251. Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 11 (1979). See also MacKenna, Criminal Law Revision Committees' Eleventh
Report., Some Comments, 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 605, 619-20.
252. Radzifiowicz, Them and Us, 1972 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 260, 275.
253. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, $ 48, at 23 (1979).
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qualifications requiring that the state establish its case against the accused
based upon independent evidence, with adverse inferences from silence serving only as supplementary evidence, it is possible to minimize the objection
that reform of the right to silence would serve to alter the burden of proof.
Elimination of the right to silence at trial occurs only after the accused has
had the opportunity to consult with counsel.
Despite grounds for distinguishing the right to silence at trial, the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure rejected any change in the existing rules
governing judicial comment on the accused's failure to give evidence. In its
view, "any modification to the present law of evidence which aimed at requiring the accused to answer a primafacie case established by the prosecution would be likely to weaken the initial burden of proof that the
accusatorial system of trial places upon the prosecution. ' 254 The Royal
Commission, however, recommended abolition of the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock.2 5 5 Nevertheless, some support still exists for
authorizing comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand 2 56 and the
Privy Council has indicated in its review of a Singapore conviction that such
comment is not inconsistent with English legal principles. 257 Given the frequency with which defendants take the stand to give testmony 258 the case
for expanding judicial comment and authorizing prosecutorial comment on
silence is perhaps not of great practical significance. More important would
be the elimination of the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock
if in fact the incidence of such unsworn statements is on the rise. 2 59 Such a
change would permit the accused's story to be tested by cross-examination,
but with the protections against the revelation of prior convictions provided
by the Criminal Evidence Act.
IV.

THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE BILL

The process of rethinking self-incrimination principles in Great Britain
has been much more than an academic exercise. The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Evidence Report was the subject of an extended parli260
mentary debate and became a heated issue among interested groups.
Despite the fact that several of its recommendations proved so controversial
that the Government decided to abandon the Report in its entirety, 26 1 some
of the Committee's self-incrimination proposals have been adopted else254. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
4.66.
255. Id. at 4.67. See also Law Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commissions' Report,
5.13, at 23 (1981).
256. E.g., Interview with Sir David Napley, former president Law Society (December 3,
1981). Sir David supported comments on the defendant's failure to take the stand as long as
this would not constitute evidence of guilt, and despite the fact that he objected to adverse
inferences arising out of the accused's failure to answer police questions.
257. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singapore).
258. Michael Zander, Written Evidence Submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure 84 (1978).
259. Interview with Lord Justice Eveleigh (November 19, 1981).
260. See generally Gerstein, The Se/f-Incrimination Debatein Great Britain, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 81
(1979).
261. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at
1.31.

19841

RETHINKING SELF-INCRIMINA TION

262
where with Privy Council approval.

The Government has become even more involved in self-incrimination
reform in the aftermath of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. It
submitted a Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 263 to Parliament which incorporated many of the Commission recommendations. Final action was
prevented by the dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent general election, however, the retention of a Conservative majority in Parliament makes
it likely that comparable legislation will be resubmitted.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's recommended changes in the
right to silence were not incorporated in the Government's Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. Most of the opposition to the Committee's entire report
centered on the proposals to permit adverse inferences to be drawn from an
accused's silence in police questioning and failure to testify at trial. Given
the absence of support from the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
for the reconsideration of the Committee's proposals, the Government understandably left them out of its legislative recommendations.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill did incorporate the Royal Commission recommendation calling for the abolition of the voluntariness test as
the standard governing the admissibility of confessions. 264 Pursuant to
clause 60 of the Bill, confessions would be excludable if they were obtained
(a) by oppression of the accused; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in
the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable
any confession which might be made by the accused in conse2 65
quence thereof.
The Secretary of State was authorized to issue a code of practice governing
police interrogations. 266 No provision made a violation of the code the basis
for excluding evidence, but it could be taken into account if "relevant to any
question arising in the proceedings. ' 267 Presumably this was intended to
reflect the Royal Commission proposal that the jury be informed that a code
violation might render a confession unreliable. 268 The Government proposal
further provided that a court could also consider evidence as to the truth or
falsity of a confession in determining its admissibility. 269 Exclusion of a
statement would not affect the admissibility of derivative evidence, nor of
testimony that such derivative evidence was discovered as a result of a state2 70
ment made by the accused.
262. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singapore)z Meng Heong
Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence: The Singpore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 89.
263. Police and Criminal Evidence Bill (H.C. Bill No. 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Evidence Bill]. See Times of London, December 1, 1982, at p. 4, col. 1.
264. See supra, pp. 9-12.
265. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 60. The prosecution must establish admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt if such a challenge is made. Id.
266. Id. at clause 52(1). Other subjects covered were the treatment, identification and detention practices of the police.
267. Id. at clause 52(8).
268. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at § 4.133.
269. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 60(4).
270. Id. at clause 60(6).
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The Government's proposals appear to leave confession admissibility
standards unclear. Oppression is defined to include torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence, 2 71 but these are hardly
precise phrases and are only illustrations of the conduct prohibited. The
alternative standard requiring exclusion of confessions given in circumstances likely to render them unreliable represents an entirely new legal principle lacking any consensus as to its content. It will be interesting to see, if
adopted, what tactics are viewed as offensive to the likely-reliability test, particularly in light of the fact that evidence as to the truth or falsity of the
confession is admissible in judging whether the confession should be
excluded.
The Government proposal, as was true for the Royal Commission recommendation on which it was based, reflects a policy which is likely to make
the exclusion of confessions more difficult. The objective of confession reliability reflected in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill may well create a
risk that police will feel that they have even greater authority than at present
to secure a confession. They may see the signal of the proposal as permission
to secure involuntary confessions as long as they are not obtained through
oppression, and as long as they are reliable. The result may well be even
greater reliance by police on custodial interrogation despite criticism of the
process.

2 72

Elsewhere in the legislation specific additional authority is given to police. Under the Bill as originally proposed, a maximum of twenty-four hours
273
A magisof police detention was-allowed before a charge had to be made.
trate upon ex parte motion could permit an additional twenty-four hours of
detention if the accused was involved in a serious arrestable offense and further detention was "necessary to enable the police to preserve evidence of or
relating to that offense or to obtain such evidence by questioning that person." 2 74 The imprecision of the standard is compounded by the definition of
a serious arrestable offense as an arrestable offense "which the person contemplating the exercise of the power considers to be sufficiently serious to
justify his exercising of."' 275 A warrant of further detention, based upon the
same standards, would have permitted the confinement to extend an additional forty-eight hours. 276 Even though the Government proposed as an
alternative that initial detention be limited to twenty-four hours, extended
for a further twelve hours on the authority of a police superintendent, and a
further sixty hours by a magistrates' court, the Law Society remained opposed. 277 It viewed twenty-four hours as the upper limit for police detention, with the total maximum after magistrate court review as seventy-two
271. Id. at clause 60(7).
272. Times of London, March 8, 1983, at 14, col. 2 (remarks of Peter Thornton, Chairman,
National Council for Civil Liberties).
273. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 32.
274. Id. at clause 33.
275. Id. at clause 74.
276. Id. at clause 34.
277. Law Society, The Law Society and the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, § 5 (1983);
Law Society, Briefing Memo on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, § 4, at 3 (1983).
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Extended detention is an obvious aid to police in their efforts to interrogate a suspect. The impact of detention can be mitigated by requirements
that police notify an individual selected by the accused that he has been
arrested 279 and that he be allowed access to a solicitor. 280 Where the statutory prerequisites are met, however, even the rights of notification of arrest
and access to a solicitor can be limited. The Government's proposals permit
delay in providing notification of arrest if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that other suspects might be alerted; individuals might be harmed; or
there might be interference with evidence connected with a serious arrestable offense.28' The same factors along with reasonable grounds to believe
that there will be a hindrance to the recovery of property, justify delaying an
accused access to his solicitor.

28 2

Even though no formal proposals are before Parliament to eliminate the
right to silence or to draw adverse inferences from its exercise, it is clear that
an effort is being made to create a police interrogation environment conducive to obtaining confessions and a standard of admissibility directed toward
the exclusion of only unreliable statements. If an accused can withstand the
impact of extended detention without access to an outsider, he will be protected by the right to silence. The reliability standard may have only a minor impact in controlling the interrogation tactics police employ. Perhaps
the real premise is that an accused should not be entitled to withhold information from the authorities, but the techniques of furthering that objective
by authorizing the jury to draw an adverse inference from his silence or by
removing all restraints from the police interrogation process offend other important values. The only limits necessary, therefore, are those which restrict
oppressive tactics and create a likelihood of false confessions. Not surprisingly, questions have been raised as to whether the limits have been properly
28 3
set.
The tenor of the draft interrogation code28 4 is fully consistent with the
approach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. Its provisions essentially
repeat the terms of the proposed statute in the areas of notifying someone of
2 85
the accused's arrest and providing or withholding access to a solicitor.
Even where access to a solicitor is provided, the accused may be denied the
right to the presence of his solicitor during the interview if an officer of appropriate rank has reasonable grounds to believe this would interfere with
the conduct of the interrogation. 2 6 The police need not await the arrival of
278. Law Society, The Law Society and the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, § 5 (1983).
279. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 44.
280. Id. at clause 46.
281. Id.at clause 44(4).
282. Id. at clause 46(7).
283. Opposition has been voiced by such groups as the Law Society, Legal Action Group,
National Council for Civil Liberties, Magistrates' Association and Justices' Clerks' Society.
Times of London, February 21, 1983, at 4, col. 1; March 8, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
284. Home Office, Draft Rules Governing the Treatment and Questioning of Persons in
Police Custody (1982).
285. Id. at
4.2, 5.2.
286. Id. at
5.5.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

the solicitor before beginning the interview if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that delay would risk harm to persons or property, or simply unrea28 7
sonably delay the processes of investigation.
In place of the Judges' Rules, the code calls for administering the following caution when the police have reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the accused has committed an offense: "I am going to ask you some questions. You do not have to reply unless you wish to do so, but whatever you
say will be written down and may be given in evidence. ' 288 The code reflects very little effort to control the interrogation process itself. There is a
restriction barring questioning between midnight and 8:00 a.m. absent justification, 28 9 a ban against the questioning of individuals intoxicated by liquor or drugs to the point of being unable to appreciate the nature of the
proceedings, 290 a prohibition against requiring the individual to stand during the questioning, 29 ' a requirement that interview rooms not cause dis293
comfort,2 9 2 and a duty to provide reasonable refreshments and breaks.
The techniques of interrogation, touching such problems as what kinds of
promises or threats are permissible, how much deception is authorized, and
whether the suspect may terminate the interview, were left untreated. The
issue of tape recording police interrogations was also avoided in the code and
294
appears to remain in an experimental status.
V.

CONCLUSION

Much of the current of self-incrimination reform in Great Britain, seen
in the efforts of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure, and recent Government proposals, reflects opposition to the broad scope of the privilege as it presently exists. Many of the
proposals have taken issue with the very core self-incrimination concept of
the right to refuse to provide information to the state free of having silence
brought to the attention of the jury. Others have sought to formalize the
practice of incommunicado questioning over an extended period, subject
only to the satisfaction of relatively flexible criteria. A major challenge has
been made to the long-standing voluntariness test for confession admissibility, with a minimal code of police conduct and the exclusion of unreliable
statements offered as an alternative.
287. Id. at
5.4.
288. Id. at
10.1.
289. Id. at 111.2.
290. Id. at
11.3.
291. Id. at
11.5.
292. Id. at
11.4.
293. Id. at
11.7.
294. The Home Office announced plans to conduct a two year experiment involving tape
recording interrogations in six police divisions. Times of London, November 16, 1982, at p. 2,
col. 5. This follows the conclusion of a Scottish experiment in tape recording police interrogations which revealed such problems as police circumventing the tape recording procedures and
questions as to the impact of the recording system on the ability of police to secure admissions
from suspects. See McConville and Morrell, Recording the Interrogaton." Have the Police Got it
Taped? 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 158; Times of London, November 29, 1982, at p. 1, col. 7. For a
general discussion of the draft code formulation see Mirfield, The Draft Code on Poice QuestionigA Comment, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 659.
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All of the proposals accept the need to prohibit uncivilized conduct in
the questioning of an accused and keep unreliable evidence out of the decision-making process. Both objectives overlap since improper interrogation
techniques damage the reliability of statements they may produce. Beyond
these concerns, however, the self-incrimination principle is an obstacle to the
acquisition of evidence. The self-incrimination reform movement in Great
Britain has largely been aimed at removing that obstacle to the extent politically feasible. Evidence reliability remains an important concern in Britain,
and thus there are concessions to the need for restraints to protect against
false confessions. The movement, however, appears not to believe that the
risk of false confessions is a serious concern, and sees little further value in the
enforcement of the accused's right of silence. The expectations are undoubtedly that admissions will be more readily obtained and more clearly admissible as evidence. Whether Parliament will enact the proposed legislation and
295
what its actual effect will be remain to be seen.

295. Action on the 1982 Police and Criminal Evidence Bill was suspended due to the dissolution of Parliament and general election in 1983. New legislation, however, has been presented
in the form of a resubmitted Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. See Times of London, October
27, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The Home Secretary, Mr. Leon Brittan, stated in Parliament that the
Government's position was that the Bill would provide police with the powers required to investigate crime, but with no more powers than were really needed. Times of London, November 8,
1983, at 4, col. 1. Nevertheless, opposition has developed out of concern that police powers
created by the Bill could be misused. See Times of London, November 9, 1983, at 2, col. 1;
October 27, 1983, at 1, col. 8. Parliamentary action will no doubt be influenced by the Metropolitan Police study demonstrating a crisis of confidence in the London Police. Times of
London, November 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Indeed, the Home Secretary made reference to this
study in his statement in support of the Bill. Times of London, November 8, 1983, at 4, col. 1.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS
CONSTANCE WARD COLE*

The family is one of the cornerstones of society.' Family relationships
are a source of great support and satisfaction for family members, 2 but these
ties can be a two-edged sword. Because family members are so interdependent, they are especially able to cause one another unhappiness and mental
3
distress.
This article will analyze intrafamily tort litigation, and particularly litigation involving emotional distress brought upon one family member by another. It discusses the development and historical limits placed on the
emotional distress tort, how the cause of action has been analyzed when
presented, and suggests an analysis that may overcome some difficulties in its
application in the family setting.
I.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort developed rather
late in the course of the common law. Traditionally, mental distress was
recognized as an element of damage when suffered as an incident to an already established tort 4 or as a consequence of a direct physical injury. 5
*
Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A., 1971, Northwestern University;
M.A., 1972, University of Michigan; J.D., 1977, Northwestern University. The author thanks
Timothy Mohan for his valuable research assistance.
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is a fundamental right); N. ACKERMAN, THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF FAMILY LIFE 15 (1958); N. BELL and E. VOGEL, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 9-20 (rev. ed. 1968); G. SIMPSON, PEOPLE IN FAMILIES 31
(1960).
2. N. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 16: "Psychologically, the members of the family are
bound by mutual interdependence for the satisfaction of their respective affectional needs.";
Benedek, The Emotional Structure ofthe Family, in THE FAMILY: ITS FUNCTION AND DESTINY 35864, 378-80 (R. Anshen ed., rev. ed. 1959).
3. N. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 18, 22-23.
4. See Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937)
(battery); American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 (1934) (trespass to land);
Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933) (assault); Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902) (trespass to land); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927) (invasion of right to privacy); DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881)
(deceit); Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (trespass to
land); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905) (nuisance); Kuregeweit v.
Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910) (assault); Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315
(1918) (false imprisonment).
5. Several early courts denied recovery unless the emotional distress was accompanied by
a direct physical injury. See St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901);
Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A.16 (1921), overruled, 269 A.2d
117 (1970); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899), overruled, 179 N.W.2d 390
(1970); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958), overruled, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See
also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959).
Many courts following this rule, however, allowed large recoveries for "mental anguish"
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6
Mental distress alone, however, was not considered compensable in tort,
7
since such damage was argued to be too difficult to assess and too easily
feigned.8 Courts worried that they would be flooded with litigation, 9 and
argued that mental distress was not foreseeable damage for which a defendant should be responsible.' 0
Despite such concerns, criticism grew" and in 1948 the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46 recognized an independent cause of action for
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.' 2 Under this action a
defendant is subjected to liability by plaintiffs proof of four elements: defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct,' 3 intended' 4 to cause 15 plaintiff

when accompanied by only a slight physical injury. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 50
(4th ed. 1971). See Ragsdale v. Ezell, 99 Ky. 236, 49 S.W. 775 (1899) (S700 for a hug and a kiss
"against her wish and by force"); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884) ($1200 for
spitting in the face); Craker v. Chicago & North Western R.R. Co., 36 Wis. 657 (1875) (school
teacher who was kissed awarded $1,000 for her "terror and anxiety" as well as her "outraged
feeling and insulted virtue").
6. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Gefter v. Rosenthal,
384 Pa. 123, 119 A.2d 250 (1956); Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81
(1953); Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900). See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100,
143 (1959).
7. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896), overruled, 176
N.E.2d at 730 (1961) ("If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established it
would naturally result . . . in cases . . . where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or
speculation".) Seealso Chicago, B&Q R.R. v. Gelvin, 238 F. 14 (8th Cir. 1916); Cleveland C.C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900).
8. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, (1896), overruled, Battalla v. New
York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Johnson v. Great Northern Ry., 107 Minn. 285, 119 N.W. 1061
(1909).
9. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,
151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 48, 61 A.1022 (1905), overruled, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Oehler v. L.
Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71, afl'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 A. 425 (1926).
10. Oehler v. L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71,aftd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137
A. 425 (1926); Justesen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 92 N.J.L. 257, 106 A. 137 (1919); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) overruled, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
11. See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); M.B.M.
Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff,
38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). See also Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in
,bodily harm.
Id.
The tort will be referred to in this article as the intentional infliction of emotional distress
or the tort of outrage.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community

1984]

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

severe emotional distress.' 6 Today, the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort is well established and recognized as an independent tort in most
United States jurisdictions.' 7
would arouse
"Outrageous!"

his

resentment

against

the actor, and

lead

him

to

exclaim,

d.
14. In tort law, the intent element requires no ill-will or motive on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff. Liability extends to both actually desired consequences and those
which the defendant, based on an objective standard, knew or should have known were substantially certain to result from his conduct. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 8, at 31-32. Note that
section 46 also applies in situations where the defendant has acted recklessly, defined in section
500 as being "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress
will follow." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment i (1965).
15. The causal concept has two aspects in tort law-cause in fact and proximate cause.
Defendant's action is a factual cause of an injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing it about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). Proximate cause on the other hand connotes
policy limitations on liability. But, according to the court in DeRosier v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 464, 130 A.145, 152 (1925): "For an intended injury the law is astute to
discover even very remote causation."
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j (1965).
Severe Emotional Distress
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living
among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the
distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity ....
The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there
is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional
distress, unless it results from a particular susceptibility to such distress of which the
actor has knowledge. See Comment f.
17. A partial listing of these jurisdictions may be found in Note, Torts."An Analysis of Mental
Distress as an Element of Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionaly
Caused, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 107-08 (1980). The following jurisdictions have adopted the
intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort as of this writing:
Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980) (dicta); Savage v. Boles, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349
(1954); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r,
Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 439, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476
P.2d 753 (1970); Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Supp. 305, 329 A.2d 609 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Dunn v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons N.W., 100
Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938); Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683,
57 N.W.2d 915 (1953); Dawson v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974);
Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558
(La. Ct. App. 1944); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); Harris v.
Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (dicta); Agis v. Howard Johnson, Co., 371 Mass. 140,
355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Warren v. June's Mobil Home Village & Sales, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 386,
239 N.W.2d 380 (1976); Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938);
Labrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. App. 1981); LaSalle Extension Univ. v.
Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457,253 N.W. 424 (1934); Burrus v. Nevada, Cal., Or. R.R., 38 Nev. 156, 145
P. 926 (1915), error dimtssed, 244 U.S. 103 (1917); Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 428 A.2d
966 (1981) (dicta); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991
(1978) (dicta); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Mashunkashey v.
Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28
(1971); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157,
276 S.E.2d 776 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167 N.W.2d 381 (1969); Medlin
v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn, 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966) (dicta); Stafford v. Steward, 295
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Intentional infliction of emotional distress has been plead in a wide variety of situations.' 8 As illustration, creditors have been subjected to liability
for particularly oppressive collection practices, 19 landlords have been held
liable for harrassing unwanted tenants, 20 and an ambulance service operator
who refused to dispatch an ambulance for plaintiffs critically ill wife for a
2
petty reason, was found liable by a jury on the tort of outrage. '
II.

HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF

ACTION

A. IntrafamilialImmunities
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort has appeared infrequently in intrafamily litigation and when it has, it often has been given a
chilly reception. 22 One factor undoubtedly influencing this dearth of intrafamily emotional distress suits has been the prevalence of intrafamily
immunities.
At common law, this immunity precluded suit by either spouse because
the woman was viewed as having lost her separate indentity at marriage and
could not sue without joining her husband. 23 Thus, the husband would be
S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916); Sheltra v.
Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145
(1974); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W.Va. 1982); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d
312 (1963).
18. Se, e.g., Holmes v. Oxford Chemicals Inc., 510 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1981), aft'd,
672 F.2d 854 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (employer reduced worker's disability payments from $500 to
$49.10 per month); Jones v. Musician's Union Local No. 6, 446 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(musician denied tenure with symphony orchestra by union vote); Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 392 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1980) (parents told incorrectly that their son had committed
suicide while in jail); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952) (threats to beat plaintiff, destroy his trucks and ruin his business unless he turned over
the proceeds from the territory of an association member); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160
Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930) (defendant wrapped up a dead rat instead of a loaf of bread for a
sensitive plaintiff); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981) (plaintiff handcuffed, beaten, threatened with bodily harm and told to leave the state or be killed); Goldfarb v.
Baker, 547 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1977) (university professor wrongfully accused plaintiff of striking him with a pie in the face and of attempted blackmail); Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96
Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980) (parents bring action for wrongful performance of an
autopsy on their deceased son).
19. Se, e.g., Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (defendant's agent suggested to plaintiff that he would "take it out in trade" if she was unable to pay
her bill); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) (widow
threatened with suit unless she paid her bills); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808,
188 S.E. 625 (1936) (pregnant woman called "deadbeat" by collection agent and threatened
with arrest); Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 270 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (blind
woman called "scum" and "deadbeat" by collection agency hired by her eye clinic); Duty v.
General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (daily telephone calls, telegrams and
letters, threats of job loss, telling neighbors plaintiffs were "deadbeats", harassing plaintiffs at
work, calling their relatives, etc.).
20. See Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976); Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928); Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 P. 436 (1913).
21. DeCicco v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 40 Colo. App. 63, 573 P.2d 559 (1977).
22. See in/fa note 58 and accompanying text.
23. See Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Dengate v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 5, 150 Eng. Rep. 1320 (1838).
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on both sides of any lawsuit by his wife against him.
This immunity was somewhat restricted when, beginning around 1844,
the Married Women's Acts were passed in every jurisdiction, giving a married woman a separate legal identity. 24 These statutes usually were construed to allow a suit against the woman's husband for torts against her
property, 25 but not for torts against her personal interests. 26 This interspousal immunity was justified by a number of rationales: preservation of
domestic tranquility, 27 prevention of a flood of litigation, 28 availability of
other remedies such as divorce and criminal actions,2 9 protection of insurers
from collusive suits, 30 and fear that the tortfeasor would share in the in31
surer's payment.
24. For a compilation of these laws see 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW §§ 167,
179, 180 (1935).
25. See Adams v. Adams, 51 Conn. 135 (1883) (fraud); Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251,
103 S.E.2d 134 (1958) (negligent damage to property); Crater v. Crater, 118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E.
290 (1888) (ejectment); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N.W. 598 (1908)
(conversion).
26. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (assault and battery); Faris v. Hope,
298 F.727 (8th Cir. 1924) (defamation); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923
(1945) (malicious prosecution); Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960)
(negligent personal injury).
27. In Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858) the court stated: "The flames which litigation
would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring
on a new era indeed - an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of
violence, cruelty, and murders." Id. at 398, quotedtn Comment, Tort Liabihty Between Husbandand
Wife: The Interspousal Immuniy Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 433 (1966). See Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); David v. David,
161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932); Patenaude v Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935),
overruled, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Kennedy v. Camp. 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954);
Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 367 (N.Y. 1863).
28. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910); Mims v. Mims, 305 So. 2d
787, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950); Bandfield
v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W.287, 288 (1898). But see Brown v. Brown, 381 Mass. 231,
409 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1980) (allowing wife recovery for husband's negligence in failing to shovel
sidewalk after a snowstorm). See generally Moore, The Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 943, 948-50 (1980).
29. In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), Justice Day, writing for the majority,
stated:
Nor is the wife left without remedy for such wrongs. She may resort to the criminal
courts, which, it is to be presumed, will inflict punishment commensurate with the
offense committed. She may sue for divorce or separation and for alimony. The court
in protecting her rights and awarding relief in such cases may consider, and, so far as
possible, redress her wrongs and protect her rights.
Id. at 619. See also Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877) (wife could not sue
husband civilly for assault because criminal court was available to an assaulted wife); Drake v.
Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (husband could not sue wife in tort because divorce
was the appropriate remedy). See generally Comment, supra note 27, at 436-37 (divorce courts
and criminal courts furnish ample redress to the husband and wife).
30. See Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20, 22 (1924); Newton
v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (1922); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208
N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889-90
(1978); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah
2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 390-92 (1963). But see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (finding the possibility of insurance fraud unconvincing as a justification
for denying a spouse recovery).
31. See Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14
Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963). See generally Moore, supra note 28, at 947 (since a husband or wife who has obtained a tort judgment against his spouse can continue to cohabitate
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Dissatisfaction with these rationales has been well documented by legal
commentators3 2 and reflected by vigorous court action. In fact, twenty-nine
jurisdictions have abolished the interspousal immunity rule entirely, 33 and
five more apparently have abolished interspousal immunity where intentional torts are involved. 34 Because of the abolition of these immunities a
woman now may sue her husband for infringements of property or personal
interests.
Similarly, immunity developed between parent and child. 35 This immunity was justified by concerns of collusive suits 36 because the parent or
37
child might inherit from the other's estate undermining parental authority,
upsetting the allocation of family resources, 38 and destroying family unity.3 9
As with interspousal immunity, these justifications have been found insufficient, 40 and parent-child immunity has been abolished generally in at least
seventeen jurisdictions. 4 ' Eight other states appear to except intentional
torts from the immunity.

42

with the latter, it is unrealistic to assume that the tortfeasor will not share in the benefits of an
award paid by the defendant's insurance company).
32. See, e.g., Farage,Recoveryfor Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 302-03 (1934); KahnFreund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 154
(1952); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1959); McCurdy, Torts Between Personsin Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1033-35 (1930); Comment, Tort Liability Within the Family Area, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 610, 618-20 (1956); Comment,
supra note 27, at 455-56; But see Moore, supra note 28, at 951-53 (the reasons for retaining interspousal immunity has substance while the arguments promoting abrogation of the doctrine are
unconvincing). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1979) (rejecting the
immunity of one spouse from liability in tort to the other).
33. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, app. §§ 841-end, at 287-91
(1979) for a list of jurisdictions that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule.
34. See Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157-58 (1971) (after divorce);
LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963); Apitz v. Dames, 205
Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), appeal after new
trial, 611 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1980); Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954) (divorce
pending).
35. See Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P.788 (1905).
36. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Thomas v. Inmon, 268
Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968);
Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
38. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
39. See, e.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Shaker v. Shaker, 129
Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo, 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
40. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471
P.2d 282 (1970); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,
199 N.W.2d 169 (1922); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Felderhoff
v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 197 1). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G
(1979) (rejecting the immunity from liability in tort between parent and child).
41. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, app. §§ 841-end, at 292-94
(1979) for a list of jurisdictions that have abrogated the parent-child immunity rule.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment e (1979); Wright v. Wright,
85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330
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These historical immunities between spouses, and parent and child,
have crumbled slowly. The majority of jurisdictions currently allow suits
between family members where the basis of the action is an intentional
tort. 43 Yet, even where immunities are abrogated, the parameters of the
duty between the parties still need definition. Although most courts today
condemn intrafamily physical abuse without hesitation, many show little
concern over intentional emotional harm.
B.

Abolishing Familial Causes of Action

Recently, courts and legislatures have dealt cautiously with emotional
injury in the family setting by abolishing the causes of action for criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. 44 Traditionally, the criminal conversation action has protected a plaintiff's interest in exclusive sexual intercourse with his or her spouse 45 and the alienation of affections tort has
protected plaintiff's interest in his or her spouse's affection and emotional
involvement. 46 The criminal conversation tort is directed at adultery while
an alienation of affections action more broadly protects the marriage from
intentional interference. Damages awarded in these actions often have in47
Socicluded compensation for injury to plaintiff's feelings and reputation.
ety's interest in strengthening marital bonds serve as justification for these
48
actions.
Over time, whether that policy was furthered by the cause of action was
questioned. 49 Concerns developed that it was difficult for juries to analyze
A.2d 335 (1974); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67
Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971); Teramano v.
Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966).
43. Obviously, no suit for the intentional infliction of emotional distress will be allowed in
those jurisdictions currently retaining intrafamily immunities. One would expect this strong
trend toward abolition of the immunities to continue, and the "duty" issue addressed subsequently in this article will be pertinent in those jurisdictions currently retaining the immunities
as well.
44. Admittedly, eventually the typical defendant in an alienation of affections or criminal
conversation action is the third party with whom the spouse is involved. Yet, with the abrogation of immunities, logically the participating spouse could be liable for plaintiff's loss as well.
See Kavanaugh, Alienation of Affctions and Criminal Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 323, 337-38 (1981) (analogizing to interference with contract suit against
original contracting party); Note, Mtor Child Has No Cause of Action Against Parent for Emotional
Harm Caused by Abandonment, 58 WASH. U.LQ. 189, 190-91 (1980) (suggesting analogy with
alienation of affections action when child sues parent for abandonment). But see Burnette v.
Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105, 1112 (1978) (alienation of affections action available only
against third party).
45. See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Iowa 1978) (the tort of criminal
conversation has been abrogated in Iowa as to conduct occurring after January 1, 1978);
Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 469, 268 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1978); Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C.
App. 201, 209, 170 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1969). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 124, at 875.
46. See Harlow v. Harlow, 152 Va. 910, 939-40, 143 S.E. 720, 728 (1928).
47. Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537, 539 (1959); Vaughn v. Blackburn, 431
S.W.2d 887, 889 (Ky. 1968); Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 220, 170 S.E.2d 104, 111
(1969).
48. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Holliman, 74 Ga. App. 735, 41 S.E.2d 332 1947); Bearbower v.
Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978).
49. See, e.g., Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927); Thompson v. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302
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rationally the emotional situations,5 0 that the cause of action failed to protect the family, 51 that it fostered blackmail, 52 and that it appeared the plaintiff was selling the spouse's affections to a third-party buyer.5 3 As a result,
thirty states and the District of Columbia have either abrogated or restricted
the alienation of affections action 54 and twenty-two states and the District of
55
Columbia have abolished the criminal conversation tort.
This trend obviously indicates little concern with emotional injury to
family relational interests. Certain rationales underlying the trend, such as
concern with jury prejudice and the negative effect on the family, do counsel
against an emotional distress action. But more arguably, the trend toward
abrogation of these actions when they are directed at third parties indicates
a concern with blackmail, an obvious abuse of the actions. 56 Even if these
concerns justify abolition of third-party alienation of affections actions, they
do not justify a blanket denial of intentional infliction of emotional distress
57
actions.
III.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION IN FAMILY SETTINGS

Very few actions for emotional distress within the family have succeeded. 58 Reported cases run the gamut from complaints about a defendant
(1979); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973) (Steakley, J., dissenting); Wyman
v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
50. Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
51. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace,
94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
52. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 195, 115 So. 447, 457 (1927); Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 323 (1850) (breach of promise to marry); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa.
272, 280, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (1976); Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455
(1980).
53. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace,
94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
54. For a list of jurisdictions that have abolished or limited the alienation of affections
action, see Kavanaugh, supra note 45, at 330-31 n.62.
55. For a list of jurisdictions that have abolished or limited the criminal conversation action, see Kavanaugh, supra note 45, at 331 n.63.
56. See F. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 169 (1952); Note, The Case for Retention of
Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426,
430 (1972).
57. In Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1983) the court refused to dismiss
a claim for infliction of emotional distress and concluded:
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and some of
its policy considerations, are different from those in an alienation claim. We cannot
conclude as a matter of law that no facts are conceivable under which a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress could be maintained merely because it, like
alienation claims, arises out of a failed marital relationship.
Id. at 498.
See also Comment, Loss of Consortium and IntentionalInfiction of Emotional Dstress. Alternatve Theories to Alenation of Affections, 67 IOWA L. REv. 859, 873-74 (1982).
58. Cases discussed involve suits between parent and child, between husband and wife and
between ex-spouses. The inclusion of the latter category indicates that the subject of this article
is more correctly understood as emotional distress arising out of the family relationship. In fact,
the type of relationship existing between the parties and whether or not the distress arises from
that relationship is relevant to how the case should be analyzed. Unfortunately, judicial decisions have failed to make these distinctions, and this failure has added to the confusion in the
area. See infta text accompanying notes 142-47.
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telling his spouse he no longer loved her,5 9 failure to pay alimony, 60 failure
62
6
to abide by a visitation schedule, ' to complaints about child snatching.
Unfortunately, a coherent analysis has not been applied in many of these
cases, perhaps explaining the judicial reluctance to recognize that family
members can, and do, inflict emotional distress upon one another.
Court decisions refusing to recognize the propriety of an intentional infliction of emotional distress action in the family are plentiful. Exemplifying
this judicial reluctance is Browning v. Browning, 63 where plaintiff husband
sued his wife and her companion for alienation of affections and intentional
infliction of emotional distress because of defendants' extra-marital affair.
Although the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the emotional distress cause of action, it gave little reasoning for its decision, noting
that in spite of recent trends recognizing the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, public policy would not be served by recognizing a cause of action on these facts. 64 Instead of articulating these public
policies, the court concluded only that "the morals of mankind are more
' '65
perfectly judged by a court having a final and eternal jurisdiction.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in Weicker v. Wecker 66 concluded that to allow an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in the area of matrimonial difficulties would revive the evils of the
alienation of affections and criminal conversation torts. The court affirmed
the appellate court's reversal 67 of the trial court's conclusion 6 that plaintiff
had a cause of action for her emotional distress suffered when her husband
got an illegal Mexican divorce, remarried and held out another woman as
his wife. Citing Weicker's reasoning, the court in Wiener v.Wiener 69 also concluded the counterclaimant wife had not stated a cause of action on allegations that her husband was abusive, told her he no longer loved her, and cut
off her financial control.
In McGrady v. Rosenbaum,7° the court held that a father's complaint that
his ex-wife caused him mental distress by moving out of state with his child,
in violation of a custody decree, was not appropriately resolved in an action
for damages. Allegations in Friedman v.Friedman 71 that defendant failed to
abide by the visitation provisions of the divorce decree met a similar fate.
59. Wiener v. Wiener, 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981).
60. Deibel v. Deibel, 512 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
61. Friedman v. Friedman, 79 Misc. 2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1974).
62. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See mnfra text accompanying notes
76-109.
63. 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id.
66. 22 N.Y.2d 28, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
67. 28 A.D.2d 138, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967).
68. 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1967).
69. 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981). While the court seemed to consider the outrageousness of defendant's conduct, it is quite clear it was merely saying these claims are for the
divorce court: "The bounds [of decency] in marital relationships are obviously circumscribed
by the availability of another cause of action (i.e. a matrimonial action) and the abolition of
causes for alienation of affections and criminal conversation." Id. at 815.
70. 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970), afdmem., 324 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1971).
71. 70 Misc. 2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1974).
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Husbands and wives have not been the only intrafamily litigators. In
Burnette v. Wahl, 72 several children sued their mothers for emotional injury
suffered because of abandonment of the plaintiffs. Again the court decided
that while the abandonment might be certain to cause mental distress, the
tort was not applicable to the parent-child relationship. Accordingly, the
court held that:
If there is ever a field in which juries and general trial courts are ill
equipped to do social engineering, it is in the realm of the emotional relationship between mother and child. It is best we leave
such matters to other fields of endeavor. There are certain kinds of
relationships which are not proper fodder for tort litigation, and we
73
believe this to be one of them.
The court expressed the concern that if such an action were recognized in
this situation, then in any divorce action a parent would be liable to his or
74
her child for emotional distress suffered because of the divorce.
The lack of substantive analysis in these cases is apparent, since the
emotional distress cause of action frequently is denied on vague policy
grounds and by analogy to the often abolished cause of action for alienation
of affections. Yet, as noted earlier, 75 the emotional distress action addresses
different interests and is not subject to much of the criticism directed at the
alienation of affections action.
Some courts have at least attempted to analyze the plaintiffs complaint
or evidence in terms of the elements of the emotional distress tort, although
such efforts often are muddled or conclusory. Even though these decisions
have failed to clearly specify the standards of liability, they implicitly recognize the emotional distress cause of action in the family arena.
A.

DEPRIVATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The emotional distress tort recently has been used successfully as a remedy for victims of child snatching in a significant number of jurisdictions.
This tort has been used against child-snatching parents, and also against
those who aid the abducting parent.7 6 A tort-based suit potentially affords
the victimized plaintiff the most complete compensation for his or her damages-costs incurred in attempting to recover the child and damages for
mental distress. And a tort suit may be more effective in prompting the
return of the child than other remedies.
In fact, the significance of the tort remedy grows when compared with
other available remedies. Although most states have felony kidnapping statutes condemning parental kidnapping, 77 even if a felony conviction results
in the return of the child, no costs or mental distress damages are recover72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
Id. at 1111, 284 Or. at 716.
Id.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 90-109.
For a list of state kidnapping statutes, see P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK, & J.

O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING:
PRACTICE AND LAW, app. IV (1982).
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able. 78 As additional deterrents to kidnapping, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 79 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA)80 were enacted. The UCCJA has attempted to limit child custody
jurisdiction to one state to prevent forum shopping,8 1 while the PKPA
would neutralize a major motive for kidnapping by requiring states to honor
82
sister states' custody decrees.
Additionally, both acts provide for the recovery of attorney's fees and
83
expenses in recovering a child when a parent has violated a custody decree.
The PKPA authorizes FBI assistance in locating an abductor who leaves the
state with the child 84 and the use of the Federal Parent Locator Service
(FPLS), which can provide information about a parent working under his or
85
her own name anywhere in the United States.
Unfortunately, even these acts are of limited utility. 86 Although the
UCCJA and PKPA remedies provide compensation to a victimized parent,
the tort remedy's damages are more inclusive and the defendant group is
larger. Where other remedies may reimburse plaintiffs costs, tort cases have
allowed out of pocket expenses,8 7 damages for mental and emotional distress, 8 8 and punitive damages. 89 While other remedies may influence only
remotely the return of the child, the tort remedy's defendant group is
78.

Id

See also KATz, CHILD SNATCHING:

THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF

CHILDREN 102 (1981).
79. 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
80. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat.
3568-73 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655,

663 (1982)).
81. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem." A Reply to Professor
Currie anda Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 197 (1965); UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122
(1979).
82. PKPA § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
7
83. UCCJA §§ (g), 8(c), 15(b), 9 U.L.A. 138-59 (1979); PKPA § 8(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A

(1982).
84. PKPA § 10(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1073(a) (1982).
85. PKPA § 9(b), 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1982).
86. The UCCJA and PKPA are not applicable until a custody decree has been entered,
and many kidnappings occur pre-decree. See Note, Tortious Interference with Custody. An Action to
Supplement Iowa Statutor Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68 IOwA L. REV. 495, 511 (1983). The
UCCJA does not require states to give sister state decrees full faith and credit. Moreover,
flexible standards to determine jurisdiction create the opportunity for abuse, and the UCCJA
lacks sanctions to remedy violations. See Note, Child Snatching: The Federal Response, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1103, 1113-14 (1982); see generally Hudak, Seiie, Run, and Sue. The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 547 (1974); Note, Preventinof
Child Stealing: The Need Fora NationalPolicy, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 829, 840-41, 857 (1970); Note,
The ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act. Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 33 CASE W. RES. 89, 94

(1982).
Under the PKPA, FBI assistance is authorized only where a state felony arrest warrant has
been issued, and not all states treat child snatching as a felony. HOFF, SCHULMAN, VOLENIK &
O'DANIEL, supra note 77, at 8-19. Moreover, Department of Justice policy has limited FBI
involvement to situations where the child is threatened with imminent physical injury. Such
proof will be difficult for the victimized parent. See Note, The ParentalKidnapping PreventionActAnalysts and Impact on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 553, 584-86
(1981). The Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) is not directly available to parents and
their attorneys but only to authorized officials who must be persuaded to take action. Id. at 588.
87. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ($5,000 awarded for legal fees
incurred in attempting to retrieve child).
88. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D. Wis.),afd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982)
(S30,000 award for emotional distress).
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broader and may include relatives of the snatching parent who aided in the
abduction. Defendants who are still available to the court will have a strong
motivation to disclose the child's location to avoid litigation or mounting
damages for a continuing violation. 90 Consequently, it appears that a tort
remedy may more fully compensate plaintiff for past emotional distress suffered and may prevent continuing mental harm by prompting the return of
the child.
Historically, theories of tort recovery have varied in name, but overlapped significantly in substance. A number of cases have relied on the intentional infliction of emotional distress. A 1930 decision in New York, Pickle
v.Page, 9 ' recognzied that in a child abduction: "The true ground of action
is outrage and deprivation; the injury the father sustains in the loss of his
child; the insult offered to his feelings, the heart-rending agony he must suf' 92
fer in the destruction of his dearest hopes."
More recently, in Kajtazi v. Kayiazi,93 the mother awarded custody
pending divorce sued her husband and his relatives for their role in her husband's abduction of her child to Yugoslavia. The mother, on her own behalf
and as guardian ad litem for the child, alleged defendants' false imprisonment, intentional infliction of mental suffering, prima facie tort and civil
conspiracy. The district court dismissed the latter two causes of action respectively, as duplicative and not recognized in New York. It awarded
plaintiffs general and punitive damages of $176,430 and $5,000 legal expenses on the other counts, noting that:
It is difficult to conceive of intentional conduct more calculated to
cause severe emotional distress than the outrageous conduct of the
defendant, Fabian, in surreptitiously abducting the infant from his
mother, who had legal custody, and falsely imprisoning him in Yugoslavia. This outrageous conduct constitutes the distinct tort of
intentional infliction of mental suffering under New York deci94
sional law.
The court in Wasserman v. Wasserman 95 reversed a trial court's dismissal
of plaintiffs claims of child enticement, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and civil conspiracy based on the father's abduction of his three
children. Although the court concluded the allegations were not within the
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, 96 it found that
89. Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (various defendants assessed
$65,000 in punitive damages).
90. See HOFF, SCHULMAN, VOLENIK & O'DANIEL, supra note 77, at 14-2. For example, in
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis), aj'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), $2000
per month was assessed against the kidnapping mother and her husband for every month the
child was not returned. This kind of award could be made against remaining relatives who
aided in the abduction and who know the child's whereabouts. The appellate court, in dicta,
however, suggested this type of award might be within the domestic relations exception. 694
F.2d at 493-94. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
91. 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930).
92. Id. at 480, 169 N.E. at 652.
93. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
94. Id. at 20.
95. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 834-35. The federal courts have long considered the granting of divorces and the
determination of custody to be outside diversity jurisdiction. This doctrine, the domestic rela-
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the complaint stated generally cognizable common law torts. Similarly, the
Vermont Supreme Court found 97 a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress where a mother alleged she had been denied communication with her daughter for three weeks. 98
Most recently, a jury in Cramler v. Donahue 99 returned a verdict against
defendants' 0 0 for $5,900,000 based on claims of tortious interference with
custody, civil conspiracy and outrageous conduct. A number of other cases
have relied on the tort of custodial interference, citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 700,101 instead of the infliction of mental distress tort.
While the tort of custodial interference had its origins in the loss of service
suffered by the deprived parent, 10 2 such loss of service is no longer a necessary element of the cause of action: "The deprivation to the parent of the
society of the child is itself an injury that the law redresses.'' 10 3 Although the
custodial interference cause of action provides damages for loss of service if
such has occurred, the more significant damages aspect appears to be for
emotional distress and expenses incurred in regaining custody. 10 4 Thus, the
overlap with the emotional distress cause of action is obvious. 105
tions exception, arose from interpretations of dicta in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
584 (1858) and Ex Porte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). While many family questions are thus
excluded from the federal courts, some issues are considered sufficiently removed from the marital relationship so as to fall outside the exception. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087-89 (4th Cir.
1980) (claims of malicious prosecution, arson, conspiracy and conversion).
97. Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978).
98. Id. at 432.
99. 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2452 (D. Colo. May 13, 1983).
100. The defendants originally were Phil Donahue, other members of the show's staff, and
the broadcast corporation involved with the Donahue Show. Donahue and the employees were
dropped from the suit. Plaintiff alleged the television defendants withheld information from
her regarding her son's whereabouts.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).
Causing Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home. One who, with knowledge
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor
child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after
it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.
Id.
102. Note, Tortious Interference with Custody. An Action to Supplement Iowa Statutory Deterrents to
Child Snatching, 68 IowA L. REV. 495, 508 (1983); Rice v. Nickerson, 91 Mass. 478, 481 (1864)
(damages for expenses).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, comment d (1977). As early as 1877, the
Ohio Supreme Court commented, "Actual loss of services is not an essential allegation to enable
plaintiff to maintain his (custodial interference) action. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 313
(1877).
104.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, comment g (1977).

The parent can recover for the loss of society of his child and for his emotional distress
resulting from its abduction or enticement. If there has been a loss of service or if the
child, though actually not performing service, was old enough to do so, the parent can
recover for the loss of the service that he could have required of the child during the
period of its absence.
Id.
105. While section 46, outlining the emotional distress tort, supra note 12, is broader in the
conduct it condemns, section 700 theoretically would allow recovery for an interference of short
duration where section 46 may not. See Note, Abduction of Childby Noncustodial Parent: Damagesfor
CustodialParent'sMental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829, 834 (1981). On the other hand, the tort of
custodial interference may not be applicable until a custody decree has been entered, but the
emotional distress tort would cover pre-decree situations.
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In Lloyd v. Loefter,' 0 6 a Wisconsin district court concluded plaintiff had
stated a cause of action for civil conspiracy under Wisconsin law against his
ex-wife and certain of her family members for abduction and concealment of
his child. The court decided defendants owed a duty to plaintiff, citing Section 700 and state criminal statutes against custodial interference. The compensatory damages of $95,000 later awarded by the court to plaintiff
included $30,000 for emotional distress, and plaintiff also was to receive
$2000 per month until his child was returned.
In Fenslage v. Dawkn'ts, 107 a father refused to return his children to the
custodial mother after summer visitation and fled to Canada. The mother
alleged civil conspiracy and the intentional infliction of mental anguish
through custodial interference. The jury, awarding her $65,000 in compensatory damages, concluded the defendant father and his relatives had conspired to remove the children from the state in violation of a custody decree,
had actively concealed their whereabouts, and intentionally caused the
mother to suffer mental distress. The District of Columbia also has recognized the cause of action for custodial interference. 108 Moreover, a Louisiana Court' 0 9 not only affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, reasoning that the
abducting wife had violated the state's kidnapping statute and breached a
duty owed to the father, but also increased the damages.
B.

OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITHIN THE FAMILY

Although these cases above dealt with the tort elements in a conclusory
manner, at least they exhibited a rational structure for analysis. A number
of other cases dealing with additional aspects of family life have affirmed
causes of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Stanback v. Slanback i 1o held that
plaintiffs allegations of outrageous conduct in breach of their separation
agreement stated a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
against her husband. III Similarly, defendant's intentional infliction of emotional distress was clearly involved in Mahnke v. Moore, 1 i2 although the court
chose to analyze the facts in terms of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In Mahnke, a child was found to have a cause of action against her
father's estate when he murdered her mother in front of her, left her with the
body for a week, and then committed suicide in her presence. Similarly, the
court's analysis is clouded in the 1914 case of Mashunkashey v.
Mashunkashey,' 3 since the tort of outrage was just developing at the time.
106. 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), aft'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
107. 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980).
108. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
109. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
110. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
111. Id. at 205-06, 254 S.E.2d at 621. The issue of emotional distress arose unusually in this
case. The precise issue was whether the breach of contract, in this case a separation agreement,
was accompanied by an independent tort so as to support a punitive damage award.
112. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
113. 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1914).
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The court did seem, however, to recognize an independent cause of action
for emotional distress when defendant husband tricked plaintiff into a bigamous marriage.' 14
In Johannes v. Sloan,15 plaintiff father, the non-custodial spouse, was
awarded $150,000 for the severe emotional distress he suffered after being
deprived of his visitation rights. The Family Law Reporter also cites a jury
verdict for a father based on his wife's interference with his visitation rights
and her malicious alienation of his children. 116 Similarly, in Rodgers v.Rodgers, 117 plaintiff's allegations of emotional distress suffered because of his
wife's interference with visitation survived a motion to dismiss.
Some courts, after analyzing the acts of a suit alleging the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, concluded certain necessary elements were
missing, and dismissed the claims. Such was the case in Hansen v. Hansen,' i8
where a child sued his mother for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because they had a fight over his drug usage, and thereafter she sent him
away to school. The mother's summary judgment motion was granted since
the court found no issue of fact as to whether the mother's conduct was outrageous, one of the tort's essential elements. In Deibel v. Dezbel,' '9 where the
plaintiff wife alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress by the defendant due to his failure to pay alimony, the court dismissed because defendant's failure to pay was not outrageous behavior as a matter of law.
Lifewise, the court in Przybla v. Przybla, 120 dismissed plaintiff's complaint
where he alleged the intentional infliction of emotional distress after his wife
had an abortion against his wishes. Because defendant was exercising her
constitutional right to abort,'21 the court reasoned her behavior could not be
termed extreme or outrageous.
The court in Vance v. Vance,' 22 on unusual facts, concentrated on another element of the emotional distress tort. Defendant husband told his
wife their twenty-year marriage was invalid and that he was marrying another woman. The court concluded that the husband's concealment of the
truth twenty years earlier, the behavior plaintiff complained of, could not
have intended plaintiff emotional distress since the husband could not have
foreseen the circumstances (that he wanted to marry another) in which the
truth would be revealed.

IV.

A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TORT IN THE
FAMILY SETTFIING

Although these decisions at least look to the substance of the emotional
114. Id. at 61, 113 P.2d at 191.
115. No. 79-L-169 (Kankakee County Cir. Ct., Mar 25, 1981).
116. 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2764 (1980).
117. No. 82-L-10593 (Cook County Cir. Ct., July 18, 1983).
118. 608 P.2d 364 (Colo. App. 1979).
119. 512 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
120. 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (1978).
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116, 154 (1973). The Court concluded that the right of personal privacy includes the decision to abort.
122. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
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distress tort, their attention can best be described as fleeting. Such conclusory analysis, while preferable to cases finding the tort of emotional distress inapplicable, is of little help in understanding the tort's role in the
family setting.
Decisions in this area suffer from one of two problems-either they refuse to recognize the propriety of an intentional infliction of emotional distress action in the family arena, 123 or recognizing the cause of action, they
fail to specify clearly the standards of liability.1 24 Those courts which conclude the emotional distress tort is unavailable to family members 125 can cite
26
some support for their position.'
Why should injuries which are recognized between strangers or when
inflicted on a family member by a stranger 12 7 not be recognized between
family members? As submitted earlier, few logical reasons have been or can
be advanced.
In Burnelte v. Wahl,' 28 Linde, dissenting from the action's dismissal,
found certain of the majority's premises unsupportable. For example, he argued that the abandoned child, who has no cause of action against the deserting parent for emotional injury since such action could disrupt the
family, also should be barred from bringing physical injury suits, and is
not. 12 9 Moreover, he argued that the statutory breach of duty at the foun123. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 76-122.
125. See 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); 22 N.Y.2d 28, 2, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290
N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
126.

GREEN, PEDRICK, RAHL, THODE, HAWKINS AND SMITH, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 175

(1968). See also Foster, RelationalInterests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493, 522: "Theoretically, a husband, as against a wife, has a legally recognized relational interest in her society and
services, and also in her support if he is indigent or infirm. Only her limited duty of support
lends itself to reasonably effective law enforcement. The husband's rights are operative only on
a moment to moment basis and the woman may withdraw her society, affections or services at
any time she pleases and the most the husband can do is to seek reinstatement in her favor,
retaliate in kind or get a divorce. The wife's rights are similar."
Relational interests are "the interests a person may have in his relations with other persons
....
L. .GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 413 (2d ed. 1977). From a broad
perspective (and apparently in the thoughts of the above-quoted authors) relational interests
may arise between the two parties to the relationship but they fall outside the law's protections
except as against interference by third persons. Green, however, states: "These inquiries do not
involve the simple two-party situations found in the protection of person and property. They
are always three-party situations; a relation which necessarily implies two persons, and a third
party who interferes with that relation." Id. at 417-18. He implies that the interests between
the two parties are of personality rot of relation. Emotional distress is usually considered injury
to personality, though such injury can also be viewed as parasitic damage when there has been
an injury to a relational interest, and is often the major element of such damage. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 700, comment g (1977). Whether we look at these family
situations in terms of injury to relations or personality, the limits on the action noted by Green
and Foster, supra, would be applicable.
127. For example, the abduction and enticement cases recognize the child's right to enjoy
the intangible benefits of family life. See, e.g., Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34
Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). See also Comment, Neghgent Injury to Family Relations: A Reevaluation of the
Logic of Lihbility, 77 Nw. L. REV. 794 (1983). Damages for loss of consortium also protect these
interests from negligent injury. Yet, the court in Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105
(1978), dismissed plaintiff's claims regarding the loss of such benefits.
128. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
129. Id. at 723-31, 588 P.2d at 1115-19 (Linde, J., dissenting). Although Justice Linde felt
that a civil action could be implied from violation of a criminal statute, his analysis of the cited
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dation of the case "would not give rise to an expandable common law precedent,"' 130 thereby negating the court's concern with suits arising from trivial
incidents.
Nor are any of the traditional objections to the emotional distress tort
any more applicable in the family situation than among strangers. 13 1 The
argument that proof is too difficult' 3 2 is still subject to the defense that similar damage determinations are made successfully in wrongful death actions.
Mental consequences from intrafamily torts are certainly no less foreseeable' 33 than those arising from torts among strangers. In fact, such consequences probably are more foreseeable. Perhaps the most valid criticism
"lies in the 'wide door' which might be opened not only to fictitious claims,
but to litigation in the field of trivialities ....
,,t34 The family setting may
provide more opportunity for trivial claims to arise, but that possibility "is a
1 35
poor reason for denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury."'
Although clearer guidelines for the imposition of liability may indeed be
necessary,' 36 this is far less drastic than denying the entire cause of action.
Closely related to the fear of a flood of trivial litigation is the theory that
family members have assumed the risk of or have impliedly consented to
most emotional injury by another family member.' 37 While "consent may
be assumed to the ordinary contacts of daily life,"' 38 it is difficult to infer
consent to abandonment or to failure to pay alimony. Moreover, even if
consent were to be implied to certain emotional "rough-housing," if defendant exceeds that consent and does a substantially different act, such as commit adultery, the consent is void.39 Since no rationale justifies the outright
denial of a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the approach followed by the court in Treschman v. Treschman, 140 is more
appropriate:
We quite agree with appellant's counsel that courts should hesitate
to invade the privacy of the home, or to question that mutual confidence which should obtain in the household. But this privacy
and mutual confidence should not be permitted to shield an evil
points would have been relevant in establishing the outrageousness of defendant's behavior for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action as well.
130. 284 Or. at 730-31 n.5, 588 P.2d at 1119 n.5.
13 . See Guynn, Compensationfor "Orphans of the Lwing'" An Evaluation of the Proposed Tort of
Abandonment, 18J. FAM. L. 501, 519-21, (1979).
132. See supra text accompanying note 7.
133. See supra text accompanying note 10.
134. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 51.
135. Id.
136. See infra text acompanying notes 152-97.
137. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations, supra note 32, at 1078. If the injury
does not extend in its pecuniary effects beyond minority, there is perhaps no good purpose to be
served in permitting an action against the parent for pain, suffering, and injury to feelings,
unsupported by pecuniary damage, since these matters may well be considered as risks of the
relation, although such action may be maintained against third persons, at least for intentional
aggressions.
138.

W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 18, at 102. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

§ 895F, comment h and § 895G, comment k (1977).
139.

W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 104.

140.

28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E.961 (1901) (intentional physical injury).
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doer from the consequences flowing from a palpable wrong.141
A.

"REAL"

VERSUS "TANGENTIAL"

FAMILY CASES

Admittedly, the cases discussed above are of little assistance in determining what are palpable wrongs justifying recovery. One preliminary
problem is the failure to distinguish those cases inherently dependent on
their family settings from those which only tangentially involve a family.
Where litigation only happens coincidentally to involve a family, the case
should be dealt with as any other emotional distress action. Yet, some of
these cases have been dismissed on vague family policy grounds.
In child-snatching cases, 142 for example, plaintiff is alleging defendant's
interference with his or her relationship with a child and the resulting emotional distress, not a disruption of plaintiffs relationship with defendant.
Since defendant's position as plaintiff's spouse has no impact on plaintiff's
distress, and the child snatching and resultant distress could have been
caused by a stranger to the family setting, 14 3 no different analysis of defendant's conduct is required because of the parties' relationship.
Analyzed from this perspective, cases alleging interference with visita144
do state a valid claim. As in the
tion rights of the non-custodial spouse
child-snatching cases, defendant is causing plaintiffs mental distress by interference with plaintiffs relationship with a third party. There is a distinction between these types of cases, however, because it is hard to visualize how
a stranger to the relationship could interfere with visitation. Typically the
custodial ex-spouse causes the non-custodian distress. Even so, as in the
child-snatching cases, the distress suffered is not related to the plaintiff and
defendant's relationship, but to plaintiff's relationship with the child. Accordingly, it should be judged separately from the parties' family ties. Even
if the court disregards the parties' relationship, additional safeguards still
exist since the elements of an emotional distress action remain for analysis
45
and the plaintiff must meet the necessary burden of proof.'
Frequently, defendant interferes not with a relationship, but with some
financial expectancy 146 of plaintiff. Although that expectancy arises from a
prior relationship between the parties, the obligation is independent of that
relationship and a similar kind of obligation could arise among strangers.
The distress arises not because the parties are or were spouses, but because
defendant failed to pay plaintiff some money. The action ought not to be
barred because it is between ex-spouses, but ought to be compared with
analogous cases such as those alleging insurance companies' intentional in14 7
On the basis of
fliction of emotional distress by failure to pay claims.
141. Id. at 210-11, 61 N.E. at 963.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 91-109.
143. Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35, (4th Cir. 1982).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 115-17.
145. Plaintiff will have to show defendant intended to cause plaintiff's severe emotional
distress by his or her outrageous conduct. See supra note 12.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 110 and 119.
147. See Whitten v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470, 479 (D.S.C.
1977), aft'd, 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1979) (allegations failed to show outrageous conduct);
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particular facts, a jury may conclude the conduct has not been outrageous
and dismiss the cause of action, but the family tie is irrelevant in that
determination.
B.

EMOTIONAL HARM ARISING FROM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE LITIGANTS:

"REAL"

FAMILY CASES

Having eliminated one source of confusion by drawing the distinction
between "real" and "tangential" family cases, we are left with the "real"
family cases, those alleging emotional harm arising out of the relationship
8
between the litigants.14
Because these parties are complaining about interaction that occurs on
an intense day to day basis, courts have hesitated to become involved. Although the concern that courts could be flooded with trivialities is legitimate, more careful analysis of the specific elements of the emotional distress
tort would eliminate much of this judicial hesitation.
Most courts have focused their attention on the element requiring that
the defendant's conduct be outrageous.' 4 9 As a practical matter, severe
emotional distress, another element of the tort, may be inferred from outrageous conduct, according to the Restatement.' 50 Unfortunately, the Restatement's explanation of just what constitutes outrageous conduct is not
very helpful, speaking in terms of "atrocious,. . . utterly intolerable."' 15 1 In
fact, the Restatement's treatment indicates that the requirement of outrageous behavior by the defendant may be the most ill-defined and amorphous
of the tort's elements.
Perhaps the more reaonable way for a court to proceed would be to first
determine whether or not defendant intended to and has, in fact, caused
plaintiff serious mental distress. In many instances of emotional family interaction, plaintiff will have difficulty proving that defendant intended to
injure plaintiff or knew to a substantial certainty 15 2 that emotional distress
would result. In even more instances, plaintiff will be unable to show severe
mental anguish. 153 By analyzing these factors, many of the petty complaints
54
that could arise would be eliminated without a trial.'
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (jury
verdict for plaintiff upheld).
148. Se supra text accompanying notes 63-69, 72-73, 112-113, 118, 120, 122.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
150. "Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46, comment j (1965). See also Note, Abduction of Child By
Noncustodial Parent: Damages For Custodial Parent's Mental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829, 835-36
(1981) (abduction of child is significant evidence that distress was suffered).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46, comment d (1965). This definition has been
criticized as being circular. Theis, The Intentional Inftction of EmotionalDistress." A Needfor Limits
on Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 275, 290 (1978).
152. See supra note 14.
153. See supra note 16. For example, if a husband and wife have a fight, it will be difficult to
show more than a temporary anguish. Moreover, the intent element and the distress suffered
elements are more definite than the outrageous conduct requirement, and may serve to defeat
the cause of action.
154. To survive a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, plaintiff's allegations would
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If, however, defendant intended to harm plaintiff in a serious way and
succeeded, the next question to be addressed is whether or not the conduct
was outrageous. What is or is not outrageous may be more precisely determined by balancing the parties' interests. 15 5 Such a balancing approach is
56
and is
certainly not new to the law. It is basic to the defense of privilege,'
157
In fact, this
the core of the reasonableness determination in negligence.
58
accommodation of competing interests underlies much of tort law.i
Approaching the issue of outrageousness from the perspective of competing interests has the additional advantage of lending more certainty to
determinations made in situations difficult to evaluate because of the relationship of the parties.i 59 Traditionally, the intimate nature of familial interaction and the attendant notions of one's implied consent to such
relationships prompted judicial reluctance. But, this new approach may
stimulate more judicial confidence since the answer is derived by comparing
the interests defendant is promoting with the interests being harmed, instead
of by deciding whether something "looks" outrageous.160
In some cases it appears that defendant, by the conduct complained of,
is merely exercising a right established by the courts or the legislature. For
example, in Przybyla v. Przyby/a,i 6 i plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant sought an abortion, which is her constitutionally protected right. In
such a situation, defendant's interest is paramount over plaintiff's more generalized interest in being free from emotional disturbance. Of course, if defendant takes action not intended to further his or her own interest but to
harm plaintiff's, the balance could tip against defendant. 162 Similarly, if the
only allegations are that a party is seeking a divorce, as one is entitled to do
have to indicate a mental reaction more serious than a headache or a few sleepless nights.
Swanson v. Swanson, 121 Ill. App. 2d. 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970).
155. See generally Hochman, Outrageousness and Privdege in the Law of Emotional Dzstress--a Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 61 (1961) (suggesting a qualified-privilege approach to emotional
distress claims).
156. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 16, at 98-99.
157. Id.
158. See generally Green, The Study & Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1955)
(describing the public policy considerations underlying the judiciary's balancing role); W.
PROSSER, supra note 5, § 3, at 14-16.
159. It may seem easier to establish defendant's lack of justification under this new approach than his or her outrageous conduct under the old. Nonetheless, many cases will be
eliminated by a consideration of the intent and distress suffered elements. If having established
those elements, plaintiff shows defendant's lack of justification, plaintiff may be entitled to recovery. See Hochman, supra note 155, at 67-68. Liability would probably not be expanded
since a careful consideration of all the elements would eliminate most complaints, but in a more
analytically satisfying way.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965). Since this is a new approach, this article suggests its use in the "real" as opposed to the "tangential" family cases.
Once a court realizes that the family relationship is irrelevant in the "tangential" cases, it ought
to be able to proceed with the traditional analysis. But where the family relationship is relevant, and courts tend to dismiss without sufficient analysis, a more structured approach may be
helpful.
161. 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (1978).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment g (1965) states: "The actor is
never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional
distress." If defendant acts in an impermissible way, the case would be analogous to the loss of a
qualified privilege to defame. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 (1977).
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under state law, 163 the conduct cannot be outrageous. Such an approach
would eliminate the fear voiced by the Burnette v. Wahl 164 majority that any
divorcing parent would be liable for the distress inflicted on his or her child
because of the dissolution.
Directly contrary are cases where defendant violates an established
right of plaintiff or abrogates an established duty owed to plaintiff. Again,
the balance of interests already has been established by the courts or the
legislature, and if the plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress by defendant's intentional act, defendant will be hard pressed to argue the action
is not outrageous. Although a specific duty regarding their relationship may
be embodied in a criminal statute, 165 duties also may be implied from civil
statutes. 166
The approach suggested in this article would lead to a result contrary to
that reached in Bumette,1 6 7 where the court found the emotional distress tort
inapplicable to the parent-child relationship. Thus, where plaintiff child
complains of maternal abandonment, plaintiffs right to be cared for is protected by statute in every jurisdiction.168 Since the legislatures have spoken
at length regarding the rights of children and their concerns with their welfare,169 the balance between the parents' freedom of action and the child's
right to care already has been fixed. Where the child suffers severe distress,
70
and abandonment obviously affects mental as well as physical well-being, 1
the complaint should be actionable.
Similarly, defendant's bigamy, which was the basis for plaintiffs com163.

H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 788 (3d

ed. 1980).

164. 284 Or. 705, 716, 588 P.2d 1105, 1111-12 (1978).
165. See, e.g., infra, text accompanying notes 169-70. The analysis would then be very similar to that of using a violation of statute to establish negligence. W. PROSSER,supra note 5, § 36,
at 190. Note, however, that this is not a suggestion that a private right of action arises from the
statute. Rather, plaintiff will have to prove the elements of the tort. The violation of duty helps
establish the outrageousness of the behavior.
166. See mnfia text accompanying notes 173-77.
167. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
168. See Katz. Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) for a
compilation of statutes applicable in all jurisdictions.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1011 (McKinney 1983). § 1011 states as the purpose of
the act:
to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to
help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. It is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the state . . . may intervene against
the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met.
Id.
The purpose clause of the Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 419.474 (1981 Repl. Part) states:
The provisions . . . shall be liberally construed to the end that a child coming within
the jurisdiction of the court may receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in
his own home, as will lead to the child's welfare and the best interest of the public, and
that when a child is removed from the control of his parents the court may secure for
him care that best meets the needs of the child.
Id.
170. Studies of foster children's adjustment have noted their trauma on separation from the
parents and difficulties in establishing new, sound relationships. See H. MAAS & R. ENGLER,
CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 356 (1959); Maas, Highlights of the Foster Care Project." Introduction, CHILD WELFARE, July 1959, at 5; Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 599, 623-25 (1973).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

plaint in Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey,' 7 1 is universally condemned, 172 and
would not be accorded much weight in a balancing test. Accordingly, defendant's interest in committing a criminal act will not compare favorably to
plaintiffs interest in not being subjected to the humiliation and anguish of
learning that her marriage is void. In fact, defendant's behavior appears
actionable as outrageous.
73
Lastly, the New York Court of Appeals decision in Weicker v. Wecker,1
may be questioned. Defendant's first wife alleged emotional distress because
of the defendant's procurement of an illegal Mexican divorce and his remarriage. 174 Although defendant had the right to divorce plaintiff under state
law, he only had the right to divorce legally, and had a duty not to divorce
illegally. Assuming an illegal divorce, it follows that defendant owed plaintiff duty not to remarry. 175 Again, it would seem defendant's failure to act
within the laws, and plaintiffs resulting emotional distress, would tip the
balance away from defendant. 176 Under this reasoning, the Weicker 177 trial
court's decision is more convincing.
Where defendant is neither protecting nor violating a clearly established right, a more detailed investigation of each of the parties' interests is
necessary. In Wiener v. Wiener, 178 for example, defendant alleged in her
counterclaim that plaintiff was abusive and told her he did not love her.
Obviously, plaintiff was exercising his right of free speech. Although that
right has never been an absolute, 179 the ability to speak one's mind in the
family context has greater value than the peace of mind of the person listening. Because the family's functioning depends on open and free communication, even negative give and take is necessary. Accordingly, this
communication does fall within the "assumed risks" of the relationship.
A similar situation occurred in Hansen v. Hansen 180 where a child alleged
that his mother fought with him over his drug usage and sent him away to
82
school.' 8 ' Defendant's interest in disciplining her child is quite strong
compared to the child's interest in freedom of action and tranquility. 8 3 Be171. 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941).
172. There are both civil and criminal sanctions for bigamy. H. CLARK, supra note 163, at
120. There is, however, a strong presumption of the validity of the most recent marriage. See,
e.g., Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal App. 3d 209, 215, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 (1976); Johnson v.
Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977).
173. 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968) (per curiam).
174. See Weicker v. Weicker, 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1967),rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 138,
283 N.Y.S.2d 385, aft'd, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
175. This duty is similar to that inMashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190, but runs to the
first wife instead of the second.
176. An interesting issue at trial would have been the cause in fact issue. Plaintiff would
have had to prove that it was the illegal divorce and remarriage which caused her distress, not
that defendant wanted to get a divorce, to which he was entitled.
177. 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852.
178. 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981).
179. Liability for defamation restricts one's freedom of speech. Liability for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress can flow from spoken words. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 12.
180. 43 Colo. App. 525, 608 P.2d 364 (1979).
181. Id. at 526, 608 P.2d at 365.
182. There is a well-recognized privilege to discipline children. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 147-155 (1965).
183. Although there has been an upsurge of interest in the field of children's rights, legally
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cause it appears here that defendant was exercising her responsibility to her
child, not abrogating it as in Burnelte,'8 4 the allegations should not be
actionable.
In the Vance 185 case, referred to above, defendant married plaintiff not
knowing his prior divorce was still pending.'8 6 Although he discovered it
shortly thereafter, he did not inform plaintiff until twenty years later when
he wanted to divorce her.18 7 Conceding that defendant was unaware of the
problem at the time of the marriage, plaintiff complained of his failure to
alert her when he did find out.' 8 Unfortunately, the court's conclusion that
defendant could not have intended plaintiff distress, since he could not have
foreseen the unhappy circumstances when he did tell her, is flawed. 189
Again, a balancing test answering the following questions would be enlightening. Why did he keep the void marriage a secret? What interest did
defendant have in not disclosing the truth compared to plaintiff's distress
when she did learn the true status of their marriage? Clearly, her distress
could have been obviated by defendant's early disclosure. Therefore, defendant's conduct is unjustified.
Somewhat more difficult is the Browning v.Browntng 190 decision. In that
case, plaintiff complained of his wife's consorting with a third party, bestowing her companionship, affections and society upon him, and secluding herself with him. 191 Assuming that plaintiff is alleging defendant's adultery, the
interests asserted are much more closely balanced. Plaintiff claimed an interest in a faithful spouse,' 92 while defendant countered that she should have
great sexual freedom. At least one author has suggested that changing mores
indicate: "the rights of the spouse flowing from the marital relationship
should no longer be conclusively presumed to include a monopoly interest in
his or her partner's sexual intercourse."' 193 In fact, there is even some support for her argument that a damages award for adultery would violate her
94
constitutional right to privacy.'
In jurisdictions where the criminal conversation action against third
parties still exists, some judicial balancing of these types of interests has already been done, and plaintiff's right to damages for loss of an exclusive
spousal sexual relationship has been sanctioned. Even where the action has
enforceable rights are limited. See generally Rodham, Children's Rights." A Legal Perspective, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21 (P. Vardin & I. Brody eds. 1979).
184. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
185. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
186. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729.
187. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729-30.
188. Id. at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729.
189. See id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 736-37
190. 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
191. Id. at 407.
192. Most couples, unless they have mutually agreed otherwise, expect to have an exclusive
sexual relationship with their spouse. Adultery is a ground for divorce in most states. H.
CLARK, supra note 163, at 815.
193. Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference With the Marital
Relationshto, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426, 433 (1972).
194. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 283-84, 365 A.2d 147, 153 (1976) (Manderino, J.,
concurring); Kyle v. Albert, 2 Faro. L. Rep. 2361 (1976).
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196
But
been abrogated, 1 95 that right has not necessarily been eliminated.
the trend toward abolishing such causes of action shows a lessened concern
that the balance may
with protection of this type of interest, and indicates1 97
swing toward defendant's interest in sexual freedom.

In summary, where defendant's interference with plaintiff's equanimity
could be accomplished as well by an outsider, cases should be treated like
any other emotional distress case. Where, however, the allegations involve
complaints about the parties' relationship, a clearer analytical structure may
alleviate judicial hesitation over involvement in family matters and concerns
over a flow of petty complaints which could arise because of the nature of
that family relationship.
CONCLUSION

The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort has developed from
a "new tort" to a well-accepted cause of action in a relatively short time
span. Its elements are fairly well articulated, but suffer from a lack of precision in application.
As the mental distress tort developed, intrafamily immunities were abolished. Such developments naturally raise questions concerning the application of the emotional distress tort in the newly available field of family
liability.
Some courts have responded to the challenge by refusing to recognize
the claims. This article suggests that such an approach ignores the raison
d'etre of tort law, compensation, and leaves plaintiff without a remedy.
There is no inherent reason why emotional distress among family members
should not be compensable. What is needed, however, is a clearer analysis of
the facts of the case and in those situations truly involving the family relationship, a more specific inquiry into what constitutes outrageous behavior.
Some decisions categorically deny the availability of the cause of action
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when it is not even relevant
that a family is involved. Cases denying a cause of action when plaintiff
complains of defendant's interference with visitation or failure to make alimony or support payments could be better analogized to cases involving similar interferences among strangers. The child-snatching cases, by
recognizing a cause of action, implement this approach.
Where the facts do involve a disruption of the relationship between the
two parties to the suit, other problems are presented. There is a legitimate
concern that the close nature of the relationship may lead to an unwieldy
number of trivial complaints. Some courts may have been unwilling to determine whether the conduct was outrageous on the Restatement's amorphous
standards. A balancing of the parties' interests would, it is suggested, lend
more certainty to that determination and present a more acceptable stan195. See supra text accompanying note 55.
196. See supra text accompanying note 56.
197. Note, however, if one's concern is with vague allegations of mistreatment there are
attendant difficulties of proof, while allegations regarding socializing with a third person would
be fairly definite and susceptible of proof.
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dard for liabilty. Family members do inflict emotional distress on one another, and where that distress is intended and results, the defendant who has
acted without justification should be liable.

PEOPLE V THOMAS: FURTIVE GESTURES AS AN ELEMENT OF
REASONABLE SUSPICION-THE ONGOING STRUGGLE
TO DETERMINE A STANDARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

As Chief Justice Warren noted in Terry v. Ohio, "[S]treet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity."' Equally
rich in diversity are the interpretations of the fourth amendment 2 protections against unreasonable search and seizure. 3 The history of the fourth
amendment teaches that whether or not a search is a reasonable intrusion in
a given situation is grounded upon more than an individual, ad hoc decision. 4 Presently, however, there is not an objective methodology established5
by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining constitutional reasonableness.
The Colorado Supreme Court has likewise struggled, without consistency, to
determine probable cause, reasonableness for search and seizure, and the ex6
clusionary rule.
Justice Clark's oft-quoted remark that "There is no war between the
Constitution and common sense" 7 is, sometimes, less true in the practice of
criminal procedure than in other areas of the law. In the attempt to find the
balance between the investigator's need to obtain evidence by search and
seizure, and the individual's right to privacy and personal security, the
courts have wavered from one extreme to the other, straining both common
sense and the Constitution. 8 Most commentators agree that the "slidingscale" approach which balances these interests, but provides no firm criteria,
9
is not practical for application by police officers in daily street encounters.
Rather, it has been suggested the courts should devise a test that defines the
"quantum" of evidence which must be present before official action is
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
4. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux. The Rie and FallofProbable Cause, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 763.
5. Id. at 763.
6. Compare People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (1983) with People v. Waits 196 Colo. 35,
580 P.2d 391 (1978).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
8. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 (1968). Justice Douglas' dissent expressed dismay at the
majority's inconsistency and lack of common sense: "We hold today that police have greater
authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a 'search' than a judge has to authorize such action.
We have said precisely the opposite over and over again."
9. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MIcH. L. REV. 39, 56 (1968).
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taken.' 0 Then, according to this view citizens would be aware of what behavior is reasonably expected of them, and police officers would not need to
risk on-the-spot judgments.
People v. Thomas I" represents an attempt by the Colorado Supreme
Court to tighten and clarify definitions and standards applied in search and
seizure cases. Although Thomas did help to clarify the standards for reasonable suspicion, the inherent lack of firm standards in police stops has not
been fully addressed. This article traces the federal and state judiciary's failure to develop consistent and objective standards for application of fourth
amendment principles and concludes with two alternatives to the traditional
ad hoc analysis. This new approach would provide an easily delineated and
minimally intrusive procedure for law enforcement officers to adopt in "stop
and frisk" encounters which result in searches for drugs.
II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

Warrantless Searches

The fourth amendment was designed to ban arbitrary and unjustified
searches and seizures. 12 The requirement of a judicially issued search warrant was chosen by the authors of the Constitution to aid these goals. 13 The
general rule that police must whenever possible obtain an advance warrant
recognizes the inherent danger of subjecting citizens to searches and seizures
based on "suspicion-charged judgments of police officers engaged in the
14
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'
B.

Arrests, Stop and Frisk, and Investigatory Stops
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others ... 5

The pivotal question in most search and seizure cases is whether the
suspect's initial detention was an unreasonable seizure. The fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure applies to citizens regardless of whether they are in public or at home. ' 6 The Court in Miranda v.
Artzona' 7 defines an arrest as a situation in which a reasonable individual,
under the circumstances, would believe that his freedom of movement was
limited such that he was not free to go.' 8
The fourth amendment governs seizures of citizens which do not result
in a trip to the police station and prosecution for a crime. Under the ruling
10. Id. at 57.

11. 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo. 1983).
12. Amsterdam, Perspectues on the Fourth Amendment, 58

MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 (1974).
13. Id. at 417.
14. Id. at 414, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968), quotig Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,

251 (1891).
16. 392 U.S. at 8-9.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 478.
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in Terry v. Ohio, 19 whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his or her freedom to walk away, the officer has "seized" that person. 20 In order to be a valid arrest, the officer must have knowledge, before
the arrest, of facts, not mere rumor or conjecture, 2 1 which indicate that the
person arrested has committed or is committing a criminal offense 22 at the
actual moment of the arrest. 23 Evidence discovered after an arrest cannot be
used to provide probable cause for the arrest. 2 4 Similarly, probable cause for
a search cannot be based on interpretations of the defendant's conduct
which appear reasonable only in the light of evidence uncovered in that very
25
search.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Stops and Frisks: Terry v. Ohio, Then and Now

In Terry v. Ohio ,26 the Supreme Court set forth detailed guidelines for
the police regarding situations where they are confronted with suspicious
behavior. The Court balanced the citizen's right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion against the state's need to investigate criminal activity. 27 When such activity happens, Terry permits a seizure of the citizen
for brief questioning and a patdown of his clothing for weapons. 28 This encounter is justified by the need for effective crime prevention and detection
by police. In each case there must be a specific factual justification, based on
29
what the officer sees and experiences, to justify the Terry inquiry.
The Court stated in Terry that the justification for the investigatory stop
in each case would be judged strictly by an objective standard. 30 Thus,
whenever a citizen is stopped the police officer must be prepared to articulate specific facts justifying that action. These facts do not have to rise to the
level of probable cause - the arrest standard - or even a reasonable belief
that someone has committed a crime. The facts must, however, be sufficient
to arouse the police officer's curiosity and specific enough to be articulated in
31

court.

Terry specifically avoided the issue of whether the police can stop and
detain a person for investigation solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. 3 2 Terry held only that a suspect can be physically seized
19. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
20. Id.
21. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).
22. Id. at 376; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
23. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P,2d 373 (1977).
24. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320,
311 A.2d 914 (1973).
25. People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 at 457, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970).
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (where the Court
first developed this balancing approach for administrative searches).
28. 392 U.S. at 30.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21-22.
32. In a footnote, the Court stated: "We thus decide nothing today concerning the consti-
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for the purpose of conducting a frisk if the police officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed
33
and dangerous.
In two related cases decided the same day, 34 the Supreme Court devel5
oped and applied the principles announced in Terry. In Sbron v. New York
the Court interpreted the constitutionality of New York's stop and frisk statute. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, and
held merely that the police acted reasonably. 36 The Supreme Court decided
the best method for determining the lawfulness of a stop and frisk was to
decide each case based on the specific, concrete factual circumstances in37
volved in the police encounter regardless of the provisions of the statutes.
The Court ruling emphasized that each case would be judged on its
particular facts in light of fourth amendment requirements regardless of
what labels the state attaches to the conduct involved. 38 Although states are
permitted to develop statutory guidelines regarding standards for search and
seizure to meet the needs of local law enforcement, these standards must
39
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.
Sibron further held that police observation of the defendant talking and
associating with known narcotic addicts over an eight hour period was insufficient to connect the defendant with criminal activity. The ruling emphasized that an incident search cannot precede a valid arrest, and that it was
significant that the officer was interested in obtaining drugs, not weapons,
40
from the search.
In Sbron's sister case, Peters v. New York, 4' the Court held that the officer
had not only reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, but also probable
cause to arrest. In Peters, the arresting officer heard noises in the hallway of
his apartment building. He glanced out and observed the defendant with
another man, "tiptoeing furtively about the hallway." 42 When he opened
the door, the two men took off, running down the stairs. The officer caught
one of the men and proceeded to search for weapons. The search produced
an instrument commonly used for burglaries.
tutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of
'detention' and/or interrogation." 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
33. Id. at 30. As one commentator suggests, the lower courts have taken the two elements
found necessary in Terry to conduct a protective frisk - reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed - and has created from them a bifurcated
standard quite different from the original intent of Terry. Eg., I W. RINGEL, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 13.1(c)(1979).

34. Sibron, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (reported with Peters v. New York).
35. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
36. Id. at 61-62.
37. Id. at 59.
38. Id. at 62.
39. Id. at 60-61. For a view advocating that states give more protection under their own
constitutions see generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individuals Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
40. 392 U.S. at 62-63.
41. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (decided with Sibron).
42. Id. at 66.
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In upholding the trial court's admission of the burglary tool, the Court
held that:
[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled
with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be consid43
ered in the decision to make an arrest.
A concurring Justice agreed with the result reached in Sibron, but questioned
whether the Terry stop should be permitted for narcotic possession cases at
all. 44 He also questioned the finding of probable cause to arrest in Peters,
stating that he would have ruled that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
45
stop but not to arrest.
Terry, Sibron, and Peters are the foundation on which the Court built the
law controlling reasonable suspicion to stop a person suspected of criminal
activity. Later cases gave the Court the opportunity to address problems
relating to stop and frisk not foreseen in Terry.
1.

The Expansion and Redefinition of Terry

Adams v. W'lliams 4 6 extends Terry to arrests for possessory offenses where
the stop was based on an informer's tip. In doing so, the Court recognized
for the first time that an officer could stop a suspect to investigate suspicious
activities without reasonable cause to believe the defendant was armed and
dangerous.
One Justice argued in dissent that the permissive Terry rules should not
be applied to mere possessory offenses.4 7 Another dissenter 48 argued that
Terry was not intended to allow a policeman to stop and frisk a citizen based
on a tip from an untrustworthy source which imparted a mere hunch that
the suspect was engaged in criminal activity. Rather, the Terry search was
intended to apply only where the officer observed, first hand, suspicious behavior which he could articulate later, in a court proceeding.
In United States v. Brtgnont-Ponce,'49 decided three years later, the Court
extended Terry to include stops for nonviolent offenses. The Court expressed
its acceptance of brief detentions for investigative purposes in the narrow
confines of a search by immigration agents for illegal aliens in the border
50
area.
43. Id. at 66-67. One commentator argues that reasonable suspicion to stop would not
have to be so coupled. E.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 9.3 at 75 n.99 (1978).
44. 392 U.S. 40, 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 74.
46. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). For a recent Colorado case which has some resemblance to
Adams, see People v. Villiard, No. 835A597 (Colo. March 26, 1984).
47. Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting). See also Note, Investigative Stops in Urban Centers. Upholdingthe
Constable's Whim, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 963 (1978) (adopts the view that Terry only meant to
apply the stop and frisk rationale in a setting involving the suspicion of potentially dangerous
criminal activity).
48. 407 U.S. 143, 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
50. Id. at 88 1.
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The Supreme Court concluded that Teny, Adams and Brtgnoni-Ponce together establish the appropriate circumstances in which the fourth amendment permits a limited search or seizure on facts which would not constitute
probable cause for arrest. 5 1 In short, given the predicate circumstances the
Court may approve stops based on no more than reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, even though the officer may not believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous.
2.

Limiting Police Discretion

Contrary to the precedents established by Terry and its progency the
Supreme Court has recently attempted to curtail limited stops in which the
police officer was unable to point to specific and articulable facts to justify
the stop. This was made clear in Delaware v. Prouse,52 where the Court refused to condone the stopping of a motor vehicle based on the officer's inarticulable hunch that the vehicle was unregistered. 53 The Court expressed
concern that such "standardless and uncontrolled discretion" is exactly what
the fourth amendment was intended to prevent.54 In its holding the Court
left open to the states the prerogative to develop neutral criteria whereby
55
traffic stops are not subject to the "unconstrained exercise of discretion."
Three months later, Brown v. Texas 56 found a Texas statute unconstitutional for the same reasons as in Prouse. The statute required a citizen to
identify himself when requested to by the police. 57 The statute was held
infirm because it permitted the police to stop suspects without cause and it
gave too much discretion to the police. This created the risk of arbitrary and
58
abusive police practices.
It is apparent from these decisions that the Court will not endorse unfettered discretion-the police must be able to articulate some reason for engaging in an "intermediate" Terry stop. As the permissive progeny of Terry
indicate, this justification is minimal.
B.

Colorado's Answer lo Terry v. Ohio: Stone v. People

The Colorado courts, like the federal courts, hold that although warrantless searches and arrests are presumptively unreasonable, 59 the presence
of exigent circumstances may eliminate the warrant requirement. 6° The
burden of establishing exigent circumstances is on the prosecution, 6 1 and the
51. Id. at 881.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
Id.
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Id. at 52.

58. Id.
59. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); e.g., People v. Gurule, 196 Colo. 562, 593
P.2d 319 (1978); People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328, 513 P.2d 196 (1973).
60. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357, 553 P.2d 777
(1976).
61. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); People v. Boorern, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939
(1974); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 448, 491 P.2d 575 (1971).
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62
court must view the totality of circumstances before making its ruling.
Under Colorado case law, several factors are to be considered in determining
whether exigent circumstances exist. These factors include whether immediate action is needed to protect public safety, 63 whether the police have probable cause to believe a violent crime has been committed and flight of the
65
64
suspect is imminent, or when it is likely that evidence will be destroyed.

Exigent circumstances exist when time is of the essence; 66 the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant are
67
crucial factors.
The Colorado legislature has codified the constitutional standards announced in Terry.68 The statute requires the existence of three elements for a
valid stop and frisk. The first requirement is that the stop be justified by
some specific information that the person stopped was recently involved in a
69
crime or that he is about to engage in a crime.
Once the citizen is stopped, a pat-down for weapons is permitted when
the officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that the person is armed.70
This second element does not require absolute certainty, but merely that the
officer point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant a reasonable
and prudent person to believe that his or her safety or that of others was in
danger. 7 ' A third requirement for a stop and frisk is that a subsequent
72
search be limited to the purpose of the stop in the first instance.
73
The leading case in Colorado for investigatory stops is Stone v. People.
This case sets forth the guidelines for lawful field investigations involving the
temporary detention of citizens on less than probable cause. Stone permits a
request for the suspect's identification and a demand for explanation of suspicious behavior. The court set forth three requirements for a valid "Stone"
stop: first, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped has committed, or is about to commit a crime; second, the purpose
of the detention must be reasonable; and finally, the nature of the detention
74
must be reasonable in light of its purpose.
62. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo.
46, 492 P.2d 627 (1972).
63. People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326, 546 P.2d 956 (1976) (where the defendant drove at high
speeds from the scene of a crime).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 562
P.2d 422 (1977); People v. Mathis, 189 Colo. 534, 542 P.2d 1296 (1975).
66. People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326, 546 P.2d 956 (1976); DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo. 46,
492 P.2d 627 (1972).
67. People v. Boorem, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939 (1974).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
69. E.g., People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977).
70. E.g., People v. Sherman, 197 Colo. 442, 593 P.2d 971 (1979).
71. Eg., People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975) (stop and frisk was justified
where defendant was seen in area of burglary and officers had seen the name of the defendant
on police flyers describing him as armed and dangerous).
72. Eg., People v. Navran, 174 Colo. 222, 483 P.2d 228 (1971) ("the right to stop and frisk
is not an open invitation to conduct an unlimited search"). Id. at 232.
73. 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
74. 174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497. Professor LaFave has noted that the reasonableness
of any detention may depend on whether the police utilized an investigatory method designed
to resolve the situation in a timely fashion.
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The Colorado Supreme Court placed limits on the Stone stop in People v.
Gomez. 75 In that case, the court held that an arrest which lacked probable
cause could not later be justified as an investigatory stop. The Stone case was
also limited in a later case 76 where a statute which gave an officer the authority to require the production of a driver's license did not give the officer
authority to stop any car at his or her discretion. 77 The court reasoned that
to allow this unchecked discretion by the police would countermand the in78
tent of the stop and frisk statute.

IV.
A.

THE PEOPLE V THOMAS DECISION

The Facts

On the morning of September 16, 1981, Denver narcotics officers
Schuelke and Chavez were on routine patrol with two other officers in an
unmarked police vehicle in a Black neighborhood known as Five Points.
While stopped for a red light Officer Schuelke recognized the defendant
Thomas standing across the street in the parking lot of a Church's Fried
Chicken restaurant and alerted the other officers to Thomas' presence on the
street.7 9 According to Schuelke, Thomas was not moving in any direction;
actually, he was "more or less just standing in the lot." 80 At that time, the
officers did not have information which suggested any criminal involvement
by Thomas. 1
There was conflicting testimony regarding the exact sequence of events
following Officer Schuelke's recognition of Thomas. Detective Chavez testified that when his eyes met the suspect's, he ran toward the "shack," an
occasional gambling establishment. Later, the detective stated that he drove
around the corner while the defendant walked toward the "shack." Subsequently, Thomas put his hand in his pocket, and began to run. The officers
assumed that "at the time [the defendant] was either trying to hide some2
thing [or] had something on him," and pursued Thomas.
After stopping the car, the officers chased the defendant on foot into the
"shack." Detective Schuelke saw the defendant throw something into a
water pitcher on top of a vending machine. 8 3 Schuelke ordered Thomas to
stop, pulled his gun, and retrieved six balloons containing cocaine from the
84
water pitcher.
At trial, Thomas moved to suppress the balloons. The motion was
granted and the district court held that the officers' chase was based on bare
suspicion and that the defendant's act of discarding the balloons was the
75.

193 Colo. 208, 563 P.2d 952 (1977).

76. CoLO.REV. STAT. § 42-2-133 (1973).
77. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550 P.2d 311 (1976); Accord Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
78. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
79. 660 P.2d 1272, 1273.

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1274.

Id.

PEOPLEv. THOMAS

1984]

product of an illegal chase.8 5 The People appealed to the Supreme Court of
Colorado, which upheld the decision to suppress the cocaine. The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity when they began their pursuit of the defendant, and that
8 6
the cocaine was a product of an illegal seizure of the defendant's person.
B.

The Holding.- Illegal Invest'gatve Stop

In upholding the decision of the trial court, the Colorado Supreme
Court found that the police had no reason to chase Thomas down the
street.8 7 Since the chase and the subsequent stop were unjustified, the defendant's subsequent act of abandonment was the result of an unlawful police intrusion,8 8 and the evidence was inadmissible.8 9
92
9
The court relied on Terry,90 People v. Tate, 1 and Stone v. People, to supply the objective test for justifying an investigative stop. Before seizing the
citizen, the Thomas 93 court held that the officers must have: 1) a specific and
articulable basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity has occurred, is
taking place, or is about to take place, 2) a reasonable purpose for the stop,
and 3) a reasonable relationship between the purpose and character of the
94
stop.
The Thomas stop was improper because it did not meet the first prong of
this test. According to the court, the fact that Thomas made "furtive gestures" is laden with inherent ambiguity, and therefore cannot justify a stop
95
People v. Waits 9 6
in the absence of other facts indicating criminal activity.
was expressly overruled, because, in that case, the suspects' furtive gestures in
a high crime area were considered satisfactory grounds for reasonable suspi97
cion to stop.
Focusing on the absence of specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion, the court held that "the balance between public interest
and - defendant's - right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of
freedom from police interference." 9 8 The Court cited Brown v. Texas 99 in its
discussion of the risk of intolerable, arbitrary, and abusive police practices
inherent in chases based on subjective criteria or less than reasonable
suspicion. 10o
The court concluded that Thomas' efforts to avoid police contact were
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1274.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
657 P.2d 955 (Colo. 1983).
174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
660 P.2d at 1274.

94. Id. at 1275.
95. Id.

96. 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978).
97.
98.
99.
.00.

660 P.2d at 1276.
Id. at 1276-77.
443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
600 P.2d at 1277.
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not illegal and were not grounds to suspect criminal activity. While Waits
held that flight was cause to reasonably suspect someone of criminal behavior, 10 1 the Colorado court followed the approach taken in a number of other
jurisdictions that such flight is not a "specific and articulable fact" which
10 2
could support a stop.
C.

The Dissent." A Restatement

In their dissenting opinion, Justice Rovira and Chief Justice Hodges
restated the issue: did the defendant's flight upon seeing the officers, his
putting his hand in his pocket as he was running, the fact that this happened
in a high-crime area, and the knowledge and experience of the officers who
recognized the defendant create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity? 10 3 Although the Justices supported the objective test employed by the
04
majority, they disagreed with the reasoning and the conclusion.
The majority was criticized for allegedly misinterpreting Sibron v. New
York. i05 The dissent argued that the factors in Sibron were merely guidelines,
not mandatory considerations. Additionally, the dissent pointed to a proposition made by the majority as to what is needed for a valid investigative
stop. The dissent notes that the Sbron Court was discussing what constituted
probable cause for an arrest and not probable cause for an investigatory
stop. 106

The dissenters contended that under the facts in Thomas, the officers
had specific and articulated facts to support their decision, 10 7 and that there
was virtually no risk of arbitrary and abusive police practice. 10 8 The dissent
stressed that the question of what amounts to reasonable suspicion is a common sense question. 10 9 In this case, according to the dissent, immediate police action was required, and courts should ask for a lesser degree of
objectively articulable evidence, as opposed to instances where there is more
time for consideration of alternative courses of action."I 0
The justices lamented the loss of the Waits standard which had allowed
police to make "reasonable inferences" based on their experience in law enforcement.III The heart of the dissent clings to the belief that deliberately
furtive actions and flight at the approach of a police officer is an obvious
attempt to avoid contact with the officer. The implication to be drawn from
sudden change in course is that the defendant had engaged in criminal activ12
ity and wished to avoid detection."
101. 580 P.2d at 393.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See 660 P.2d at 1275-76 and cases cited therein.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1277-78.
392 U.S. 40 (1968). See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
660 P.2d at 1278.
Id. at 1278-79.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
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V.

A.

ANALYSIS

Attempting to Define Reasonable Suspicion

The reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard, used for investigatory stops can be defined by comparison to the arrest standard. The only
difference between reasonable suspicion to stop, and probable cause to arrest, is that the latter requires a greater quantum of evidence.
The "reasonable suspicion to stop" standard is generally thought to be a
level of suspicion greater than a mere hunch, but less than the probable
cause required for an arrest.' 1 3 A police officer's observation of the appearance of a suspect, his or her conduct, and the location of the activity all
contribute to a finding of "reasonable suspicion to stop."
Reasonable suspicion to stop is reviewed on an ad hoc basis, 114 by assessing the totality of circumstances" 15 in determining whether it was reasonable to suspect that the person stopped was engaged in criminal activity.
Similarly, probable cause to arrest tests the officer's ability "to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences
from these facts, reasonably warrant intrusion."' 16
The definition of "probable cause" has probably caused more confusion
than any other aspect of search and seizure law. More often than not, it is
the presence or absence of probable cause that will determine the constitutionality of a search or seizure. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has allowed the required degree of probable cause to fluctuate with the particular
facts of each case.1 7 Professor Amsterdam once wryly noted that recognition of a sliding scale of probable cause would produce more slide than
scale. 118
B.

The Sliding-Scale Approach

Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court decisions regarding fluctuating probable cause standards, a sliding-scale approach has been applied by
various courts, including the Colorado Supreme Court. Significant factors
used in their determinations have included:" 19
1.

Personal Knowledge and Experience of the Officer

In Terry v. Ohio, the Court recognized that the officer's experience allows
him or her to view the facts as a meaningful whole demonstrating reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. 120 Other courts have held that the officer's
knowledge of the suspect is an important factor. 12 ' The discretion of the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
(1977);

Cf. People v. Branin, 188 Colo. 235, 533 P.2d 1138 (1975).
See People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977).
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
392 U.S. at 21.
Bacigal, supra note 4 at 765.
Id. at 786.
See Bell, Factors Wh'chjusti; a Stop and Frisk, 6.6. SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REV. 1 (1979).
392 U.S. 1 at 21 (1968).
United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817
People v. Ressin, 620 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1980).
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officer is limited, however, and reliance on mere hunches is considered insuf22
ficient for reasonable suspicion.'
2.

Furtive Gestures

The courts have been inconsistent in their definition of "furtive gesture," calling it any conduct which an experienced officer considers suspicious. 1 23 Because such a gesture is often innocent movement on the part of
the suspect, however,' 2 4 it is not grounds for reasonable suspicion in the absence of additional facts. 125 Nervousness, excitement, or abrupt movement
is generally considered a natural response to confrontation with an officer of
26
the law. 1
3.

Flight of the Suspect

Flight poses similar problems in that motive is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. 127 Some courts have found that simply running in the opposite direction from an officer or turning around in the vicinity of an officer
is entirely consistent with innocent behavior.' 28 Other courts, however, have
held that "flight invites pursuit and colors conduct which hitherto has appeared innocent."' 29 The Colorado Supreme Court held in Waits that flight
alone may be sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion when the flight ap30
pears to be a direct response to the suspect seeing the officer.'
4.

Suspicious Conduct

Suspicious conduct, like furtive gestures, must be considered in light of
the surrounding circumstances 13 ' and interpreted by an experienced officer.' 32 Again, court rulings have been contradictory and confusing. In
Terry, the defendants were observed by undercover officers as they conferred,
proceeded alternatively back and forth along an identical route, and paused
to stare in the same store window approximately twenty-four times.' 33 In
light of the officers' experience, the suspicious conduct was grounds for reasonable cause. 134 In Cooper v.United States,' 35 police were held to have reasonable suspicion to stop a man carrying two color television sets in a high
122. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978); People v.
Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664, 665 (1974).
123. See Bell, supra note 119, at 3. See also 660 P.2d at 1275-76, and cases cited therein.
124. Yolo Couny, 3 Cal. 3d at 818, 478 P.2d at 455; Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664.
125. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64; People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550 P.2d 311 (1976).
126. Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 665 (1974).
127. Yolo Couny, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455, quoting People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 274, 292, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318, 330 (1969).
128. McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. App. 1982).
129. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977).
130. 196 Colo. 35, 38-39, 580 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1978).
131. Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1981).
132. Tery, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968); Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
dented, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
133. 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
134. Id. at 21-22.
135. 368 A.2d 554 (D.C. 1977).

1984]

PEOPLE v. THOMAS

crime neighborhood, 136 whereas stopping a man with a television set at a
13 7
bustop was found unreasonable in People v. Qurntero.
5.

Similarity to Description of Wanted Persons

Generally, similarity to a description of a person or vehicle is probable
cause for further investigation.13 8 It is necessary, though, for the description
to be specific, 139 unless other factors are present, e.g., presence in an isolated
location late at night.
6.

Time and Place of Stop

Location and hour, if coupled with other factors, may give sufficient
color to a suspect's conduct to justify further investigation.140 Rarely, how14
ever, is time and place alone sufficient cause. '
7.

High Crime Areas

Many courts have found that this factor may color conduct which
otherwise might not reasonably arouse suspicion. 142 Other courts, however,
warn against the ease with which abuse may occur, and discourage use of
this factor. 143
8.

Nearness to the Scene of the Crime

Spatial and temporal proximity of a suspect to the scene of a reported
crime is often a relevant factor in determining probable cause.' 44 This does
not justify dragnet-type stops in which any pedestrian is subject to a roving
police interrogation. 145 In Colorado, mere presence at the scene of a crime
146
does not constitute probable cause for arrest.
9.

Evidence in Plain View

Under the plain view doctrine, 147 evidence in plain view may be relied
on to establish probable cause.' 48 This doctrine is limited in that !) there
must be a valid intrusion, 2) there must be an inadvertent discovery, S) the
136. Id. at 557.
137. 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983).
138. United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Shackleford, 37
Colo. App. 317, 546 P.2d 964 (1976).
139. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
140. People v. Damaska, 404 Mich. 391, 273 N.W.2d 58 (1978).
141. Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1976).
142. United States v. Garr, 461 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972);
People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
143. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978); People v.
Marquez, 183 Colo. 231, 516 P.2d 1134 (1973).
144. Bell, supra note 119, at 1, citing United States v. Wright, 565 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978); People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
145. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
146. People v. Branin, 188 Colo. 235, 533 P.2d 1138 (1975); People v. Feltch, 174 Colo. 383,
483 P.2d 1335 (1971).
147. The plain view doctrine was fully developed for the first time in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
148. Id. at 455-56; People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401, 500 P.2d 977 (1972).
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officer must immediately recognize that what has been discovered is evidence of wrongdoing and must have reason to believe that the item seized is
contraband before he or she may seize what is plainly seen. 149 Inherent in
the plain view doctrine is the principle that the object seized must not have
150
been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.
In Thomas, the court discusses several of these criteria, holding that the
combination of factors present were insufficient to support a police stop.
The dissent reached an opposite result concluding that the factors present
indeed justified the stop. Although it is rare that a stop will be justified on
the presence of a single suspicious factor, it is similarly rare that only a single
factor will appear in a given situation.151 As the decisions illustrate, not only
does each case depend on its peculiar set of factors, but courts often interpret
the same factors differently, with different courts giving different meaning to
what constitutes probable cause or reasonable suspicion.15 2 This complexity
is exacerbated when one considers that state and federal standards of probable cause and reasonable suspicion can and do, vary.
C.

Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The New Complexity

The Colorado Constitution has a provision to protect state citizens from
unlawful search and seizure, which is essentially identical to the fourth
amendment. 153 The Colorado Supreme Court may interpret the Colorado
Constitution as guaranteeing Colorado citizens more protection than is given
by similar federal provisions,' 54 but it cannot interpret the United States
Constitution as providing greater safeguards than those delineated by the
federal courts.
The dissent in Thomas argued that the court was establishing a per se
rule which made it unreasonable for the police to suspect a citizen of a crime
for mere avoidance of police contact.155 This may well be true. The holding
in Thomas could give more protection to a state citizen than required by
Terry and subsequent federal decisions. Thus, the United States Supreme
Court is without jurisdiction to reverse the state decision. 156 The state courts
can, and are, expanding their own constitutional provisions to provide
greater protection for their citizens.157
It is probably more than a mere coincidence that the justice writing for
149.
150.
151.

403 U.S. at 468-71.
Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. at 324, 326, 311 A.2d at 918, 916.
Bell, supra note 119, at 1.

152. Id.
153. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
154. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] state is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards.") (emphasis in original); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
155. 660 P.2d 1272, 1278.
156. See Brennan, supra note 39, at 501 n.80.
157. Id. at 495. As Justice Brennan notes, states are construing identical state constitutional
provisions to provide greater protection than required by the federal provisions; See also Developmerts in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1370
(1982) (examines the trend of states to use their own constitutions in the criminal procedure
area).
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the majority in Thomas had expressed in an earlier case that the Colorado
Constitution was superior protection for the right of privacy than its federal
counterpart. 158 Even if the dissent is correct in holding that the fourth
amendment does not dictate the result in Thomas, it is clear that the decision
is justifiable under the state constitutional counterpart.
VI.

Two

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS IN

NARCOTIC CASES:

THE "ALL" OR "NOTHING"

APPROACHES

It is evident from People v. Thomas that the police do not have an easy
task in determining reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, especially
in narcotics cases. A fresh approach to the problem of pretext searches for
drugs in stop and frisk encounters is sorely needed. The present case-by-case
method should not be used for possessory offenses; rather Colorado should
adopt the "all or nothing" approach in combating drug related offenses.
The stop and frisk situation would then be limited to crimes threatening life
or property. In light of the courts' inability to agree upon a definition of
reasonable suspicion, it is unrealistic to expect a police officer, who is understandably unaware of the fine nuances of the search and seizure laws to operate in this area. The purpose of this section is to explore two alternatives to
the case-by-case analysis used to decide stop and frisk cases involving narcotic offenses.
The two approaches, or a combination thereof, could be strictly limited
to narcotic possession offenses. The advantages of both approaches are essentially the same: establishing clear guidelines for police conduct and reducing resentment against the police.
A.

The "A/I" Approach

The "all" approach represents the idea that the police cannot effectively
combat crime involving narcotics by use of the reasonable suspicion standard. The courts frequently exclude evidence because the stop was arbitrary. The "all" approach would alleviate this problem. This approach, as
discussed by Professor LaFave, would permit the police to stop suspected
narcotic possessors for interrogation without the same quantum of suspicion
required by Terry.' 59 This is premised on the fact that the stop was "pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitation."' 6 0 Professor LaFave
noted two other Supreme Court cases which the Colorado court relied on to
158. Justice Quinn Stated:
I believe that Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution contemplated greater
protection for privacy interests than is presently available under Fourth Amendment
doctrine. We have recognized on other occasions that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, while entitled to respectful considerations, are not controlling on the
issue of constitutional protections emanating from identical or similar provisions in the
Colorado Constitution.
People v. Spies, 615 P.2d 710, 718 (Colo. 1980). (Quinn, J., dissenting).
159. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); See, e.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 9.3(g)
(Supp. 1983).
160. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 43, at 42-43.
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support this proposition. 16 1 He suggests that the Court might approve of a
neutral plan under the Camara v. Municipal Court 162 balancing test if the police could demonstrate a particular enforcement problem. 16 3
The advantage to this approach is that the police would not need individualized suspicion, as in Thomas, if they operated under a tightly and carefully designed plan to limit police discretion. As LaFave noted, the Court
may rule negatively if confronted with a neutral plan to question persons in
an area known for drug users, but a tight and strictly designed plan might
64
pass muster.'
The most likely type of situation where a neutral plan would be approved by the Court, according to LaFave, is where the plan is used to combat a "special problem" existing at a given time and place, such as a
65
neighborhood drug market.'

B.

The "Nothing" Approach

This approach would eliminate an officer's authority to stop a citizen
for a suspected possessory offense. This was the approach taken by the
66
PoAmerican Law Institute in drafting its model stop and frisk statute.'
lice officers would only be authorized to stop a person suspected of violent, or
property crimes.
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure cites two reasons why
narcotic offenses were not included in the stop and frisk statute. First, use of
the stop and frisk in narcotic stops creates an obvious temptation to abuse
the limited search for weapons as a pretext to search for drugs. Second, the
need for stop and frisk as an enforcement tool for narcotic investigators is not
as great as other types of crimes.' 6 7 The vice officers tend to rely more on
informers and undercover agents to apprehend drug offenders than on the
stop and frisk method.'68 This is also apparently the case with the Denver
169
Police Department.
This "nothing" approach reverts back to the original intent of Terry v.
Ohio: that the stop and frisk should only be used when the person stopped is
70
believed to be armed and dangerous. 1
161. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976).
162. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
9 3
163. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43 § . (g), at 44-45 (Supp. 1983).
164. Id. at 44.
165. Id. at 45. Professor LaFave gives three cases as examples where such a plan could be
utilized: 1) a problem with vandalism; 2) an area of numerous auto thefts; 3) situation involving special responses, i.e., preventing racial incidents.
166. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 (Official Draft 1975).

167. Id. § 110.2 commentary at 278-79.
168. Id. at 279.
169. Interview with Detective Sgt. Costigan, Vice and Narcotic Bureau, Denver Police Department, in Denver (Aug. 3, 1983) (stated that over half the arrests initiated by the bureau are
by warrant, more than any other bureau in the department). [hereinafter cited as Interview].
170. Set supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Possible Benefits of Either Approach

The adoption of either approach would result in immediate benefits.
The "all" approach would encourage development of clear guidelines for the
officer on the street. This "neutral" plan would also insure the equal treatment of citizens by reducing the influence of bias and providing uniform
standards and control of police conduct. 7
The "nothing" approach, on the other hand, would help to eliminate
abuse of the stop and frisk as a pretext to search for drugs. This, in turn,
could result in better relations between citizens and the police.'
Both of these approaches could be used simultaneously by amending
the Colorado stop and frisk law 173 to exclude stops for suspicion of a possessory offense, and developing a "designed stop" plan subject to neutral and
fixed standards to be used in special cases should the need arise. A change in
the existing law that would enable police officers to work effectively while
simultaneously eliminating the abuse of the stop and frisk is long overdue.' 74
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is essential that both the criminally accused and the police know what
is expected of them; behavior constituting "good police work" one day
should not be grounds for reprimand or dismissal the next. The judiciary's
use of individualized inquiry rather than objective standard has perpetuated
confusion in this area.
People v. Thomas represents an attempt to refine the definition of reasonable suspicion in stop and frisk encounters. This attempt to clarify an objective standard for search and seizure does not alleviate problems inherent in
practical application. Implementation of either the "all" or "nothing" approach would help to eliminate arbitrary police behavior which results in
the suppression of otherwise admissible evidence.
Michelle Conklin
William Mulcahy

171.
172.
(1968).
173.

3

3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 9. (g) at 44 (Supp. 1983).
See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 157-68

COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
174. See generally D. BAYLEY & H. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA (1968) (a survey of the relationship between the Denver Police and

Minorities); Interview, supra note 169. (When Detective Costigan was asked whether Thomas
would affect stop and frisk cases he replied that it probably would affect convictions, but not
stops. The department still wants officers to stop even if it means no convictions. In fact, Detective Costigan, before this interview, had never heard of the holding in Thomas although he
personally knew the defendant as a career criminal, with many past convictions for drug related
offenses. When asked if the ruling in Thomas might encourage perjury by the police he answered in the affirmative.)

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION:

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

LIMITS THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE IN THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act)'
is to assure employees safe and healthful conditions in the workplace. 2 One
method of enforcing the safety standards set forth in the Act is through
workplace inspections conducted by Compliance Safety and Health Officers
of the Department of Labor. 3 Compliance officers, like other law enforcement officers, are constrained in the scope and mode of their searches by the
4
dictates of the fourth amendment.
One such fourth amendment constraint was announced in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. ,5 where the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment implicitly requires officers of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) to obtain search warrants prior to a nonconsensual inspection of an employer's place of business. 6 Evidence seized in
violation of this fourth amendment constraint is generally suppressed pursu7
ant to the exclusionary rule.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)). For
the legislative history set generally S. REP. No. 1292, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177-5202.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (stated purpose of the Act is to "preserve the country's
human resources"); see also Cape & Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d
1148 (1st Cir. 1975).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982). This section reads in pertinent part that "the Secretary
[of Labor], upon presenting appropriate credentials . . . is authorized-(l) to enter without
delay and at reasonable times any . . . workplace . . . and (2) to inspect and investigate ...
and to question privately ..
" Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) held this section unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspection of business premises without
a warrant or its equivalent. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1982).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the text of the fourth amendment, see in/fa note 11. See
also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957-58 (11 th Cir. 1982).
5. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
6. Id at 324-25.
7. Perhaps the most succinct definition of the exclusionary rule is found in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court, in extending the exclusionary rule to the states held "that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
On July 5, 1984, the United States Supreme Court announced three decisions that will
have a profound effect on the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155,
rev'g 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. In Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177, rtv'g and remanding 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), the
Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply where the searching officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is subsequently
found to be invalid because of a technical mistake. In Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 52 U.S.L.W. 5190 (U.S. July 5, 1984), rev;g 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983),
the Court held that a deportation proceeding is a purely civil action in which the exclusionary
rule does not apply.
There are several other situations in which illegally seized evidence will not be suppressed.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently reassessed the
imposition of the exclusionary rule in cases where evidence is seized pursuant
to an invalid warrant. In Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. ,8 the Seventh Circuit held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, subsequently found to be invalid, is admissible under the goodfath exception if the
officer acted reasonably and in good faith in conducting the
administrative
9
inspection.
In light of the Seventh Circuit's newly created limitation on the scope of
the exclusionary rule, this comment analyzes the Federal decision first, by
briefly outlining the case's relevant legal background; second, by presenting
the material facts of the case; third, by synthesizing the reasoning in both
majority and dissenting opinions; and finally, by exploring the logic of the
°
decision from constitutional, precedential, and policy perspectives.'
I. BACKGROUND

A.

ConstitutionalRequirements

The fourth amendment protects an individual's privacy expectation
against unlawful government intrusion by requiring that searches be both
reasonable and based upon probable cause. I Aside from certain exceptional situations,' 2 the search warrant is the mechanism intended to assure
that these requirements are met.' 3 Moreover, fourth amendment protections govern searches not only of individuals but also of commercial
enterprises. 14
In 1925, the Supreme Court indicated that probable cause to conduct a
See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting the use of illegally seized
evidence to impeach defendant's testimony); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)
(permitting use of illegally seized evidence when initial illegality has become attenuated);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally seized evidence excluded from state criminal proceeding not excluded from federal civil proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence not excluded at federal grand jury proceedings).
8. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. Id. at 1023.
10. A meaningful discussion of the good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence obtained in an administrative search is possible only in light of the rule's criminal law background;
therefore, this comment will also address the background of the exclusionary rule in the criminal context.
11. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See znTfa note 18.
13. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that nonconsensual warrantless
searches are presumptively invalid. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
14. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). In See the Court stated:
[T]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to
enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id at 543.
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search exists if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge
would be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that
5
the alleged illegal action is occurring in the place he intends to search.'
More than fifty years later, the Barlow's court addressed the issue of probable
cause in the administrative context by stating that it may consist of either
showing that the inspection was conducted pursuant to current administrative standards or that there existed specific evidence of the alleged violation.' 6 The Barlow's court also stated that probable cause in the criminal
law context is not required for an OSHA inspection, instead a standard less
stringent than the criminal standard would suffice.17
Apart from the limited exceptional classes of cases,' a warrantless
search has been considered inherently unreasonable.' 9 In determining
whether a warrant is a necessary safeguard for the protection of constitutional rights in the administrative search context, the Supreme Court has
weighed the public's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's privacy interest.2 0 Hence, given the lesser standard of probable
cause, and the magistrate's freedom to apply this balancing of interests, the
Supreme Court arguably grants the individual less protection under the
fourth amendment in the administrative search context than in the criminal
context.
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). A search of an automobile for
liquor, subject to seizure under the Prohibition Act, does not violate the fourth amendment if
made upon probable cause; that is, "upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.
...Id. at 149.
16. 436 U.S. at 320-21. For a more detailed discussion of probable cause see Ball, Good
Faith and the Fourth Amendment. The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionay Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
17. The Barlow's Court explained the applicable standard of probable cause as follows:
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara o. Municipal Court,
387 U.S., at 538. A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any
of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment
rights.
436 U.S. at 320-321 (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (permitting warrantless searches
of gun dealerships). Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (permitting
warrantless searches of liquor dealerships). Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978)
(permitting warrantless searches of massage parlors for building code violations).
19. Barlow'r, 436 U.S. at 312.
20. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 541 (1967). In Camara the Court
stated:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search.
Id at 534. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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The Exclusionary Rule and Its Rationale

The exclusionary rule, or suppression doctrine, is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard constitutional rights by suppressing evidence
obtained in violation of the reasonableness and probable cause requirements
of the fourth amendment. 2 ' This rule was first applied in 1914 to illegal
v. United States2 2 and was
searches conducted by federal officials in Weeks
23
applied to the states in 1961 by Mapp v. Ohio.
The exclusionary rule has been historically based on one of three rationales: to advance a personal constitutional right, 24 to preserve judicial integrity, 2 5 and most important, to deter official misconduct. 26 Recently,
however, both the personal constitutional right theory and the judicial integrity arguments have failed to persuade the Court to suppress evidence. 27 In
United States v. Calandra28 the Court elevated deterrence to prime importance
and refused to accept the dissent's assertion that the exclusionary rule inheres in the fourth amendment's limitation on unlawful searches and
seizures and is founded upon the imperative of judicial integrity.2 9 The Calandra decision laid the foundation for the current judicial trend of narrow30
ing the scope of situations in which the exclusionary rule applies.
Two years after Calandra, the Court in UnitedStates v. Janis3t refused to
apply the exclusionary rule in a federal civil tax proceeding where the evidence had been illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of a
state government. 32 In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun embarked
21. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule was first recognized by way of dictum in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).

23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
25. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 469-485 (1928) (Holmes and Brandeis J.J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488,
500-03, 441 N.E.2d 725, 737-43 (1982) (Liacos, J., concurring), rev'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S.
July 5, 1984).
26. In Calandra, Justice Powell observed:
The rule's primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960).
414 U.S. at 347. See also Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11 th Cir. 1982).
. 27. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976) (considerations ofjudicial
integrity are subordinate to deterrence and do not require exclusion of the evidence). See also S.
REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 n.21 (1983), where the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly rejected the proposition that the exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution.
28. 414 U.S 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule does not extend to grand jury proceedings).
29. Id at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is the view of Justice Brennan that the exclusionary rule enables "the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness" and
assures the people "that the government would not profit from the lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government." Id at 357.
30. See supra note 7.
31. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
32. Id at 454. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 52
U.S.L.W. 5190 (U.S. July 5, 1984), the Court held that a deportation proceeding is a purely
civil action in which the exclusionary rule does not apply. If the exclusionary rule does not
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upon an exhaustive discussion of the empirical inconclusiveness surrounding
the exclusionary rule's impact on deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct. 33 Justice Blackmun concluded that exclusion in a federal civil proceeding would be unlikely to deter unlawful but good faith conduct of state
police. 34 TheJanis holding, however, stopped short of concluding that deterrence of official abuse will never be advanced by excluding evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed in good faith but subsequently
found to be invalid.
C.

The Quasi-CriminalDistinctibn

In addition to constitutional considerations, judicial integrity, and deterrence, courts have also considered whether evidence obtained from an illegal search will give rise to a "quasi-criminal" penalty as opposed to a civil
penalty in a non-criminal case. 35 Although OSHA rarely has cause to impose criminal penalties, 36 the quasi-criminal penalties it does impose can be
severe, as exemplified by the $34,000 in penalties imposed in Federal. Generally, courts seem more willing to apply the exclusionary rule in situations
where the threatened penalty is "quasi-criminal" instead of civil. 37 Apparently, this distinction is made because "quasi-criminal" penalties may involve punishment which is comparable to or greater than some criminal
38
penalties.
The penalties which may be levied against an employer for violating
OSHA requirements are found within the Act itself.39 The plain language
of the Act distinguishes only between civil and criminal penalties 40 and
apply to deportation proceedings because they are civil actions, it should not, consequently,
apply in OSHA proceedings which are no less civil, nor more criminal, in nature than deportation proceedings.
33. Id. at 447-60.
34. d. at 454.
35. See, e.g., Savina Home Industries v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.6 (10th
Cir. 1979). The term "quasi-criminal" has been defined as relating to civil laws which, in general, "provide for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property," and the levying of punitive
"disabilities such as the loss of a professional license or public employment." Clark, Civil and
Criminal PenaltiesandForfeitures.A Frameworkfor Constitutional Anayszs, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 381
(1976). See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). "[S]uits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences [sic] against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they
are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution ....
36. The criminal penalty provided for under the Act states that:
Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order promulgated
pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this
chapter, and that violation caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $20,000
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982).
37. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-702; Savina Home Industries, 594
F.2d at 1362.
38. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 701.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1982).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982) (willful or repeated violations may be assessed a civil penalty
of not more than $10,000 for each violation). 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982) (violations causing
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makes no reference to "quasi-criminal penalties." Various commentators
and judges, however, have concluded that "penalties having both certain
41
penal and civil aspects appear on balance to be 'quasi-criminal'.
D.

The Good Faith Exception

The Federal decision assumes major administrative and constitutional
significance because it represents the first time a court has directly applied a
good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence in an administrative law
context. 42 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, if applied at
all, may apply only when an officer acts in the good faith belief that his
conduct is constitutional and where he has a reasonable basis for that belief.43 Under the good faith exception, if a judge finds that the officer reasonably conducted a search in good faith, the exception to the exclusionary
44
rule is invoked and the fruits of the invalid search are admissible.
The good faith exception was not adopted by an appellate court until
1980 when the Fifth Circuit announced the new rule in United States v. Wihams. 45 The Williams case, however, did not involve an administrative
search; rather, it involved heroin seized in a search made incidental to a
46
criminal arrest.
Judges Gee and Vance, in part two of the
'litims opinion, stated that
the evidence seized was valid regardless of whether the defendant's arrest
was technically correct. 47 The court found that "evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the
course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
' 48
mistaken, belief that they are authorized.
death may be punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or by imprisonment of not more than six
months).
41. Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule.- Should the Employer Go Free Because the Compliance
Officer has Blundered?, 1981 DUKE L.J. 667. See also Savina Home Industries, 594 F.2d at 1362 n.6
(10th Cir. 1979).
42. The exception was first recognized by way of dicta in Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC, 645
F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
43. See supra note 7. See generally Ball, supra note 16, at 635.
44. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recently issued a report on Senate Bill
1764, the Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983, which proposes to enact a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule at section 3505 of title 18, United States Code. The new section
would read:
Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence which is obtained as a result
of a search or seizure and which is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded in a
proceeding in a court of the United States if the search or seizure was undertaken in a
reasonable, good faith belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant
to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reasonable good faith belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and material misrepresentation.
S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2 (1983).
45. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1980).
46. Id. at 833.
47. Id at 840.
48. Id In a footnote, the judges elaborated upon the prerequisites for the invocation of the
exception and stated:
We emphasize that the belief, in addition to being held in subjective good faith,
must be grounded in an objective reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon
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The Williams court based its decision on the deterrence rationale stating
that the exclusionary rule exists to deter flagrant abuses of police search
power and not reasonable good-faith ones.4 9 The majority expounded upon
the 1975 Supreme Court case of Brown v. Illinois50 where Justice Powell, in a
concurring opinion, distinguished between flagrant police abuses of the
fourth amendment and mere "technical violations." 5 1 Justice Powell conceded that the fruits of an abusive or flagrant fourth amendment violation
must be surrendered to demands of judicial integrity and deterrence; however, where mere technical violations exist, neither of these considerations
justify the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence. 52 Setting forth examples of technical violations, the Williams court specifically included the
situation where an agent relies on a warrant, issued by a neutral magistrate,
which is later invalidated. 53 Two other examples of technical violations
cited by the Wiiams court include reliance on a statute which is later ruled
unconstitutional, 54 and reliance on a court precedent which is later
55
overruled.
E.

The Current Confusion

Only a handful of circuits have addressed the issue of the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in administrative searches, and among those that
recognize the applicability, even fewer have extended their analysis to include the good faith exception. In 1978, for example, the Ninth Circuit
56
suggested that the exclusionary rule does not apply to OSHA proceedings.
The court rejected the idea that the exclusion of evidence is a personal constitutional right, stating that under the particular facts of the case, the exclu57
sionary rule did not apply.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit in Savina Home Industries v. Secreta of Labor 58 suggested that the exclusionary rule could apply to
OSHA inspections violative of the warrant requirements announced in Bararticulable premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to
believe that he was acting lawfully. Thus, a series of broadcast breakins and searches
carried out by a constable-no matter how pure in heart-who had never heard of the
fourth amendment could never qualify.

Id at 841 n.4a.
49. Id at 840.
50. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
51. Id at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
52. Id
53. See Wilzams, 622 F.2d at 841.

54. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
55. Wiliazms, 622 F.2d at 841.
56. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court stated: "that the Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding suggests that the rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings." Id (citing United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); see aLro supra note 32.
57. The Ninth Circuit specifically held that retroactive application of the exclusionary rule
would have no deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct and therefore imposition of
the rule would be purposeless. Todd, 586 F.2d at 690. The court specifically stated, however,
that it did not decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply "to an OSHA search in a
proper case." Id at 691.
58. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
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low's. 59 The Savina court reasoned that, in the absence of an exclusionary
sanction, a conclusion that an inspection violated the fourth amendment
would be of no practical significance. 60 In accord with the Savina dictum is a
1982 Second Circuit opinion which stated that "the exclusionary rule can be
properly and beneficially applied in those civil proceedings where it has a
61
realistic prospect of achieving marginal deterrence."
Adding to this discordance is the inconsistency among the circuits on
the issue of whether a good faith exception applies to evidence seized illegally during an OSHA inspection. The Tenth Circuit was the first to recognize the exception, as originally stated by Williams 62 in the criminal context,
as being applicable to the administrative context. In Robberson Steel Co. v.
63
the court stated in dictum, that the good faith exception is equally
OSHRC
applicable in civil OSHA enforcement cases. 64
Shortly after Robberson, the Eleventh Circuit, in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co. ,65 analyzed an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) decision which rejected the possibility of applying the good
faith exception. 66 The court concluded that the Commission properly rejected the application of the exclusionary rule. 6 7 The court rejected the
good faith argument, at least as applied to the Sarasota facts, by distinguishing Williams on the basis that it involved a criminal rather than a civil action, and because Wilhams involved a search made incidental to an arrest,
68
not a search conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant.
II.

FACTS

Against this highly inconsistent and rapidly developing background, the
Seventh Circuit decided Donovan v. Federal ClearingDie Casting Co.. The incidents which led up to the Seventh Circuit's decision began on January 7,
1980, when Natalio Alamillo had both hands severed while working on a
punch press at the Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. (Federal). 69 Two days
later, the ChicagoSun-Times printed an article describing a twenty-three hour
operation during which surgeons reattached Alamillo's hands. The article
stated that Alamillo's family members were uncertain how the injury took
70
place; officials at Federal refused to comment on the cause of the accident.
59. Id. at 1363.

60. Id. at 1361.
61. Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1256
(1983). The Tirado court rejected the civil/criminal distinction as a basis for invoking the rule
by stating: "A test for the exclusionary rule that turns on the civil or criminal character of the
proceeding does not comport with an objective of achieving substantial deterrence." Id at 313-

14.
62. 622 F.2d at 830.
63. 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
64. Id at 22.
65. 693 F.2d 1061 (1lth Cir. 1982).
66. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (1981), affdsub nor., Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693
F.2d 1061 (llth Cir. 1982).
67. 693 F.2d at 1072 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
68. Id.
69. 695 F.2d at 1021.
70. Id. at 1026 (Pell, J., dissenting).
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On January 10, the Sun-T'mes printed a picture of the victim with the
doctor who headed the surgery team. The caption under the picture included a statement from the OSHA area director that referred to past punch
press violations found at Federal and expressed OSHA's intent to make an
"unannounced" inspection of the plant. 7 1
On the same day, an OSHA compliance officer attempted a warrantless
search of the Federal premises but was refused entry. 72 Immediately thereafter the agent sought and obtained approval of a warrant application by a
United States magistrate. 73 On the following day, OSHA agents, with warrant in hand, again attempted a search of Federal, but were again denied
entry on the ground that the warrant had been improperly issued. 74 Federal
subsequently filed a motion to quash the warrant in the district court and
75
OSHA filed a civil contempt petition against Federal.
Both matters were decided by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, which sustained the warrant's validity, found
Federal in civil contempt, and ordered the inspection of Federal's premises.76
Soon thereafter, Federal appealed the district court's decision to the Seventh
Circuit which, seventeen months later, dissolved the warrant and reversed
the ordered inspection, holding that the initial warrant had been issued
77
without probable cause.
During the interim, however, OSHA conducted a wall-to-wall inspection of Federal's premises pursuant to the district judge's order. The inspection revealed the existence of sixteen serious, five willful, five repeated, and
two other-than-serious violations. 78 As a result, OSHA proposed penalties of
$35,400. 79 Federal contested these citations and the case was docketed to be
heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ).
While this administrative case was pending, the earlier appeal to the
Seventh Circuit was decided on the issue of the warrant's validity. 0 In response, Federal filed with the administrative court a motion to suppress evidence, and in the alternative a motion to dismiss. The ALJ granted the
motion to suppress, thereby suppressing all evidence seized, and dismissed
the citations. 8 ' In ruling on the motion, the ALJ relied on Secretay ofLabor v.
71.

Brief for the Respondent at 2, Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d

1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021. The Barlow's Court discounted Congress' finding that the
success of OSHA depends upon surprise inspections, thereby creating an obvious disincentive
for businessmen to consent to warrantless inspections 436 U.S. at 319-20.
73. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021.

74. Id.
75. Brief for the Respondent at 3.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 1021 n.2. For further discussion on the OSHA penalties see 29 U.S.C. § 666
(1982) (types of violations and the amount of penalties attached thereto); 29 C.F.R. 1903.14
(1983) (issuance of citations by the Area Director and de minimus violations). See also California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
79. 695 F.2d at 1021 n.2. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15 (1983) (explanation of procedure regarding proposal of penalties).

80. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981).
81. Brief for the Respondent at 4.
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Sarasota Concrete Co. 82 which held that an ex-employee's complaint to OSHA
of a specific hazard did not establish sufficient probable cause for the issuance of an inspection warrant applicable to the entire workplace; and, there83
fore, evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant should be suppressed.
The Secretary of Labor petitioned for administrative review of the ALJ's
decision but was rejected and the decision thereby became final in the ad84
ministrative process.
The Secretary then appealed directly to the Seventh Circuit.8 5 The
appeal relied upon United States v. Williams.86 The Secretary principally argued that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because "the Secretary reasonably and in good faith believed the invalid warrant under which he
conducted his inspection was proper."' 8 7 In response, Federal argued that
the good faith exception announced in Williams did not apply in OSHA
proceedings.8
The Seventh Circuit 89 reversed the ALJ and invoked for the first time,
in an administrative law context, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court held that evidence shall not be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule when it is discovered in the course of actions taken in good
faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that the actions are
authorized. 90
III.
A.

REASONING

The Majority Opinion

Chief Judge Cummings' majority opinion held that the evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant upheld by the district court and provisionally
upheld by the court of appeals, but invalidated more than one year later,
was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 91
The opinion was primarily premised on the idea that an inspection made
pursuant to a district judge's orders amounts to a reasonable and good faith
92
inspection.
From this starting point, 93 the majority relied primarily on two cases to
arrive at its conclusion. First, the court cited Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretay of
Labor94 as authority for the proposition that the exclusionary rule should not
82. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.

83. Id.
84. 695 F.2d at 1021 nl. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1982).
85. 695 F.2d at 1021. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1982).
86. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
87. Brief for the Petitioner at 6.
88. Brief for the Respondent at 36-38.
89. Chief Judge Cummings wrote the opinion of the court in which Senior District Judge
Dumbauld joined.
90. 695 F.2d at 1023.
91. Id
92. Id at 1025.
93. The majority first rejected Federal's preliminary arguments of res judicata and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. 695 F.2d at 1022.
94. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
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be applied to OSHA proceedings. 95 Second, the court cited United States V.
Williams 96 for the proposition that a good faith exception already exists in
the criminal law arena.97 The court quoted at length from the Williams
opinion; the most relevant part stated:
[T]he exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by
police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the
rule ceases, its application must cease also. The costs to society of
applying the rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve are simply
too high ... .9
In further support of its position, the majority cited dicta from the three
paragraph opinion in Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC where the Tenth Circuit
noted that the Williams reasoning applies to civil OSHA enforcement proceedings. 99 Furthermore, the court reasoned that an application of the exclusionary rule would preclude both the issuance of an order to abate the
hazardous working conditions and the possibility of assessing subsequent enhanced penalties'0° for non-compliance with the Act. 1 1
The court also reasoned that if the exclusionary rule were applied,
OSHA might not be able to obtain a subsequent warrant because "the original probable cause might be too stale or non-existent." 10 2 Moreover, the
additional delay resulting from an application of the exclusionary rule could
allow Federal to alter or disguise the violations, thus thwarting the purpose
03
of the Act.1
The majority also noted that there are already alternatives to the exclusionary rule that serve to deter OSHA violations of an employer's constitutional rights. These include: the requirement to secure the approval of a
neutral magistrate before OSHA may inspect premises over an employer's
objections; the employer's right to move to quash a warrant prior to its execution; and, the ability of an employer to refuse entry pursuant to a warrant
04
unless the Secretary prevails in a civil contempt proceeding.'
Finally, the majority rejected as irrelevant the deterrence argument and
stated that "good-faith, reasonably based violation[s] of this type cannot be
deterred."' 1 5 The majority summed up by stating that the judicially approved inspection warrant, coupled with the delay before its execution,
"demonstrates the Secretary's good faith, the reasonableness of his belief that
10 6
the warrant was proper, and his caution before executing the warrant.'
95. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1024.

96. 622 F.2d 830.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

695 F.2d at 1023.
Id at 1023 (quoting Wdhams, 622 F.2d at 840).
Robberson, 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982).
Federal, 695 F.2d at 1024.
Id.
Id (citing Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1980)).
695 F.2d at 1024.
Id (citing United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1973)).
695 F.2d at 1024.
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The Dissenting Opinion

Judge Pell's dissent represents a more detailed analysis of the applicability of the exclusionary rule and good faith exception.' 0 7 His analysis is divided into two general parts. The first part addresses the major principles
relevant to the suppression issue,10 8 and the second part rebuts specific
points raised by the majority.' 09
Judge Pell's first major assertion was that OSHA lacked the requisite
probable cause. 1 10 He noted that neither of the two Sun-Times articles concerning the accident made any reference to culpability on anyone's part, or
to any particular OSHA violation."' Furthermore, he attacked the adequacy of the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Field
Operations Manual which provides for OSHA investigation of "accidents
involving significant publicity" as being an unreasonable administratively
created basis of probable cause. 1 2 Judge Pell argued that the only "significant" aspect of the publicity regarded the extraordinary surgical effort and
that there was not a "whisper of a basis" for OSHA concluding that the
13
accident resulted from an OSHA violation."
Judge Pell then addressed the relationship between the OSHRC and
the non-administrative federal courts. In short, he opted for deference to the
OSHRC decisions because it has special competence in the field of occupational safety and health and because a court "must therefore defer to the
findings and analysis of the Commission unless such findings are without
substantial basis in fact.""'14
Next, the dissent asserted that the evidence seized violated both statutory and constitutional restrictions."m 5 Judge Pell, in support of this contention, cited section 658(a) of the Act 1 6 for the proposition that OSHA
citations may only issue "upon inspection or investigation conducted pursuant to law."''17 He qualified the statute by quoting from the legislative history: "In carrying out inspection duties under this Act, the Secretary, of
course, would have to act in accordance with applicable constitutional protections." ' " 8 According to Judge Pell, these constitutional protections include vacating any OSHA citation not preceded by a lawfully conducted
107. Id.at 1025 (Pell, J., dissenting).
108. Id.at 1026-29.
109. Id.at 1029-33.
110. Judge Pell preliminarily maintained that the case was barred by res judicata, that the
Secretary of Labor did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and that it is not proper for a
court of appeals to "relegate the exclusionary rule to dodo status" when the Supreme Court has
not chosen to do so. Id.at 1025-26. In retrospect, Judge Pell might agree that such status has
since been conferred.
111. Id. at 1026-27.
112. Id.at 1027.
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.at 1028.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982).
117. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
118. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting) (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 38709 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger)).
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Judge Pell also strongly argued for the applicability of the deterrence
rationale by stating that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in cases
such as this will "have relatively rapid and widespread effects in ensuring
that OSHA inspections are conducted in accordance with the fourth amendment." 120 The Judge then launched into a tirade composed of one-line judicial admonitions of past OSHA misconduct, thereby making clear his belief
that OSHA had acted as unreasonably in the instant case as it had in the
past. ' 2 The exclusion of evidence therefore was necessary to deter such abusive conduct. Furthermore, Judge Pell suggested that the compliance officer
22
knew, or should have known, that his actions were unreasonable.'
In further support of his contention that OSHA acted unreasonably,
Judge Pell noted that the inspection was plant-wide and not targeted exclusively at the operation that caused injury to the victim. He thereby suggested that an OSHA inspection, prompted by a punch press injury, should
23
be restricted to that particular punch press.'
The second major part of Judge Pell's dissent responded to specific case
law tendered by the majority. For example, the dissent rejected Todd 12 4 as
not presenting any substantive authority for the proposition that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings, because Todd dis25
cussed the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in dictum only.'
By advocating use of the exclusionary rule in an OSHA search case,
Judge Pell implicitly chose not to recognize United States v. Jams 126 as creating a general bar to the exclusion of evidence in all proceedings which are
arguably civil in nature. Instead, Judge Pell argued that there is an "absence of clear-cut authority" from the Supreme Court that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings.1 2 7 The judge also alluded
to the quasi-criminal nature of the OSHA penalties as a further basis for
invoking the rule.' 2 8 The Todd dicta was ultimately dismissed by Judge Pell
29
as a "gratuitous suggestion" which "carries little weight."'
Judge Pell then turned to the keystone of the majority opinion, United
States v.

jlhams.'

30

He attacked the applicability of Wilams on two

119. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
120. 695 F.2d at 1028 (citing Secretary of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1608, 1613 (1981), afd sub. nor., Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11 th
Cir. 1982)).
121. 695 F.2d at 1028-29 (Pell, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 1029.
123. Id Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982), held that
searches prompted by an employee complaint of a specific work area must be confined to that
area and evidence obtained from areas other than those specified is subject to exclusion. Id. at
1068-70. Sarasota was not decided by the circuit court until after the Federal decision.
124. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. The Todd court held that the Barlow's decision did not have retroactive application,
586 F.2d at 689.
126. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
127. 695 F.2d at 1030 (Pell, J., dissenting); but cf.supra note 32.
128. Id. at 1032.
129. Id
130. 622 F.2d 830.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:3

grounds. First, there was no factual resemblance between the two
searches;' 3 1 one was criminal, the other civil. Second, even if the facts were
substantially similar, the instant facts failed to meet the Williams twopronged test of good faith and reasonableness: "Believing in good faith that
an accident has occurred is by no means a good faith belief that it was the
result of a safety violation."' 132 Consequently, Judge. Pell asserted that he
could not reasonably believe that on the basis of a "meager report of an
accident in a newspaper" an agent could objectively and reasonably believe
33
that a violation existed.'
Judge Pell then attacked the two Tenth Circuit cases relied upon by the
majority: 134 Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC 135 and Savina Home Industries, Inc. v.
Secretaty of Labor.136 He argued against the applicability of these cases by
pointing out that the controlling issue in both was whether Barlow's could
apply retroactively and not whether the exclusionary rule applies in non37
criminal contexts.'
Finally, Judge Pell rejected the argument that OSHA may be unable to
obtain another warrant because of staleness or non-existence of the original
violations. 138 He reasoned that OSHA is free to conduct future inspections
because there is no specific statutory time limit governing a subsequent
search other than that the search be conducted "as soon as practicable after
receiving a complaint."' 39 Therefore, if the hazardous condition has disappeared through the mere passage of time or through affirmative action,
OSHA's statutory purpose has been achieved. If, on the other hand, the
hazardous conditions have not been abated, OSHA may always conduct another inspection. 40
III.

ANALYSIS

The problem presented by Federal is one characteristic of most illegal
search cases; it depicts the conflict between the law enforcement agent's perceived need to inspect and the owner's expectation of privacy. In order to
determine whether the Federal holding is sound, this analysis approaches the
decision from constitutional, precedential, and societal (policy) perspectives.
131.

695 F.2d at 1030 (Pell, J., dissenting).

132. Id
133. Id. at 1031.
134. Id. at 1031-32.
135. 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).

136. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
137. 695 F.2d at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1032-33.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 657() (1982).
140. 695 F.2d at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting). The dissent does not adequately consider the
fact that that a man lost both of his hands, albeit temporarily, and the loss may have been
caused by the willful neglect of Federal. During the interim between accident and search,
which Judge Pell considers harmless, employers can cover up the hazard thereby avoiding any
possible penalty. Therefore, as long as an employer knows that any accident caused by a violation can be quickly covered up or corrected, there is a disincentive to comply with OSHA
standards. Hence, worker health and safety is further jeopardized and OSHA's attempt to sat-

isfy its statutory purpose is further inhibited.
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The analysis then delineates and responds to some of the major criticisms of
establishing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
A.

Constitutional,Precedentialand Societal Perspectives

Prior to Federal, evidence obtained pursuant to a nonconsensual administrative search conducted without probable cause was suppressed.1 4 Because the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had previously determined that
142
objective probable cause was lacking in the search of Federal's premise;
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was obtained illegally and ought
to have been suppressed. However, because the fourth amendment does not
itself call for exclusion of evidence, it would follow that a good faith exception to a judicial remedy is not unconstitutional.
The good faith exception realistically, will apply only upon some showing that the inspecting officer believed he acted constitutionally. The state
of mind of the investigating officer, therefore, is important when analyzing
the applicability of the good faith exception and, hence, the determination
of the probable cause the officer believed existed becomes more subjective.' 4 3 In Barlow's, the Supreme Court announced two possible grounds for
a finding of probable cause: specific evidence of an existing violation, or
showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection were satisfied. 144 Whereas Barlow's analyzed probable
cause from this objective perspective, Federal suggests that probable cause
exists if the officer acted reasonably in believing it existed given the attendant circumstances, which include both specific facts and administrative standards. In short, Federal differs from past analyses of fourth amendment
compliance because it considers the officer's state of mind.' 45
If good faith is accepted as the controlling standard, several elements
suggest that the OSHA officer in Federal acted reasonably and possessed a
141. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
142. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981) (decided
by a different panel of judges than the subsequent Federal decision, 695 F.2d 1020).
143. That is, the ostensibly reasonable mind of the reviewing judge must evaluate, to some
degree, the mind of the searching officer, as it existed at the time of the search, and the circumstances surrounding the search to determine, objectively, whether the search was reasonable.
Based on this test for reasonableness, it is understandable that one might conclude that the
creation of a good faith exception "will not dispel any confusion that now exists in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence." S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 2d Seas. 37 (1984) (minority view of
Senator Mathias on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983).
144. 436 U.S. at 320.
145. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recently rejected the notion that a good faith
exception would promote police ignorance of the fourth amendment, S. REP. No. 350, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984). In so doing, the committee quoted from Williams: "We emphasize
the belief, in addition to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in an objective
reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulable premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe that he was acting lawfully." Williams, 622
F.2d at 841 n.4a.
In the same report, however, Senator Mathias, expressing the view of the minority, asked:
"Assuming we in Congress have the power to relax the requirement of the exclusionary rule,
what message would we send to law enforcement by doing so?" S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1984). Answering his own question, Senator Mathias stated: "Our action will invite
law enforcement at all levels to regress to the days when some police departments viewed the
Fourth Amendment as a statement of principles with no practical effect." Id.
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good faith belief that his actions were constitutional-that is, he reasonably
believed his acts were based on sufficient probable cause and were objectively reasonable.
The first factor supporting the reasonableness of the officer's belief that
probable cause existed was the extremely serious character of the victim's
injury. The injury consisted of an employee having both hands cut off while
operating a punch press. 146 The fact that the victim's hands were subsequently reattached does not mitigate the seriousness of the injury. More important is the severe nature of the accident itself and the fact that such an
accident generally would not occur absent extreme carelessness by the victim
or a serious violation of safety standards by the employer. 14 7 In short, based
on the gruesome nature of the injury, the officer arguably acted reasonably
in believing that there was probable cause to inspect the Federal premises for
OSHA violations. It is unlikely, however, that the injury itself would constitute "specific evidence of an existing violation" under the Barlow's test for
probable cause. 143
A second factor is that Federal had a history of OSHA violations including punch press safety violations.t49 The inspecting compliance officer
was aware of the previous citations and included copies thereof in the application for the inspection warrant. 150 This fact, when coupled with the nature of the publicized injury, further strengthens the argument for sufficient
probable cause. t 5 ' An alternative view, as expressed in the dissenting opinion, is that the officer in his "pell-mell rush to the courthouse" violated the
agency created requirement that complaints be evaluated prior to
inspection. 152
A third important factor indicating the objective reasonableness of the
Federal search is that the compliance officer did not act alone but with the
approval of a United States magistrate.1 53 The magistrate, acting as a neutral third party, issued a warrant after determining that a search was sup146. Federal, 695 F.2d at 1021.
147. The Eleventh Circuit in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (1 th Cir.
1982), chose not to follow the Federal extention of the good faith exception. Neither the Seventh
nor Eleventh Circuit Court noted the distinction that the invalid OSHA inspection in Sarasola
uncovered twelve "non-serious" violations and did not result in monetary penalties, while the
safety violations discovered in Federal were serious and resulted in penalties of $35,400. This
distinction suggests that the magnitude of the violation may be another factor tacitly considered
by the courts when deciding whether the good faith exception applies.
148. In National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the D.C. Circuit stated that "actual occurrence of hazardous conduct is not, by itself, sufficient
evidence of a violation, even if the conduct has led to injury." Id. at 1267.
149. 655 F.2d at 797.
150. Id
151. Based on the Barlow's standards of sufficient administrative probable cause, one may
argue that a newspaper clipping is also not specific evidence of an OSHA violation. This argument, however, is countered by the fact that the second Barlows standard provides that probable cause may derive from reasonable administrative standards. See infra note 17 and
accompanying text. This standard was arguably satisfied pursuant to the Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Field Operations Manual, Ch. VIII (1983), which provides for
investigation of accidents involving "significant publicity." For a summary of the Field Operations Manual, see [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY HEALTH GUIDE (CCH)
12,808.
152. 695 F.2d at 1031 (Pell, J., dissenting).
153. 695 F.2d at 1021.
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ported by probable cause and was not unreasonable.1 54
Justice Powell, in Brown v. Illinois,' 55 advocated a "sliding scale" ap56
proach to determine whether illegally seized evidence should be excluded. 1
On one end of the scale lie flagrantly abusive fourth amendment violations
which require the exclusion sanction for deterrent purposes.157 On the other
end lie "technical" violations which describe police conduct in which abuse
or negligence is absent.1 5 d An example of a technical violation is where an
59
officer relies in good faith on a warrant which is subsequently invalidated. 1
The Federal search was held invalid, subsequent to the search, because the
warrant was issued without probable cause. Therefore, under the Brown
analysis, the violation in Federal was technical and the least serious type of
violation under Justice Powell's analysis.
In sum, the elements of probable cause in the mind of the compliance
officer, objective reasonableness, and a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate were all present in the Federal inspection. From a perspective which
holds the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to be constitutional,
the Seventh Circuit was correct in determining that the exception could apply to the Federal facts.
The majority's presumption, that a good faith exception exists, is, however, suspect from a precedential perspective. The Federal majority correctly
stated that the case was one of first impression.' 60 Prior to Federal, the good
faith exception had been recognized by a non-administrative court, in the
6
civil context, only by way of dicta.' '
The dissent correctly pointed out 1 6 2 that applying the good faith exception to the present set of facts was inconsistent with the OSHRC decision in
Secretaly of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co. ,t63 affirmed on appeal one week after
the Federal decision. 164 In Sarasota the OSHRC held that a complaint alleging specific violations does not justify an inspection of the entire work area
and the compliance officer's good faith in making a wall-to-wall search does
not preclude suppression.' 65 Affirming the OSHRC decision, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that evidence seized as a result of the wall-to-wall search
was subject to suppression and that the good faith exception as promulgated
in Wzllams did not apply.' 66 The Sarasota court chose to reject the Williams
154. Regarding the element of a neutral magistrate issuing a warrant, as the issuance relates
to probable cause, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965),
stated: "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fail." (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960)).
155. 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
156. Id at 610-12.
157. Id at 610-11.
158. I
at 611-12.
159. Id at 611.
160. 695 F.2d at 1021.
161. See Robberson, 645 F.2d 22.
162. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
163. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.
164. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
165. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608.
166. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete, 693 F.2d at 1072.
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good faith exception, 167 partly because the good faith holding in Williams
1 68
did not apply to situations where a search warrant had been obtained.
Williams was also distinguished as a criminal proceeding based on evidence
obtained pursuant to a search made incident to an arrest. In contrast, the
citations issued in Sarasota, as in Federal, were civil, or at best "quasi-criminal", and the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant which the compliance officer initially believed was valid. Thus, the Sarasota court
concluded that it was not bound to adhere to the analysis set forth in
Willhams. 169
Because the OSHRC has authority to make constitutional determinations on the act from which it was granted authority,17 0 the Federal court
might have given the OSHRC decision greater deference; however, it was
17 1
not bound to follow OSHRC's decision.
Ultimately, it must be concluded that the Federal decision was based on
inadequate precedent. However, the decision may be justified on the larger
grounds of promoting greater judicial flexibility so that OSHA may better
fulfill its statutory purpose of advancing health and safety in the workplace
without infringing unduly on the privacy expectations of employers. If it
were not for judicial innovation and flexibility the common law would stagnate hopelessly, unable to correct past mistakes and respond to new
problems. By introducing the good faith exception to administrative proceedings, the Seventh Circuit has implemented the legal philosophy espoused by the then Judge Cardozo when he wrote:
We must learn that all methods are to be viewed not as idols but as
tools. We must test one of them by the others, supplementing and
and best
reinforcing where there is weakness, so that what is1 strong
72
in each will be at our service in the hour of need.
In short, although the Federal decision was not justified by precedent, it may
be justified on the basis of responding to a need for greater flexibility in the
73
application of the exclusionary rule in the administrative search context. 1
167. Id The official Sarasota opinion stated, at 693 F.2d 1072, that twelve members of the
Williams court advocated a good faith exception. This is incorrect, thirteen members joined in
the good faith holding in Williams, 622 F.2d at 840.
168. WIlams, 622 F.2d at 840 n.l.
169. 693 F.2d at 1072.
170. See id.at 1067.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1982) (OSHRC determinations subject to review by federal courts
of appeal).
172.

B. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 103 (1924).

173. Although the privacy interests of individual defendants in the criminal context are
generally greater than those of the employer in the OSHA context, the "anti-exclusionary rule"
branch of the current court has nevertheless limited its attacks on the exclusionary rule to the
criminal context. See supra note 7; Oliver v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 4425 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1984) (Permitting warrantless searches of "open fields" leading to siezure of marijuana plants);
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 217, 2336 (1983) (White, J., concurring); See alsoStone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burger, Who will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964) (suggesting abolishment of the exclusionary rule or a limitation on its scope).
If it is accepted that one has a greater expectation of privacy in the home and person than
in the workplace, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981), then it follows that creation of a
good faith exception ought to be tested first in the OSHA context. The Supreme Court, how-
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The court in UnitedStates v. Janis 174 recognized that the determination
of whether the exclusionary rule should apply in a criminal proceeding depends upon whether the deterrent effect of the remedy outweighs the cost to
society of suppressing relevant evidence.' 75 The Federal majority did not explicitly engage in this balancing test; however, the holding implicitly indicates the belief that any possible deterrent effect would not outweigh the cost
to society of excluding reliable and probative evidence of serious OSHA violations. Similar past violations, severed hands, and $35,400 worth of current
violations undoubtedly tipped the scale in favor of the societal interests in
effective enforcement of OSHA safety standards.
Although the social implications are likely to be minimal, OSHA officers in the Seventh Circuit will probably enjoy greater success in having
evidence that conforms to the good faith requirements admitted. In turn,
this may put more pressure on employers to provide safer working conditions
for their employees and, at least in theory, the employees should enjoy safer
working conditions.
B.

Crzt'ict'sm and Response

Despite the Federal decision, the good faith exception is still the subject
of much criticism. Critics maintain that the good faith exception effectively
bypasses the only remedy available to a defendant aggrieved by a fourth
amendment violation. 17 6 As the Eleventh Circuit recognized: "if Fourth
Amendment rights are to be recognized in an OSHA context, it seems reasonable that the only enforcement mechanism developed to date should like77
wise be recognized."'
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent to United States v. Pelter 178 that the
adoption of a good faith exception will destroy the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule. 179 Justice Brennan maintained that the purpose of the
80
exclusionary rule is to deter "by removing the incentives to disregard it."'
Critics of the exception also argue that the courts are provoking a relaxation
ever, seems destined to create the exception in the criminal context where privacy expectations
are arguably greater. Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert.
granted sub norn. Massachusettes v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983) (arguments heard January
17, 1984), may prove to be the case in which the good faith exception is recognized by the
Supreme Court in the criminal context.
174. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
175. Id. at 448-49. Chief Justice Warren described this same conflict in Spano v.New York,
360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959): "we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests
of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and in its interest in preventing
the rights of the individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement."
176. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5163-71 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725, 731-36 (1982), rev'd sub nor.
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S. July 5, 1984); S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong.
30-40 (1984) (minority view of Senator Mathias on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation
Act of 1983).
177. Saraota, 693 F.2d at 1071.
178. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
179. Id at 544 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 557 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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of police awareness of fourth amendment rights.' 8 ' And the legitimate governmental interest in enforcing the Act would not be forfeited by tenaciously
requiring OSHA agents to maintain a high level of constitutional awareness
8 2
in their limited area of fourth amendment concerns.1
At least one commentator has criticized the establishment of a broad
good faith exception to technical violations of the kind involved in Federal
because it may encourage magistrate shopping in order to find the magistrate most likely to issue a warrant on weak probable cause; and also that
"good-faith" is based largely on the officer's subjective state of mind "which
is determined from his self-serving and generally uncontradicted
3
testimony." '
Proponents of the exception have also advanced alternatives to the suppression remedy, which, if implemented, could more effectively attain the
goal of deterrence. The alternative remedies include: taking civil action
against the offending officer personally or against the government; taking
criminal action against the offending officer; establishing departmental disciplinary proceedings and external review boards; and granting injunctive relief.184 None of these alternatives, however, has yet been institutionalized to
any substantial degree. Nor does it seem likely that they will become readily
available in the foreseeable future.
The adoption of a good faith exception, however, does not spell doom
for employers' fourth amendment rights primarily because the reasonableness and good faith requirements provide built in definitional protections
which necessarily guard against flagrant constitutional violations.
In short, the good faith exception, when applied in the OSHA context,
on a case by case basis, and combined with reliable alternative remedies to
exclusion, may create the desirable effect of allowing into evidence reliable
and probative evidence of OSHA safety violations. While making the evidence admissible, the exception will simultaneously deter flagrant abuses of
the inspection power, and preserve the privacy interests of employers. The
administrative arena seems best suited to test a good faith exception because
the privacy expectation is arguably less substantial than that at stake in
criminal searches. The Supreme Court, however, disagrees.' 85
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit's -holding in Federal established for the first time the
good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence obtained by an OSHA
compliance officer in violation of the fourth amendment. In order for the
181. See Ball, supra note 16, at 656.
182. See Trant, supra note 41, at 716.
183. Id at 708-09.

184. See id. at 710-15 (criticisms of alternatives also presented). See also Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment.- The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT.REV. 89; Roche, A Viable Substitutefor the Exclusionag
Rule. A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1973); Wilkey, Constitutional
Alternatives to the Exclusionay Rule, Exclusionary Rule Symposium, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 531 (1982); Comment, The FederalInjunction as a Remedy for UnconstitutionalPolce Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
185. See supra note 7.
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exception to apply, the'officer must conduct the inspection in good faith and
in the reasonable belief that his actions are authorized.' 8 6 The Federal holding, however, conflicts with a factually similar Eleventh Circuit case where
the court chose not to adopt the good faith exception given the record before
it, and instead suppressed the illegally obtained evidence.' 8 7 Although the
Federal case is representative of the current judicial trend of narrowing the
exclusionary rule's applicability, 188 the decision's impact will remain uncertain outside the Seventh Circuit until the Supreme Court first decides
whether the exclusionary rule applies as a remedy in cases where OSHA
commits fourth amendment infractions.1 89 Given the recent emasculation of
the exclusionary rule, 190 it would be logical for the Court to create a general
bar to the-exclusion of evidence in OSHA proceedings; however, it seems
unlikely that the Court will be as willing to admit probative evidence against
employers as it is against criminal defendants and illegal aliens.
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